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Abstract 
      
      This thesis considers armour and infantry unit organization and 
structure in the British Army during the Second World War, specifically 
in Montgomery‟s 21st Army Group in North-West Europe.  The strengths 
and weaknesses of how corps and divisions responded to Montgomery‟s 
command system – and in particular the commonality of doctrinal 
practice – has become an issue of debate among historians.  This thesis 
examines and analyses the factors that produced both an effective 
weapon and a functional doctrine for combining armour and infantry.  It 
does this by tracking how 21st Army Group moved from „anarchy‟ to 
„problem solving‟ under Montgomery‟s direction. 
     It shows that far from being either authoritarian or anarchic, 
Montgomery‟s ultimate command system actually encouraged 
commanders to use their initiative within the goals set out by 
Montgomery in late 1944 in a series of pamphlets.  He believed in the 
imposition of doctrine, but this overlooks mid-July to end-of-September 
1944 when he was open to the „bubble-up‟ of new ideas: albeit post-
pamphlets the subsequent price of uniformity of doctrine was a certain 
apparent inflexibility.  By late 1944 when Montgomery‟s 21st Army 
Group „stood at the door of Germany‟, armour-infantry co-operation 
practice is shown to have involved the coordination of armour originally 
intended to play different roles; infantry, and artillery on the basis of 
commonly agreed upon understandings which had been reached by an 
essentially collaborative process.  Once set out in Montgomery‟s 
pamphlets, however, no deviation from this framework was 
subsequently permitted.  Simultaneously, success in action depended 
on commanders exercising their initiative to be proactive to a greater 
extent than has hitherto been suggested: Montgomery wanted to 
constrain choices yet he allowed armoured commanders enough 
freedom of action to respond to challenges within the „master plan‟.   
     This thesis thus makes an original contribution to the debate on 
Montgomery‟s command style, and its consequences, and more widely 
on the role of a great commander.    
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
     The ability of 21st Army Group to integrate its combat arms has not 
yet been fully explored and satisfactorily explained.  In particular, this is 
true with respect to its ability to reach a common understanding of how 
the traditionally understood role of armoured divisions was to be unified 
with the traditional infantry tank role.  The former‟s role was principally 
to provide for fast moving exploitation after a breakthrough, while the 
latter‟s was to support the infantry in breaking into and consolidation.  
The new unified role was that armour should be equally capable of 
performing both or either roles (see Appendix I).  This study examines 
and analyses the factors that produced a functional doctrine for armour, 
infantry and associated instruments and did just what was necessary to 
bring them „up to scratch‟.  Thus, this thesis is concerned with armour-
infantry organization and structure in the British Army in the Second 
World War, in particular with regard to Bernard Law Montgomery‟s 21st 
Army Group in North-West Europe, 1944-45.  It is specifically concerned 
with the British contribution to this Anglo-Canadian army group.     
     The traditional British understanding of the roles of both arms of 
British armoured warfare – the independent tank and armoured 
brigades which had the role of close infantry support, and the armoured 
divisions which were intended by the War Office to incorporate a more 
mobile role – needed to be reconciled with the requirements of the 
changing operating environments of North-West Europe.  The effect is 
not at issue, but views of Montgomery‟s leadership and command range 
between two apparently opposed views which have emerged: one that he 
was an authoritarian top-down leader and commander who imposed his 
views, and the second that the British Army in Normandy under his 
command suffered from, or some would say revelled in and benefited 
from, doctrinal indiscipline.  This thesis will address the issue of how 
and when 21st Army Group moved from doctrinal „anarchy‟ to problem 
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solving under Montgomery‟s direction, and who else – if anyone – may 
have been involved in the process.  
     Thus, it examines operational development, innovation and 
command-and-control in this army group in order to explore how units 
and formations actually worked to solve tactical problems on the 
ground.  At issue are the development of ideas among Montgomery and 
his subordinates at a high level in 21st Army Group about how the 
problems of fighting with armour and infantry should be tackled and the 
practice of combining or integrating armour and infantry by „their‟ army 
group.  These then translate back down into lower-level commanders‟ 
decisions on when, where and how to fight with infantry and armour at 
the divisional and brigade levels.  Thus the thesis investigates how a 
group of „effervescent‟ commanders interrelated, and what the effect of 
those inter-relationships was in the formulation of a workable doctrine.   
 
 
 
 
     While the literature on Montgomery, 21st Army Group and the 
campaign in Europe is extensive, attention has re-focused, or become 
more sharply focused on doctrine.   
     Military doctrine is the understanding of the methods of actual 
fighting accepted at any given time.  Doctrine, it has been said, ensures 
– or should ensure – that „everyone knows the right thing to do and that 
they all do the same things in the same circumstances‟.1  Doctrine can 
thus be considered the „synapse‟ connecting the working of strategy 
across the levels of war.  It is intended to be the vital articulation 
between previous thinking, past experience and the present military 
problem to be solved.  It is, therefore, not fixed or immutable but rather 
something which can change or move all the time.  Output of doctrine – 
the methods of actual fighting – was continually moving as commanders 
struggled to adjust doctrine to the correct lessons from operations.  The 
two processes worked together at the operational level.  It has become 
very much an established way of analysing war to divide it into levels, 
                                                          
1
 J. Gooch, preface to T. Harrison Place, Military Training in the British Army, 1940-1944: 
From Dunkirk to D-Day (London: Frank Cass, 2000), viii. 
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strategy and tactics being the other two.  However, they are rather 
artificial levels.  In practice, they bleed into one another.  The 
operational level of war concerns the activities of armies and corps. How 
a campaign is fought is determined at this level.  It is also an interface 
which connects individual, tactical battles with overall strategic aim and 
intentions.  Thus, it should be noted that the terms operational and 
operational command as used here are not specific to corps 
commanders only but apply also to the commanders of divisions and 
brigades to the extent that they were „concerned with the direction of 
military resources to achieve the objectives of military strategy‟ at their 
level.2  
     The literature on Montgomery and 21st Army Group has gone 
through several phases over time, providing alternative explanations of 
how he commanded and the doctrinal basis of this Army Group‟s 
activities.  Initially, the late 1940s saw the publication of a large number 
of typically uncontroversial British unit and formation histories and 
personal accounts.3  Then, several American accounts appeared that 
focused on the 1944-45 inter-Allied disputes over strategy and 
command and seemed to threaten the respect on the British side for 
Montgomery‟s prowess.4  For a long time, the 1944-45 disputes between 
                                                          
2
 Ministry of Defence, Design for Military Operations – The British Military Doctrine, 
(London: HMSO, 1989), p.38.  
3
 Exemplified by: Anon [Maj. E. Palamountian], Taurus Pursuant: A History of the 11th 
Armoured Division, (privately published, Germany, c.1945); Anon, Summary of Operations 
June 1944-1945: 49 (West Riding Reconnaissance Regiment, Royal Armoured Corps 
(privately published, Neuenkirchen, [Germany], May 1945; Anon [Lieut-Col.  J.G. Hooper], 
The River Rhine to the Baltic Sea: Operations of VIII Corps, March-May 1945 (privately 
published, Hamburg, [Germany], July 1945); Anon [Brigadier W.S. Clarke], The Story of 
34th Armoured Brigade (privately published, Germany c.1945); Anon [? Maj. G. Courage], 
„Campaign Diary‟: The 15th/19th The King‟s Royal Hussars, North-West Europe, 1944-45 
(privately published, 15th/19th H RHQ Palestine, 1946); A. Borthwick, Battalion: A British 
Infantry Unit‟s Actions from El Alamein to the Elbe 1942-44 (London: Bâton Wicks, 2001 
[1946]); Brig. M. Carver, The History of 4th Armoured Brigade (privately published, 
Gluckstadt, [Germany], 1945/Aldershot: Gale & Polden, 1945); J. Forbes, 6th Guards Tank 
Brigade: The Story of Guardsmen in Churchill Tanks (Sampson Low, Marsden, [n.d.]); 
Lieut.-Col. G.S. Jackson, Operations of Eighth Corps: Normandy to the River Rhine 
(London: St Clements Press, 1948); M. Lindsay, So Few Got Through: With the Gordon 
Highlanders from Normandy to the Baltic (Barnsley: Leo Cooper, 2001 [1946]); Capt. J. 
Stirling, D-Day to VE-Day from My Tank Turret: A Personal Account, written between D-
Day 1944 and May 1945 (privately published by the author, Axbridge BS26 2LN, [n.d.]).   
4
 The most important were Eisenhower‟s and that of Brigadier General W. Bedell Smith, his 
chief of staff: Gen. D.D.Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe (London: Heinemann, 1948) and 
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American and British commanders (Eisenhower and Montgomery) would 
be reprised by many American and British scholars.  The publication of 
the American and British national, official histories, however, saw 
stakeholders united against the perceived threat of Soviet aggression.  In 
these histories the relative strengths of armies were measured 
quantitatively.  There was little attempt to appraise combat performance 
for reasons having to do with Cold War ideological imperatives.  During 
the 1950s and 1960s, a school of British historical writing developed 
that sought, mainly through operational narratives, to refute American 
criticism of Montgomery and to emphasise the achievements of 21st 
Army Group in the wider Allied campaign.  Narratives including the 
Official British History, by Ellis, and its forerunner by North, put 
forward the view that the performance of 21st Army Group gave „little 
occasion for adverse criticism‟.5  A study of Montgomery‟s career stated 
that: „Britain was splendidly served by the men Montgomery put in 
charge of his corps and divisions‟.6  The Official History‟s narrative had 
little to say about issues of command and control, or experience, or 
what had been learned in 21st Army Group since D-Day.  Wilmot, 
however, was more critical of British „drive‟.7  Thus, there was little 
attempt at this stage to appraise operational development, or innovation 
and command in 21st Army Group objectively.   
     By the 1980s, a new wave of interpretations began to appear.  
Historians began, for almost the first time, to go into specifics on the 
Western Allies‟ armies‟ capabilities and performances in the North-West 
Europe campaign, and at the same time to posit multi-factorial 
explanations of outcomes.  The historiography entered a new phase, one 
of objective reconsideration, as this new wave of interpretations 
emerged, for example, the work of Weigley, D‟Este, Hastings, Lamb, and 
                                                                                                                                                                    
Brig. Gen. W. Bedell Smith, Eisenhower‟s Six Great Decisions: Europe 1944-45 (New 
York: Longmans, Green, 1956).   
5
 Maj. L.F. Ellis, Victory in the West, vol. I: The Battle of Normandy, vol. II: The Defeat of 
Germany, History of the Second World War, UK Military Series (London: HMSO, 1962, 
1968); J. North, North-West Europe, 1944-45: The Achievement of 21st Army Group 
(London: HMSO, 1953).  See, for example, Ellis, Victory in the West: Normandy, p.491. 
6
 R. Lewin, Montgomery as Military Commander  (London: Batsford, 1971), p. 265. 
7
 R.W.W. „Chester‟ Wilmot, The Struggle for Europe (London: Collins, 1952). 
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Millett and Murray.8  The centre ground of the earlier debate, that is the 
disputes over theatre strategy, gave way to new considerations and new 
questions.  For the first time, historians attempted to appraise the 
British senior command, in most cases coming to rather negative 
conclusions and disparaging the performance of the British contribution 
to 21st Army Group. 
     For Max Hastings, „the focus of debate about [...] disappointments in 
Normandy should not be upon Montgomery [...] but upon the 
subordinate commanders and formations who fought the battles.‟9  In 
Normandy, D‟Este argued, „both Montgomery and Dempsey were 
altogether too considerate in retaining commanders who did not 
measure up‟, while „Montgomery‟s frequent habit of bypassing Dempsey 
to give orders directly to his own subordinates also, at times, limited 
subordinates‟ freedom to exploit opportunities for a breakthrough and 
show that they could „measure up‟.10  Even in his most recent work on 
the war in Europe, Hastings still argues that the British had only one 
corps commander – Horrocks – „who could be considered competent‟.  At 
divisional level too, Hastings holds that British general officers did not 
match those of America or Germany.11  
     Also in the 1970s and 1980s there were the revelations of the secret 
of „Ultra‟ code-breaking.12  The help which the most senior Allied 
commanders had known that they were receiving from the code-
breakers at Bletchley Park included being able to read certain types of 
German messages.  This revelation contributed to the scrutiny and the 
                                                          
8
 R.E. Weigley, Eisenhower‟s Lieutenants: The Campaigns of France and Germany, 1944-
45 (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1981); C. D‟Este, Decision in Normandy: The 
Unwritten Story of Montgomery and the Allied Campaign (London: Collins, 1983); M. 
Hastings, Overlord: D-Day and the Battle for Normandy (London: M. Joseph, 1984; Pan, 
1999); R. Lamb, Montgomery in Europe: Success or Failure? (London: Buchan & Enright, 
1983) and Military Effectiveness, vol. I: The First World War, vol. II: The Interwar Period, 
vol. III: The Second World War, ed. by  A.R. Millett and W. Murray (Boston: Unwin 
Hyman, 1988).  
9
 Hastings, Overlord, p.172. 
10
 D‟Este, Decision in Normandy, pp. 289, 352 and 388. 
11
 M. Hastings, Armageddon: The Battle for Germany 1944-45 (London: Macmillan, 2004), 
p. 32. 
12
 Examples of this genre include: R. Lewin, Ultra Goes to War (New York: McGraw-Hill, 
1978); also R. Bennett, Ultra in the West: The Normandy Campaign 1944-45 (London: 
Hutchinson, 1979), the secret having been revealed by Winterbotham in The Ultra Secret 
(1974).  
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revision of the uncritical acclaim which they had previously received.  
However, whether the fact that commanders could read this intelligence 
made their day-to-day decision taking substantively easier or more 
difficult is moot: they certainly had a great deal more information on 
which to make their decisions.  Arguably, while the information was 
often useful in major campaign movements this was not always the case 
later in the campaign in the battle for Germany: for example „Ultra 
provided very little operational intelligence during the Veritable action‟ 
and it helped other levels of command little with the small-unit-type 
defence with which 21st Army Group had to contend in early 1945.13   
     By the early 1990s, most historians of the campaign accepted that – 
for reasons that were many and complex, and not always clear – British 
performance in combat on occasions left much to be desired.  Many 
interpretations focused on combinations of factors which to a greater or 
lesser degree included an alleged dearth of operational and tactical skills 
combined with an aversion to risk-taking on the part of British 
divisional generals compounded, more often than not by Montgomery‟s 
over-control.  However, there were counter arguments that represented 
a challenge to the revisionist paradigm – many from surviving 
participants.14  Most, to some degree, held that British quantitative 
superiority was pitted against German qualitative superiority 
(particularly in the case of their most modern armour) and that this, and 
the other factors (including much of the terrain of the Normandy 
countryside) which contributed to the difficulties of conducting offensive 
operations, invalidates the criticism levelled against British troops and 
their commanders. 
     Historians today seek to provide fuller explanations of British 
operational and tactical failure and success in North-West Europe, for 
example Murray and Millett, Stephen Hart, French, Harrison Place, 
                                                          
13
 Bennett, Ultra in the West, p.216; R. Bennett, „Ultra and some Command Decisions‟, 
Journal of Contemporary History, 16 (1981): 131-151 (p.141).  
14
 Exemplified by K. Tout, Tank: 40 Hours in Normandy (London: Robert Hale, 1985), 
Tanks, Advance! (London: Robert Hale, 1987) and also P. Delaforce‟s divisional histories, 
such as Black Bull: From Normandy to the Baltic with the 11th Armoured Division (Stroud: 
Sutton, 1993).  
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Jarymowycz, Russell Hart, Copp, and Buckley.15  There has been a 
swing back to the view that the performance of Montgomery‟s army 
group has been greatly underrated.  An important expression of this 
view is in Copp‟s two books on the campaign which, although on the 
Canadians, have much to say about doctrine, structures and issues 
relating to the British.  In particular, he cites the Simonds operational 
policy document from February 1944.16  In the context of the creation of 
the doctrine the British and Canadians would employ in Normandy, 
Simonds‟s directive is highly informative.  Simonds took the best 
available „policy‟ and wrote it up, undoubtedly directed at lower level 
commanders, putting it together with what can be seen as an attempt by 
the Canadian commander to relate tactical doctrine and strategic aims 
and intentions in some determination of „how we will fight‟.  If the 
evidence for the view that the performance of British troops has been 
greatly underrated is to be definitely established however, Copp 
concedes that  
a great deal of work needs to be done [;] we need studies of 
the British Army at corps, divisional and brigade level so 
that we have a firm base for addressing questions about 
leadership, command, combat motivation and combat 
effectiveness.17 
The collection in which Copp‟s chapter is published, however, just 
focuses on Normandy, which essentially was a period of learning and 
experimentation with the new methods.  It does not – by definition – deal 
with the later institutionalization of the lessons learned which happened 
                                                          
15
 W. Murray and A.R. Millett, A War To Be Won: Fighting the Second World War 
(Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 2000);  S. Hart, Montgomery and “Colossal Cracks”: The 
21st Army Group in Northwest Europe, 1944-45 (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2000); D. French, 
Raising Churchill‟s Army: The British Army and the War against Germany, 1919-45 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000); Harrison Place, Training in the British Army, 40-
44; R.J. Jarymowycz, Tank Tactics: From Normandy to Lorraine (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 
2001); R. Hart, Clash of Arms: How the Allies Won in Normandy (London: Lynne Rienner, 
2001); T. Copp, Fields of Fire: The Canadians in Normandy (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 2003) and Cinderella Army: The Canadians in Northwest Europe (Toronto: 
Toronto University Press, 2006), and J. Buckley, British Armour in the Normandy 
Campaign 1944 (London: Cass, 2004) and The Normandy Campaign 1944: Sixty Years On, 
ed. by J. Buckley (London: Routledge, 2006).    
16
 Simond‟s „Operational Policy – 2 C[ana]d[ia]n Corps‟ document is reproduced in 
Appendix A in T. Copp, Fields of Fire. 
17
 T. Copp, „The 21st Army in Normandy: Towards a new balance sheet‟, in Normandy: 
Sixty Years On, ed. by J. Buckley, pp. 11-21 (pp. 11 and 19). 
8 
 
after Normandy and can be shown to have continued until the end of 
the war.  Questions as to why difficulties such as those experienced in 
combining combat arms together existed; whether they were solvable, or 
solved in particular have become major bones of contention.  The 
volume of the historiography relating to Montgomery‟s ability and 
authority doctrinally as Commander, 21st Army Group reflects both the 
scholastic importance and the intensity of the debate about the subject.   
     Published first-hand accounts by senior commanders who are 
significant for this thesis by virtue of the specific contributions they 
made constitute a higher-level narrative of considerable importance.18 
Although „lower level‟ narratives, of which there were many published 
around 2000 and in immediately subsequent years, can be used as a 
source of information inter alia about what happened on the ground, 
they can also be used to provide insight into the technical difficulties of 
conducting operations by those who worked to solve tactical problems at 
the small unit level.19  Further, they contribute usefully to the debate 
not only at the level of detail but also where and when they comment 
upon the practical implications of command decisions and working 
practices.  
     Hart‟s work played a pivotal role in moving discourse beyond the 
revisionism of the 1980s and 1990s.  He stresses the impact that 
manpower shortages and concerns over troop morale exerted on 
Montgomery‟s generalship, and argues that, when these factors are 
considered, it is clear that he handled 21st Army Group in North-West 
                                                          
18
 Accounts by individuals who were corps, armoured division or independent armoured 
brigade commanders in the campaign are: Maj.-Gen. A.H.S. Adair, A Guards‟ General: The 
Memoirs of Major General Sir Allan Adair BT, GCVO, CB, DSO, MC, JP, DL (London: 
Hamish Hamilton, 1986); FM Lord Carver, Out of Step: The Memoirs of a Field Marshal 
London: Hutchinson, 1989); Lieut.-Gen. Sir B.G. Horrocks, A Full Life (London: Collins, 
1960), and, with E. Belfield and Maj.-Gen. H. Essame, Corps Commander (London: 
Sidgwick & Jackson, 1977)  and Maj.-Gen. G.P.B. Roberts, From the Desert to the Baltic 
(London: William Kimber, 1987.  
19
 For example: Bill Bellamy, Troop Leader: A Tank Commander‟s Story (Stroud: Sutton, 
2005); R. Boscawen, Armoured Guardsmen: A War Diary, June 1944-April 1945 (Barnsley: 
Leo Cooper, 2005); C. Farrell, Reflections 1939-45: A Scots Guards Officer in Training and 
War (Edinburgh: Pentland Press, 2000); S. Hills, By Tank into Normandy: A Memoir of the 
Campaign in North-West Europe from D-Day to VE Day (London: Cassell, 2002); S. Jary, 
18 Platoon (Carshalton Beeches, Surrey: Sydney Jary, 1987); Maj.-Gen. R. Leakey, with 
Col. G. Forty, Leakey‟s Luck: A Tank Commander with Nine Lives (Stroud: Sutton, 1999); P. 
White, With the Jocks: A Soldier‟s Struggle for Europe (Stroud: Sutton, 2001).   
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Europe more effectively than many scholars have suggested. Hart 
argues that the generalship of Montgomery‟s subordinate army and 
corps commanders was „highly competent‟, and that their methods 
„mirrored‟ those of Montgomery.20  He is at pains to emphasise „the 
extent of consensus that existed within 21st Army Group concerning 
operational techniques‟.21  Hart‟s more recent work concentrates on 
Montgomery and his two subordinate Army commanders.  He analyses 
the operational methods used by Montgomery, Lieutenant-General M.C. 
Dempsey and Lieutenant-General H.D.G. Crerar.  He argues that 21st 
Army Group conducted this campaign more effectively than some 
scholars had argued previously and that the generalship of Montgomery 
and his two subordinate army commanders was „both appropriate and 
competent‟. He points out that:  
This assertion combines two interconnected subarguments: 
first, that Montgomery handled the 21st Army Group more 
appropriately than some of the existing literature has 
recognized; and second, that historians can only appreciate 
fully how the 21st Army Group conducted the campaign by 
examining its two highest command echelons rather than 
by focusing solely on Montgomery.22 
  Hart does not, however, provide an integrated operational analysis at 
the corps and divisional levels, as he recognises.23  Focussing only at the 
army commanders and „operational‟/corps commander level (as in the 
case of Hart) cuts out the lower and middle levels of command, where as 
this thesis will show it can be demonstrated that thoughts and actions 
also eventually influenced strategy.  While Hart‟s work, self-evidently 
attaches little importance to the lower (tactical levels) of command in 
shaping doctrinal practice, that of Buckley by contrast arguably 
attributes much: „the 8th Army‟s method of integrating tanks and 
infantry, for example, was soon seen to be unworkable and was quickly 
replaced by other tactics, often methods developed in Normandy 
                                                          
20
 S. Hart, „Field Marshal Montgomery, 21st Army Group, and North West Europe, 1944-
45‟ (doctoral thesis, University of London, 1995), p. 285. 
21
 Ibid., p. 290. 
22
 Hart, Montgomery and “Colossal Cracks”, 44-45, p. 2. 
23
Ibid., pp. 1 and 2.   
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between armour and infantry commanders following experience in 
battle‟.24  
     Buckley challenges the revisionist view of Normandy as a failure for 
British armour.  His starting point is that too much previous analysis 
has assumed failure simply because it not follow the pattern set by the 
Germans in 1939-42.  Buckley basically accepts the argument that the 
doctrine inculcated in training in the UK prior to D-Day was sometimes 
flawed and at times quite damaging.  The most notable example of this 
was the attempt by Montgomery to impose his view of infantry-tank co-
operation tactics upon 21st Army Group following his appointment in 
1943.25  Thus, Montgomery‟s failure to impose a common interpretation 
of doctrine would appear to be due in part at least (although there was 
more to it than this) to the unwillingness of his senior and intermediate 
commanders to deviate from their rigorous training.  Nevertheless, 
Buckley argues that both independent brigades and divisional brigade 
groups had developed workable tactics for infantry-armour co-operation 
by the mid-point of the campaign in Normandy.26  The British Army‟s 
approach was to be „flexible and non-dogmatic‟.  Montgomery‟s attempts 
to eliminate any potential confusion by having one straightforward 
doctrine came at the price of inflexibility.  However, although 
Montgomery‟s 8th Army doctrine did have a deleterious impact, this was 
less damaging than it might have been because of unit and formation 
commanders‟ discretion.  Thereafter: „what some have argued was a 
weakness in the [...] approach to doctrine – indiscipline – was to prove a 
considerable advantage for the armoured units as they attempted to 
grapple with the operational difficulties thrust upon them by the 
Normandy campaign‟.27  Montgomery‟s failure to impose a top-down 
dominance created a situation in which everybody was in charge of his 
own doctrine.  However, this was not the case by late 1944.      
     French and Harrison Place offer apparently contradictory 
interpretations of how Montgomery commanded and the commonality – 
                                                          
24
 Buckley, British Armour, Normandy, 44, p.212-213.  
25
 Ibid., pp. 5 and 212. 
26
 Ibid., p. 102; Buckley, in Normandy: Sixty Years On, ed. by J. Buckley, p. 87. 
27
 Buckley, in Normandy: Sixty Years On, ed. by J. Buckley, p. 80. 
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or otherwise – of doctrinal practice.  French exemplifies further the shift 
away from defining combat capability solely in terms of available combat 
power, that is by numbers of units or volumes of equipment, toward a 
definition which focuses on the complex interaction of conceptual, 
material, and moral elements.  He continues: „but combat capability not 
only depends on how these elements interact with each other; it also 
depends on how together they synergise with enemy forces‟.28  French 
seeks to provide an explanation of British operational and tactical 
failure and success against the German Army in the Second World War.  
His argument may be summarized as follows.  In the 1920s and 1930s, 
the leadership of the British Army‟s solution to problem of military 
success at the level of major warfare without the heavy losses sustained 
in the First World War was a conception of fighting that was 
technologically progressive and tactically innovative – that is, it 
embraced wholly motorized and a limited mechanized mobility and the 
necessity of combined arms operations.  However, the army entered the 
Second World War with neither the necessary equipment nor an 
appropriate doctrine to properly implement this vision.  Moreover, 
prevailing culture and attitudes left inculcation of the army‟s 
understanding of the methods of fighting and training to achieve a 
sufficient level of fighting capability to the discretion of unit 
commanding officers.  French asserts the British Army‟s commitment to 
„autocratic, top-down managerial control‟.29  Flowing from this assertion, 
he is much concerned with formal interactions and institutional 
relationships and has little to say about the interplay and 
interrelationships between protagonists at the different levels.   
     There is wide agreement that the ability to conduct combined arms 
warfare was vital to success for major armies in the Second World 
War.30  Indeed, it has been argued that „the [British] army‟s integration 
of combat arms raises the most serious questions about British 
                                                          
28
 French, Raising Churchill‟s Army, 1919-45, p. 11. 
29
 Ibid. p. 283. 
30
 J.M. House, Combined Arms Warfare in the Twentieth Century (Lawrence: University 
Press of Kansas, 2001). 
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operational effectiveness [in the Second World War]. 31  French states 
clearly that the British Army failed to use their tanks „in co-operation 
with other arms‟ and that it was „not until the middle of the Normandy 
campaign that the army finally abandoned the last remnants of its pre-
war conviction that tanks and infantry within armoured divisions could 
and should operate separately‟.32  French gives much of the credit for 
this and other improvements of the army‟s fighting capability later in the 
Second World War to Montgomery.  Montgomery 
did not create the army‟s operational doctrine, but he did 
insist that formations under his command practised a 
common interpretation of it. The outcome was that by the 
second half of the war, the British possessed what was in 
some respects a military machine capable of considerable 
flexibility on the battlefield.33   
Contrarily, Harrison Place, exploring the doctrine and training for attack 
at the unit, or minor tactical level argues that „unsteady though progress 
towards a well-founded tactical method was before 1944, the process 
degenerated into a shambles when Montgomery began to throw his 
weight about 21 Army Group‟.34  While Harrison Place concedes that it 
would be unfair to blame Montgomery entirely for the tactical errors into 
which tank-infantry co-operation fell, he argues that Montgomery‟s 
intervention to change established practice before D-Day made the 
situation worse.  However, „the problem facing 21 Army Group was not 
merely a matter of bad doctrine; it was also a matter of doctrinal 
indiscipline [...] units and formations pleased themselves when it came 
to tank-infantry co-operation tactics‟.35   
     Buckley seems to be saying that the two opposing interpretations 
cannot be reconciled, and it might thus be assumed that he has 
therefore chosen to come at the issue from a new direction.  Buckley 
does, however, represent a helpful jumping off point for this thesis, in 
effect coming to some sort of a mid-point position between these two 
schools of historiography.  This helps us to understand and focus on the 
                                                          
31
 W. Murray, „British Military Effectiveness in the Second World War‟, in Millett and 
Murray, Military Effectiveness: Second World War, p. 110.    
32
 French, Raising Churchill‟s Army, 1919-45, pp. 221 and 269.  
33
Ibid., p. 261. 
34
 Harrison Place, Training in the British Army, 40-44, p.154. 
35
 Ibid., p. 164. 
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dimensions of the problem.  The weighting that should be given to 
Montgomery‟s role remains unclear, however: as does how, when, and to 
what effect corps, divisions and brigades responded to Montgomery‟s 
command system.  What is left unresolved by Buckley‟s contribution, 
therefore, is what weight to actually give Montgomery in the outcome.  
Buckley does not tell us about the management process.   
     As the lessons of Normandy began to be disseminated within 21st 
Army Group, Montgomery‟s pamphlets of late 1944, especially Some 
Notes on the Conduct of War and The Infantry Division in Battle and The 
Armoured Division in Battle, became part of the ongoing process.  This 
process has been extensively examined by historians, yet the importance 
of Montgomery‟s pamphlets as a record of this process has often been 
neglected.  It is not to be argued that the pamphlets were driving 
doctrine; rather they were a documentation of what corps and division 
commanders were already practicing.   
     Montgomery‟s pamphlets appeared on a scene where there were and 
would continue to be War Office publications in a number of series.  
Nevertheless, what happened in 21st Army Group in late 1944 and 1945 
was that subordinates, now steeped in ideas which Montgomery believed 
had come to be accepted as the right ones, adopted „his‟ methods.  The 
first three months of 1945 were then a period of testing and a settling in 
period; of the new and old offensive techniques, the context or backdrop 
for which was the advance to the Rhine and preparation for the final 
assault on Germany.  By the time of the assault across the Rhine, at the 
end of this period, the situation was that all commanders were 
conducting the campaign in this new way for 21st Army Group‟s final 
advance to the Baltic and the Elbe.  The methods of armoured warfare 
in North Africa had been found not to be applicable in North-West 
Europe and had been replaced.   
     Montgomery believed that these new methods should be in 
commanders‟ minds as a kind of mental map which actually supplied a 
very narrow range of options by which commanders could orientate 
themselves into situations, that is a framework for action which also 
carried the negative sanction of dismissal if commanders did not 
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attempt to comply with it.  Thus, while commanders could and did have 
an informed pragmatism – indeed were encouraged to use their initiative 
which would allow commanders orientational precision of thought as to 
what were the really important factors at any one time, and a general 
permission to act accordingly – Montgomery felt he had to continue to 
keep a tight grip on what was going on underneath him in terms of 
command.   
     In short, if the questions raised by the literature are consolidated 
and rephrased to ask: how did Montgomery‟s process of command 
function to move from a situation of doctrinal anarchy as identified by 
Harrison Place (back) to one of doctrinal uniformity, as argued by 
French; then it may be resolved.  We know this doctrinal anarchy ceased 
to be the case by the mid-point of the Normandy campaign (sic. 
Buckley).  Asking this question in this way, it is anticipated, will resolve 
the apparently irresolvable issue of the relationship between the 
authoritarian command style of Montgomery and the doctrinal 
indiscipline which existed at the start of the Normandy campaign.   
 
 
 
 
     Thus, the historiography differs in fundamental and important ways 
and some important questions are left as yet unanswered.  Furthermore, 
there are a number of dimensions of the problem, particularly at the 
level of the corps, divisions, tank brigades and independent armoured 
brigades of 21st Army Group, which have yet to be fully explored.  To 
resolve these debates, or at least to develop them in new ways, requires 
analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of Montgomery‟s command 
system, of how corps and divisions responded to it, and of the 
effectiveness of the weapon they forged and used between them.  
     The central interpretive proposition of this thesis is that the apparent 
problem posed by the historiography has obscured the central question 
which is how Montgomery‟s command produced a functional doctrine by 
late 1944.  What has been lacking, therefore, is a comprehensive and 
satisfying explanation of how all the various processes worked and 
interacted and interrelated over time to produce not only the desired 
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output, that is a common doctrine, but also the desired outcome which 
was success at the campaign level.   
     A more productive way of understanding what was happening is to 
see it as a more complex process which accommodated both top-down 
imposition and apparent weak command and control.  Practice changed 
as the campaign developed and this study will assess the extent to 
which the commanders of the tank brigades and independent armoured 
brigades, corps, and divisional commanders were drivers of these 
changes as part of a wider process under Montgomery‟s direction.  Two 
propositions are advanced to facilitate deeper analysis of the issues.  
The first is that there was more direct communication between 
Montgomery and corps and divisional commanders and brigade 
commanders concerning operational doctrine, best practice and lessons 
learned than has hitherto been recognised.  This leads directly on to the 
second, which addresses how that communication happened in practice.  
This thesis presents evidence for the „bubbling up‟ of operational 
methods from below the corps and the divisional levels, originating at 
the brigade level.  It will be shown that Montgomery was actually more 
open to the second dimension – the bubbling up, the internal, the cohort 
acting, the interactive – than has been supposed.          
 
 
 
 
     The task of this thesis requires both a conventional focus on 
command and a cross-level study of Montgomery‟s command as 
mediated through a small group of commanders.  Further, to analyse 
this question more completely, this thesis will draw on evidence from the 
context of the entire North-West Europe campaign, not just Normandy.   
     The issues laid out at the outset of this Introduction as to whether or 
not the development of operational fighting capability, and in particular 
the capacity to conduct combined arms warfare, had any basis in a 
common doctrine of all arms has divided scholars, but the key to 
understanding how the outcome developed lies in understanding the 
ways in which the two processes of fighting and the creation of doctrine 
interrelated.  Alongside this stands the new light this thesis will throw 
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on how such doctrine may have been created.  A third interrelated 
contribution is in answering how Montgomery commanded, and 
whether, and to what extent, doctrine was imposed or generated.  In this 
way the debate about how Montgomery commanded can be resolved.  
     There was a set of relationships as well as a development of practice.  
It is necessary to describe and analyse these, focusing on the qualities 
and contributions made by individuals and the levels at which they 
made their contributions.  It is then necessary to analyse how, to what 
degree, and with what consequences those contributions were mediated 
up through the system and had their effects.    
     The term armour-infantry co-operation has come to mean for many 
the tactical level, whereas this thesis looks at the success of armour-
infantry co-operation at this level and relates it to changes in brigade 
and divisional structures.  It is clear from the context of the campaign 
that the innovation and flexibility of British brigades and divisions must 
be taken into account in any explanation of that success.  To 
understand how 21st Army Group fought the series of operations and 
actions which constituted the North-West Europe campaign it is 
necessary to view them not specifically in terms of tank-infantry co-
operation doctrine but in the wider setting of general British military 
doctrine, problems and thought, as well as of commanders‟ decisions 
and of how they used the equipment they had.  Thus, it is also 
necessary to consider how armoured and infantry formations were 
organized, so that the groupings and structures at the tactical level were 
correct to facilitate armour-infantry co-operation as traditionally 
understood and as practised in 21st Army Group prior to late 1944. 
     It is in the development of British armoured warfare doctrine from 
the late 1930s as well as the experiences of fighting earlier in the War – 
mainly in North Africa – that the roots of the underlying understanding 
of the main protagonists involved in this study are to be found.  To 
produce an understanding of the different types of experience possible, a 
small group of commanders are classified as members of one of three 
groups: successful commanders who had fought in North Africa and 
were bound by the „lessons‟ they learned there; commanders who had 
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fought in North Africa but who were not bound by or to the lessons 
learned from previous victories; and commanders who had not fought in 
the desert.   
     The story ends, for the purposes of this thesis, with the successful 
implementation of Montgomery and 21st Army Group commanders‟ 
apparently „co-created‟ armour-infantry doctrine.  This then allowed 
21st Army Group to progress from the first footstep and tank track on 
German soil to the Elbe and the Baltic without further reviewing its 
doctrine for the handling of forces of armour, infantry, and associated 
instruments in the face of new challenges.  This thesis will demonstrate 
how the interaction of Montgomery, key commanders, and 
„circumstances‟ led to the emergence of a new framework for action 
through which previous experience could be brought to bear to gain 
both operational initiative (what Montgomery called „the Initiative‟) and 
tactical initiative whereby commanders could use their initiative to solve 
problems on the ground.   
 
 
 
     The corps commanders, armoured division commanders, 
commanders of independent armoured and tank brigades and infantry 
division commanders who, in addition to Montgomery, are important 
enough to make them key members of a small group of commanders for 
the purposes of this study include: Major-General A.H.S. Adair, Guards 
Armoured Division; Lieutenant-General E.H. Barker, 49th Infantry 
Division and later VIII Corps; Lieutenant-General G.C. Bucknall, XXX 
Corps to August 1944; Brigadier R.M.P. Carver, 4th Armoured Brigade; 
Brigadier W.S. Clarke, 34th Armoured Brigade; Major-General G.W.E.J. 
Erskine, 7th Armoured Division; Brigadier W.D.C. Greenacre, 6th 
Guards Tank Brigade; Major-General E. Hakewill Smith, 52nd Infantry 
Division; Brigadier the Hon. W.R.N. Hinde, 22nd Armoured Brigade; 
Lieutenant-Colonel/acting Brigadier P(atrick) R. C. Hobart, Guards 
Armoured Division, 7th Armoured Division; Major-General L.O. Lyne, 
50th Infantry Division, then 59th Infantry Division and later 7th 
Armoured Division; Lieutenant-General Sir R.N. O‟Connor, VIII Corps to 
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December 1944; Major-General T.G. Rennie, 3rd Infantry Division and 
later 51st Infantry Division; Major-General G.P.B. Roberts, 11th 
Armoured Division; Major-General G.L. Verney, 6th Guards Tank 
Brigade and later 7th Armoured Division; Major-General L.G. Whistler, 
3rd Infantry Division; and Brigadier A.D.R. Wingfield, 34th Tank 
Brigade, acting CO 8th Armoured Brigade, and 22nd Armoured 
Brigade.36   
     It should be noted that this thesis is specifically concerned with the 
contribution of the British Army (i.e. English, Scottish, Welsh and Irish 
units) to the principally Anglo-Canadian 21st Army Group, which also 
included 1st Polish Armoured Division.  Several of Montgomery‟s 
offensives were led, at levels of command which are particularly focused 
on in this thesis, by Canadian generals.  Canadian forces formed 
Canadian II Corps, 2nd British Army until late July 1944, when 1st 
Canadian Army became operational.  The GOC Canadian II Corps, 
Lieutenant-General G.G. Simonds, is an individual of particular 
importance.  However, as this thesis is not a study of Canadian battle 
doctrine in Normandy thus Simonds was not added to the list of 
commanders for study in this thesis.  Similarly, what can rather 
arbitrarily be defined as Canadian operations are, in general, omitted in 
terms of analysis or commentary.  However, it is necessary to bring in 
Operation TOTALIZE (7-10 August 1944).  TOTALIZE, which although 
Canadian driven involved British forces (about a third of the force) and 
saw the introduction of many of the issues previously identified, is 
examined because of the contribution of this operation in particular to 
the story of 21st Army Group operational technique.    
    Although the seventeen individuals focussed upon held twenty senior 
independent (i.e. Brigade, Divisional or Corps) commands they are 
actually linked, for example Erskine, Verney and Lyne successively 
commanded 7th Armoured Division, and Barker replaced O‟Connor as 
GOC VIII Corps, as shown in Figure 0.1. 
                                                          
36
 See APPENDIX II for an explanation of the selection of the corps commanders, divisional 
commanders, and commanders of independent tank (later armoured) brigades who 
compromise this group.   
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Figure 0.1: The selection of commanders including Montgomery 
 
The commands of the other commanders selected parallel the 
commands shown in Figure 0.1.  The independent commands of, for 
example, Clarke (34th Armoured Brigade) parallel Carver‟s command of 
4th Armoured Brigade, as shown.  To pursue „bubble up‟ operational 
methods it is also necessary to go down to the level of the regimental 
COs and below where and when appropriate.  For example, and 
following on from Figure 0.1, 7th Armoured Division can be extended 
downwards (in terms of rank) to include: Hinde, Wingfield, Hobart, and 
so on and right down to the level of Major B.E.L. Burton and Captain 
J.R. Brown, who were, respectively, the second-in-command of an 
infantry battalion and an artillery Command Post Officer, and who in 
each case wrote accounts which have been used as primary sources.37  
Many significant papers have been traced and examined for these 
commanders, including some not explored before by historians.  
Extending the search to regimental and, or battalion commands helps to 
complete the picture for an infantry point of view.   
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     Finally, investigating armour-infantry organization and structure in 
21st Army Group in the campaign in Europe and preparation for it has 
to begin before 1944, around 1937-38, because that is when the first 
armoured divisions were established and the problems began; and, in 
order to understand more fully Montgomery and his fellow commanders‟ 
decisions regarding integrating armour and infantry, it is necessary to 
look back to the formation of their ideas. 
 
 
 
 
     This thesis thus attempts to assess how Montgomery‟s command 
produced a functional, workable and adaptive doctrine for armour, 
infantry and associated instruments by late 1944 by examining and 
analysing operational development, innovation and command-and-
control in 21st Army Group.  Operational development, innovation and 
command in 21st Army Group emerges as a complex phenomenon: 
driven by a „bubble-up‟ process of ideas and, ultimately, a top-down 
system of management.  However, the thesis presents a picture of a 
process that was both a complicated and also a complex one.  The same 
factors and issues need to be simultaneously understood from different 
perspectives.  No one part should be understood in isolation from the 
processes surrounding it or indeed from its own position within the 
continuum of development over time.  The thesis thus contributes 
holistic understanding of the creation of doctrine to the literature on 
Montgomery, 21st Army Group and the campaign in Europe. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
 
THE ARMY, ARMOUR, AND MONTGOMERY BEFORE 1944 
 
 
 
     It has been widely accepted that the British Army‟s defeat in North-
West Europe in the summer of 1940 at the hands of the German Army 
was not offset by its victories over the Italian Army in the winter of 
1940-41.  The reasons for the British Army‟s inability to counter the 
organization and techniques of the German armed forces in 1940 are 
said, by the military commentator and writer B.H. Liddell Hart and by 
those historians who follow his lead, to include the conservatism and 
resultant inability of the higher echelons of British Army command 
between the two world wars to fully comprehend the scope and meaning 
of armoured warfare and the failure to adopt an appropriate doctrine 
and organization while the opportunity was still within reach.1   
    However, the Army‟s victories over the Italians are held to embody „a 
record in armoured mobility that has never been equalled‟.2  Yet Britain, 
the country which had invented the tank, went to war in 1939 without 
an effective armoured force, unlike Germany, where as the 1940 
German campaign against France and the Low Countries would show, 
armour capable of strategic deep penetration had been developed, 
although „the victors were at first just about as surprised as the 
vanquished‟.3  The British Army, however, was completely motorised, 
that is not dependent on horse transport at all or on foot-mobility alone.  
Every arm of service and support was equipped with means of transport 
and movement utilizing the internal combustion engine to provide or 
                                                          
1
 See R.H. Larson, The British Army and the Theory of Armoured Warfare, 1918-1940 
(London and Toronto: Associated University Press, 1984), pp. 102-104. 
2
 Capt. Sir B.H. Liddell Hart, History of the Second World War (London: Papermac, 1992 
[1970], pp. 116-127 (p. 124). 
3
 K.-H. Frieser, with J.T. Greenwood, The Blitzkrieg Legend: The 1940 Campaign in the 
West (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2005 [1996], p. 2. 
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improve mobility.4  This was completely unlike the German Army.  The 
highly armoured and mechanised Panzerwaffe, or armoured force of the 
Wehrmacht, was only the most modern element of the German army.  
There were actually two armies within the Wehrmacht: „on the one hand, 
the ten Panzer and six motorized infantry divisions, and on the other 
hand, the actual army that looked rather old-fashioned and had inferior 
equipment‟.5  The main mass of the Wehrmacht proceeded at the pace of 
the foot soldier and which still used animals to draw part of its logistics 
and artillery.6  The British Army thus had important differences in 
comparison to the German Army which could be significant not only for 
tactics but also operationally, that is not only for where and when to 
fight but for commanders‟ choices of  how to fight.  It had a movement 
capability using unarmoured vehicles that gave it at least a notional 
capacity to compensate for its shortcomings in armour.  However, 
German armoured divisions were combined arms teams.  Armour and 
infantry both worked together all the time – infantry were integral, as a 
result of experience gained from the breakthrough at Sedan during the 
1940 campaign in the west.7  The armoured divisions‟ infantry was 
usually equipped with a suitable panzergrenadier vehicle.  Nevertheless, 
the operational insights and innovative tactical applications of 
Montgomery and Lieutenant-General R.N. O‟Connor, allowed them to 
excel in the offensive use of motorised logistics in the beginning of the 
Second World War and achieve significant strategic advantages without 
tanks (for example: Montgomery in the defence of the Yser canal during 
the Flanders campaign in 1940) or at most with limited tank support 
(for example, O‟Connor in his Libyan campaign, 1940-41).8   
                                                          
4
 See, for example, B. Bond, British Military Policy between the two World Wars (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1980), Chapters 5 and 6: pp. 127-190.  Following Liddell Hart, Bond 
emphasises the high opportunity cost of this. 
5
 K.-H. Frieser, The Blitzkrieg Legend,  p. 31. 
6
 See R.L. DiNardo and A. Bay, „Horse-Drawn Transport in the German Army‟, Journal of 
Contemporary History, 23 (1988), 129-142: „[a]lthough the army increased its number of 
panzer and motorized infantry divisions, it was still primarily dependent on horses [...] to the 
tune of 4000 per week in April of 1940 (p. 130)‟. 
7
 Frieser, The Blitzkrieg Legend, p. 174. 
8
 For a detailed examination of this subject, see C.J. Forrester, „Great Captains and the 
Challenge of Second Order Technology: Operational Strategy and the Motorisation of the 
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     The infantry, however, could draw on lessons of combat experience 
that had been first learned from 1917-18, which were already 
comprehended – at least in doctrinal terms. Therefore, in order to come 
to a completely rounded understanding of the ideas of Montgomery and 
others for the combining of tanks and infantry just before the war and 
early in it, and the problems left behind from that time, it is necessary to 
focus on the essentially competing demands in the 1920s and 1930s of 
those wishing to modernise the army – that armour be developed to 
become the predominant arm – and the desire of most of those in charge 
of the army to create a modern army with tanks in a way that ensured 
the continued existence and importance of the infantry arm and infantry 
divisions, alongside the new armoured divisions, and the problems that 
this created. 
 
 
British Thought and Thinking about Motorization and Armoured 
Divisions before 1940  
 
 
     Between the wars, Britain lost the earlier tank lead which it had 
gained in the First World War and, for various reasons, did not 
concentrate on developing a modern armoured force like the German 
panzerwaffe.  Further, it was widely held in the British Army between 
the two world wars that motorization, applied to operations at the level 
of small, colonial wars, could provide commanders with the capacity to 
execute wide lateral movements speedily.  Much of its equipment 
emphasised characteristics of mobility over fire-power – which would be 
found very useful early in the Desert War because of the ability of widely 
dispersed columns to move over great ranges and achieve effects out of 
all proportion to their actual weapon power.  Tanks‟ fire-power became a 
subsidiary consideration to mobility, which imposed an important 
constraint on their effectiveness in action.  
     At the level of major warfare the future role of tanks was, however, 
an issue of great contention.  The debate in Britain was paralleled 
                                                                                                                                                                    
British Army before 1940‟, (unpublished master‟s thesis, University of South Africa, 2002) 
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elsewhere – particularly in Russia, France and Germany.  It is possible 
to delineate at least five categories of attitudes towards British Army 
mechanization, excluding those who simply did not think seriously 
about their profession: 
[t]he revolutionaries who believed with Fuller that the tank 
was an invention of overwhelming importance which would 
dominate future land warfare [;] reformers; they supported 
a thorough revision of tactical doctrine but neither their 
ends nor their means were as drastic as Fuller‟s [;] 
progressives [:] thoughtful officers who appreciated the 
tactical shortcomings revealed in the First World War but 
were largely content to work for improvement in their own 
arms or areas of experience [; t]he fourth category, who may 
be termed conservatives, were not opposed to 
mechanization per se but disapproved of the concept of 
independent armoured formations [; and t]he fifth and final 
category [who] were opposed not merely to the tank but 
also to the mechanization of transport.9 
However, sufficient for this thesis is a tri-part categorization, as follows.  
In the period between the world wars there was an expectation among a 
first category, some military writers and soldiers with a desire to 
modernise the British Army, that armour should be developed to become 
the predominant arm of the Army.10  Few of them, or of like-minded 
German, French or Russian counterparts, considered that there could 
be any satisfactory substitute for the tank and large modern armoured 
forces.11  Some emphasised the need for an offensive infantry element 
with dedicated transport – ideally tracked and armoured – which would 
contribute to the armoured battle by moving into the gaps created by 
the tanks to overcome and clear defended obstacles.  All saw armoured 
forces as the primary means of achieving breakthrough and eventually 
success in future war on land. 
     Many of Britain‟s senior soldiers took a different view and thus fall 
into our second category.  They were often far from antagonistic to tanks 
or to the permanent establishment of tank forces, however.  Their view 
                                                          
9
 Bond, British Military Policy, pp. 130-33. 
10
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was that the proper employment of tanks did not require the 
development of the kind of armoured forces for which the „modernists‟ 
hoped.  Instead, they sought to improve co-operation between tanks and 
existing arms.  What they wanted was more tanks on the battlefield at 
the speed of infantry brought to battle by mechanical transport.  The 
important feature to note about this motorised transport of infantry was 
the virtual abandonment of any official consideration of a fighting role 
for infantry in motorised transport working with tanks to carry out 
specifically „armoured‟ tasks, operating together in permanent all-arms 
formations.  Infantry was „in-house‟ in armoured divisions, it was not yet 
integral with the armour.  Infantry tanks required to be more heavily 
armed and armoured than other tanks.  This firmed up the distinction 
in Britain between „Infantry‟ tanks, intended for close-support of 
infantry, and „cruiser‟ tanks, intended for traditional cavalry-type 
general armoured tasks.  The role of motorised transport in major 
warfare would remain primarily the movement of men, guns, and 
supplies.  This reflected earlier thinking and experience.  
     A final category of senior commander can be distinguished.  These 
were thoughtful officers who perceived that movement utilizing the 
internal combustion engine was significant not only for tactics but also 
operationally, and needed only to be understood and brought to an 
adequate level of efficiency, workability, and mobility.  They held the 
tank to be only one weapon rather than the operationally decisive one 
under all conditions.  However, these practitioners did not see motor 
transport simply in the logistic sense.  They understood its potential for 
the strategic movement of forces; including during the course of a battle 
in order to affect its outcome.  This realization constituted a notional 
alternative employment of mechanical transport, additional to its logistic 
uses.  Montgomery and O‟Connor can be placed in this latter category. 
     Montgomery is rightly ranked among the most notable British 
Second World War commanders.  O‟Connor is less well-known, in part 
because of his own disregard for publicity.  In view of O‟Connor‟s high 
profile departure from command of VIII Corps in Montgomery‟s 21st 
Army Group in late 1944, it is relevant to investigate the extent to which 
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their careers, experiences and ideas overlapped earlier and at the start 
of the war.  Montgomery established his reputation as a field 
commander during the British Army‟s Flanders campaign of 1940.  
O‟Connor commanded the forces which defeated the Italians in the 
British Army‟s First Libyan Campaign, 1940-41.  Montgomery‟s and 
O‟Connor‟s initiative and thoughtful use of the mobility at their disposal 
contributed in one case to the deliverance of significant British forces 
from destruction at the hands of a German Army with a superior, 
modern tank force and in the other to the destruction of a larger and 
well-equipped Italian force.   
     Interestingly, Montgomery was less closely involved with 
experimental formations of all arms in the 1920s, or the early armoured 
divisions in the 1930s than many other of the protagonists dealt with in 
this thesis.  Earlier, O‟Connor had been involved with the Aldershot 
Experimental Brigade in 1921-22.  The Experimental Brigade, also 
known as the 5th Brigade, included infantry, tanks and artillery.  
Brigadier (as he then was) E.H. Barker, arguably even less well-known, 
will nevertheless occupy an important place in this thesis.  A more 
junior commander in Palestine in 1938-39 than Montgomery and 
O‟Connor, he had played a key role in the formation of the first British 
armoured division back in England.  He became a member of the War 
Office Committee on Mechanical Transport (the so-called „Finch 
Committee‟) after Dunkirk.  As Montgomery explained to Barker (in 
classic Montgomery style and with characteristic turn of phrase) he had 
been appointed „to keep Finch straight; he [Finch] is quite useless and 
has already been pushed out of his Division; it is very necessary that 
you should stand up to him, say what you think in no uncertain voice, 
and force it through‟.12  Although other commanders had begun their 
military careers, these three, Montgomery, O‟Connor, and Barker can be 
taken as illustrative of the three most important types of commander for 
the purposes of this thesis: each of these three types falls within the 
latter category of commander between the wars, as above.  Compared 
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with O‟Connor‟s celebrated departure from command, Barker 
experienced a promotion that was equally spectacular.  
     Throughout the 1920s and 1930s the British Army had been trying 
to assimilate the lessons of the First World War into its doctrine but also 
anticipate how the latest military technology might alter the conduct of 
war.13  During the period between the two world wars the British Army 
lost the tank advantage it had had and fell behind other major powers in 
the development of armoured forces, and, instead, it was decided to 
motorise the entire British Army to include each of the traditional arms: 
it was desirable, therefore, that the mobility of every arm be improved 
through general motorization and by a limited mechanization.14      
     In the late 1920s the British Army had established an experimental 
formation of approximately brigade size and set up exercises to test 
procedures for the close co-operation of infantry, tanks and artillery in a 
wholly mechanised force, the feasibility of operations conducted at a 
tempo determined only by the speed of the constituent elements, and 
the administration of such a fast-moving force.  It included tanks, two-
man tankettes, armoured cars, guns drawn by artillery tractor and a 
machine gun battalion carried in six-wheeled lorries, as well as 
motorised ancillary and support units.  It lasted for just two years.  
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 See French, Raising Churchill‟s Army, 1919 -45, pp.12-30,  who argues convincingly that 
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Trials were discontinued in favour of allowing the rest of the Army to 
catch up in the application of modern methods of transport to all arms.   
     In 1932, the War Office Committee on the Lessons of the Great War 
(the so-called „Kirke Committee‟) suggested that the key to the problem 
of converting a „break in‟ into a „break through‟ lay with creating a highly 
mobile reserve containing a powerful punch which would include „a 
sufficiency of cavalry or lorry borne infantry‟.15  Towards the end of the 
1930s, newly-mechanised cavalry regiments were combined with the 
Royal Tank Corps battalions to form the Royal Armoured Corps (RAC).  
Originally, the cavalry were to have been given a mixture of light tanks, 
trucks and lorries, so that some regiments could act as motorised 
infantry.  Instead, the entire cavalry was mechanised, to carry out the 
traditional light cavalry roles using light tanks.  Mechanization of the 
cavalry, a commander of great importance for the purposes of this 
thesis, Captain the Hon. W.R.N. Hinde (as he then was) wrote, would 
replace the old light cavalry, which was only acceptable because „the 
duties of the Divisional Cavalry Regiment remain constant, and only a 
modification of tactics is necessary to fit a Mechanised regiment to carry 
out the duties of a horsed Regiment‟.16  In 1935, for example, despite the 
fact that the Mobile Division of 1934 was in effect without any infantry 
support because the duty of the motorised infantry was close 
reconnaissance, he had concluded that „examining the composition of 
the Mobile Division it would appear to be a well balanced force‟.  
Further, if the infantry were not there to support the tanks, which they 
were not, neither was it the role of the tanks of the Mobile Division to 
defend the motorised infantry.  That was the role of „obstacles and A/T 
guns on all the approaches fr[om] which attack may be expected‟.17  All 
this reflected the view which was widespread within among regiments 
such as Hinde‟s 15th/19th Hussars at the time that the cavalry was 
being mechanised for its traditional roles of long-range reconnaissance, 
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pursuit, and economy-of-force operations. Hinde‟s was always 
essentially a light cavalry, „armour-only‟ approach to tank warfare.  His 
perspective did not change – or changed very little – between that time 
and 1944.  
     The inclusion of Motor Battalions during the formation of armoured 
divisions was intended to make the armour more effective, but armoured 
divisions had more tanks than infantry, with the tanks and infantry 
organised separately.  All this did not reflect a commitment to create a 
new „elite‟ force with the capacity for armoured warfare, as in Germany.  
Instead, it was an attempt to revive the concept of the Army as a mixed 
force, utilizing a greater number of tanks but not necessarily employing 
them as its pre-eminent arm.18 
     However, many of Britain‟s most senior soldiers in the War Office and 
the Army at this time tended to adhere to attrition as the strategy most 
appropriate for major warfare (where the aim was the imposition 
through superior force of such a loss of personnel and equipment on an 
enemy that he could no longer fight). Motorization, it was held, could 
influence operations, tactics and logistics in the execution of attrition 
strategy but it did not have a strategic function or role per se.  In the 
First World War guns had developed into new categories.  An important 
problem with which British artillerymen had to contend, particularly on 
the Western Front, arose from the requirement for better mobility for 
larger weapons and their heavier ammunition, and more rapid 
deployment.  It was concluded that the substitution of motor tractors for 
animal traction could be a solution.  The infantry‟s problem on the 
Western Front had not been the inability to penetrate enemy positions 
so much as inability to exploit this.  It was thought that, because of the 
depth of the modern battlefield, physical exhaustion had played its part 
in bringing attacks by foot-mobile only infantry to a halt.  Motorization 
thus could be part of the solution.   
     The provision of better logistical supply to the front lines had been 
another significant problem on the Western Front.  Although rations and 
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stores usually had to be manhandled into the trenches, mechanical 
transport was employed to vastly increase the amount of supplies which 
could be brought forward from railheads to troops in the front line.  
Now, it was held, these could be moved by mechanical transport in 
greater quantities and at several times the speed of horse-drawn 
vehicles.  Complete motorization could be a solution to problems of 
mobility in three functional areas: the transportation of men and 
weapons to the battlefield, the transportation of men and weapons on 
the battlefield to where they would dismount before moving forward 
engage to the enemy, and the transportation of supplies.  These so-
called dominant personalities argued that reform and reorganization 
directed toward the creation of a motorised army led by tanks rather 
than of an armoured force was what was required.  Thus, the British 
Army motorised to improve mobility and bring artillery and infantry into 
action closer to the centre of the battle to make possible the practice of 
combined-arms tactics, and to improve logistical efficiency.    
     The British Army, however, did not heed those promoting the 
primacy of the tank and disregarded their challenge to the Army to 
adopt the desired doctrine and organization while the opportunity was 
still within reach.  Thus, there was a lack of adequate tanks in sufficient 
numbers in 1940.  Although the first British armoured divisions of the 
late 1930s were heavily tank-orientated, failure to develop an adequate 
principal gun, reluctance to move from riveted to cast or welded 
construction, and failure to develop a standard engine of sufficient 
power, all meant that those tanks intended to engage in specifically 
armoured operations had significant shortcomings.  However, more 
„conservative‟ contenders, who adhered to an attrition strategy, were 
able to take considerably more sanguine views of developments.  They 
could, for example, point to what the Army had done to recognise and 
rectify shortcomings in reaching sufficient standards of mobility for the 
infantry and adapting tactical techniques and operational concepts.19   
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     Both Montgomery and O‟Connor were effective and skilful and their 
contrasting employment of the troop-carrying capacity of mainly 
unarmoured vehicles was to achieve strategic advantages.  Both were 
effective and skilful.  It will be noted here, however, that both also 
utilised motorization in a different but related way: to substantiate their 
understanding of the principles which must underlie effective command 
under modern conditions, and of the practices by which it should be 
managed, that is control.  Montgomery‟s, O‟Connor‟s and Barker‟s early 
military experiences were clearly important for the development of the 
leadership strengths, particularly the command and operational skills 
and insights which they would demonstrate later.  Barker later said   
I was always round the line.  I mean I always have been 
even as a Divisional Commander.  I was always round the 
line.  If you see your chaps you know what they are doing.  
Not like the early days of the First World War when we 
were, I never saw my Brigadier in the trenches.  I never saw 
my Divisional Commander ever and in those days one did 
not go round and see the troops.20   
     One point upon which Montgomery and O‟Connor were agreed was 
that the absence of senior commanders‟ forward presence had negatively 
affected the Army‟s efficiency in the First World War by producing 
military situations in which command and control had tended to become 
separated.  However elaborate their information-gathering means, it had 
been difficult for senior commanders to grasp where the opportunity for 
outcome lay.  Junior commanders had been compelled to repeatedly 
order their men to undertake frontal assaults against prepared defensive 
positions and as O‟Connor discovered at first-hand during the 
Passchendaele campaign of 1917, heavy losses were often a result.  
Such experiences led O‟Connor, like Montgomery, to emphasise the 
importance of training, not only for efficiency but for minimizing 
casualties.  Effective operational command, that is the commander‟s 
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responsibility for controlling the battle as a whole, demanded senior 
commanders‟ forward presence.  This would ensure the most effective 
use of information on such things as the enemy‟s whereabouts, 
capabilities and intentions and on any vulnerability of the enemy to 
flanking and surprise movements.  In the Second World War both made 
their own forward presence whenever possible a cornerstone for their 
conduct of operations.  However, this was completely contrary to what 
Field Service Regulations stated for higher commanders.21   
 
 
Training, Teaching and the Principles of War    
 
 
     For the guidance of its commanders, the War Office published Field 
Service Regulations (FSR) which was a sort of primer which summarised 
the principles or methods by which certain results could be attained.  
Eight „principles of war‟ were drafted for FSR, Volume II, Operations 
(1920) by Colonel (later Major-General) J.F.C. Fuller.  These were: 
Maintenance of the objective, Offensive action, Surprise, Concentration, 
Economy of force, Security, Mobility, and Co-operation.  It was essential 
to decide the aim or object of any military operation and relentlessly to 
pursue it.  The ultimate military objective in war was the destruction of 
the enemy‟s forces on the battlefield.  Victory could only be won by 
offensive action.  A commander‟s concept of operations, plans and 
dispositions must surprise his adversary in order to effect a greater 
concentration of force than the enemy at the decisive time and place.  
Therefore, in accordance with the principle of security, information on 
such things as his whereabouts, capabilities and intentions had to be 
kept from the enemy.  Raids and other diversions which did not 
immediately contribute to the object of having more force than the 
enemy at the point of contact must be avoided, in accordance with the 
principle of economy of force.  Mobility, permitting the concentration of 
superior force at the right time and place, was important, as was the 
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need to ensure that all services and all parts of the Army co-operate.  
For the first time, an official publication identified a „terse list of 
operational dictums, each identified by a title, that claimed to be the 
“principles of war”‟.22  FSR was revised in 1924, 1929 and 1935.  A 
quasi-official compendium to accompany FSR illustrating the content of 
each principle or method by means of examples from military history 
was also produced.  The numbering of chapters and sections in this 
accompanying volume corresponded with that of FSR.23  Changes to FSR 
itself were the product of technological developments and experience 
gained in manoeuvres and Staff Exercises. 
 
 
The Threads of Experience in 1941-42 
    
  
     Montgomery‟s and O‟Connor‟s methods were rooted in the experience 
of the British Army, expressed in FSR, except, arguably, with respect to 
risk.  O‟Connor first used such a forward command, control, 
communications, and intelligence (C3I) system in a basic form in the 
Western Desert.  Between 1942 and 1945, Montgomery would make this 
the basis of his system for controlling ever-larger, fully modernised, 
mechanised and armoured formations, eventually splitting his 
headquarters into three parts, Tactical, Main and Rear, and placing 
himself at the small and mobile „Tac HQ‟ well forward in the battle area.  
One of the roughly thirty to forty vehicles which might make up Tac HQ 
at any one time was Montgomery‟s office caravan.  However, O‟Connor‟s 
insistence on commanding from near the front line eventually resulted 
in his capture on 6/7 April 1941 when his car was ambushed by a 
German patrol.  
     At the beginning of the war Montgomery and O‟Connor still held the 
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 view that the consolidation of British military motorization, together 
with the improvements in radio and wireless – with which the British 
Army was experimenting – could be utilised for the purpose of 
maintaining close personal contact with their subordinates and 
reintegrating command with control.24  The availability of command 
vehicles with good communications and suitably powered staff cars, 
they understood, made it possible for the commander to be able to leave 
his headquarters and move rapidly around his command, visiting his 
subordinate commanders to make operational decisions immediately 
and personally, while in theory remaining in contact with his staff.25  
Montgomery‟s own often retrospective view however, was that 
application of his own rule of remaining „balanced‟ always allowed him 
the flexibility to cope with risk.  The test of operations in 1940 and 1941 
showed that Montgomery and O‟Connor were effective leaders and 
skilful commanders, who understood the capability for manoeuvre 
provided by the motorization of the British Army before 1940.  
O‟Connor‟s North African operation, COMPASS was to be a large-scale 
raid but O‟Connor‟s planning could allow for the possibility of 
exploitation.  His plan was to surprise the Italians by passing through a 
gap identified in their defensive line and take the enemy camps in detail 
from the rear.  COMPASS was the blueprint for his last North-West 
Europe operation as GOC VIII Corps, by which time Montgomery‟s high 
command would not allow him to take such risk. 
     An important feature of both Montgomery‟s and O‟Connor‟s earlier 
operations was the contrasting employment of motorised transport to 
achieve significant strategic advantages even without tanks or at most 
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with limited tank support.  In both of these instances, motorization gave 
the British Army the capacity to offset the shortcomings in armour, 
doctrine and organization which it had at the beginning of the Second 
World War.  Although Montgomery and O‟Connor were dedicated to 
being true professionals in spirit as well as in name, they were 
nevertheless able to understand the need for avoiding simple adherence 
to prescribed military practice in favour of a thoughtful approach.  They 
accordingly grew to be modernizing, progressive commanders whose 
imaginative approaches early in the war enabled them to respond to the 
disadvantages imposed upon the British Army by the lack of a modern 
really suitable armoured force.  They were able to take advantage of 
what they had and to adapt it away from stereotyped concepts of 
logistical or tactical employment which they replaced with beneficial 
operational and strategic utilization.  However, the effects of employing 
fighting methods influenced by the apparent „lessons‟ of O‟Connor‟s 
victory over the Italians became more and more pernicious later in the 
Desert War.  Although Montgomery eventually changed these methods, 
they influenced the formulation of fighting methods and doctrine in 
Middle East Command (MEC) in significant ways up to the middle of the 
war.  A simplified version of the MEC argument runs as follows.   The 
Cyrenaica campaign showed that „an army should be primarily designed 
for mobile armoured action‟.26 What emerges is that, while new 
armoured weapons were important so were insight, imagination, 
initiative, originality, and dynamic leadership, for it still requires 
thought to apply advanced equipment and weaponry, or when an army 
is faced with difficult or new problems of fighting – a lesson that the 
British Army had to learn after Dunkirk and the early desert victory at 
Beda Fomm.  This was something the importance of which Montgomery 
was arguing as early as the 1920s and 1930s, before the army was fully 
modernised, armoured and mechanised.   
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Montgomery – the Developing Mind ...         
 
     Montgomery, it has been suggested, was encouraged by the 
inadequacy of the Staff College, Camberley, where he was a student 
from 1920 to 1921, to see his potential as a teacher and trainer to the 
British Army.27  One of the most important things to note about 
Montgomery in the 1920s and 1930s was authorship.28   What 
Montgomery was concerned with in the 1920s and 1930s has to be 
looked at in the wider context of the British Army trying to assimilate 
the lessons of the First World War into its doctrine but also to anticipate 
how the latest military technology might alter the conduct of war.  
However, others who feature in this thesis and who obtained the coveted 
psc certificate between the two world wars (denoting that an officer had 
attended the Staff College) were very positive about the quality of the 
professional training which they received.29   
     Montgomery, it has been said, had by the mid-1920s a clear idea of 
the sort of army Britain should have.30  Nonetheless, the future role, 
equipment and organization of tank forces was an issue of great 
contention.  The categorization of groups that can be distinguished in 
terms of their attitudes to or views on this major issue faced by the 
British Army in the 1920s and 1930s provides the background, or 
context for Montgomery‟s writings and what others were writing.  Earlier 
in this chapter it was suggested that the portrayal of most soldiers in 
the War Office and on the General Staff as members of a category that 
may be termed „conservatives‟ were opposed to tanks and anti the 
establishment of tank forces is incorrect.  The labelling of this group and 
their categorization as being opposed to the establishment of tank forces 
is largely a creation of Liddell Hart‟s.  If there was a lack of adequate 
tanks in sufficient numbers, and an unhelpful bifurcation in armoured 
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doctrine when the British Army went to war again in 1939, far from 
turning its back on new military technologies, in the 1920s and 1930s 
the General Staff developed the idea of a small, professional, completely 
motorised army with many tanks.  It is important to see where 
Montgomery stood in relation to all of this and to what extent he can be 
seen as typical of a group of officers. Montgomery‟s growing authorship, 
widening correspondence with other military thinkers, and enthusiastic 
acceptance of a Staff College instructorship have been pointed to as 
evidence that, from at least the mid-1920s, he was increasingly anxious 
to study the past to draw lessons for the future.31  This suggests that a 
helpful start for an investigation of Montgomery‟s developing mind in the 
1920s and 1930s can be made by identifying the nature of the issues in 
his writings of those years.  Montgomery‟s military writings of the inter-
war period – published and unpublished – make it possible to identify 
his most important ideas of these years in order to come to valid 
conclusions with respect to his developing mind in the 1920s and 
1930s.32 
     Montgomery‟s first major piece of writing – a five-part series of 
articles which appeared in the Antelope between January 1925 and 
January 1926 – addressed the subject of the growth of modern infantry 
tactics.  At the very outset, Montgomery made clear his now abiding 
conviction that, to be successful in battle you must be superior at the 
point where you intend to strike the decisive blow and it has been stated 
that: „no clearer or more concise statement of Montgomery‟s primary 
tactical belief would ever be made‟.33  This is important; but hardly 
surprising.  Nevertheless, an apparently questioning stance over the 
development of tank warfare in Montgomery‟s thinking in the last of the 
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articles on tactics for the Antelope can serve as a point of departure from 
which to expound both Montgomery‟s tactical and organizational 
thoughts about tanks at this time.  While it has been argued that 
Montgomery 
congratulated Liddell Hart on his „Model Army‟ article, he 
did not really agree with Hart‟s emphasis on armour. In the 
end, he felt, all wars become a confrontation between 
infantry – and the training of this infantry, its ability to 
move with cohesion, and to co-operate with artillery, tanks, 
engineers and aircraft, would determine the outcome.34     
This is important, because of Liddell Hart‟s critique of Montgomery‟s 
approach to tactics – based on Montgomery‟s omission of exploitation in 
attack – and „diagnosed‟ by Liddell Hart as early as 1924.35  Taking issue 
with the interpretation that Montgomery did not really agree with Liddell 
Hart‟s emphasis on armour, it is argued here that what Montgomery did 
not agree with was Liddell Hart‟s theory of armoured warfare; in 
essence, the idea of the deep thrust as an alternative to the strategy of 
attrition, based around the capabilities of an army in which armour was 
the principal arm, and utilizing the offensive capabilities of the tank 
coupled with surprise and unorthodox action to produce a decision.  
Montgomery addressed the issue of the army‟s reorganisation further in 
an outline sketch of the subject of some problems of motorization and 
mechanization, or „mechanicalisation‟ as it was called then, at the end of 
1926.  Again writing in the Antelope, Montgomery argued that modern 
conditions demanded increased mobility, and this should be motor 
mobility – the horse should be abolished from war.  Thus, infantry 
should be provided with motor transport, which, providing mobility, 
would facilitate the concentration of superior force at the right time and 
place.  The power of the modern defence, however, would require the 
generation of firepower sufficient to allow the attacking infantry to gain 
ground.  This, Montgomery concluded, required effective artillery-tank-
infantry co-operation: „additional mechanical support is [...] necessary.  
                                                          
34
 Ibid., p.183.  See Capt. B.H. Liddell Hart, „The Development of the “New Model” Army: 
Suggestions on a Progressive, but Gradual Mechanicalization‟, Army Quarterly 9 (October 
1924), 37-50.  Montgomery‟s first published article, on the subject of training the Territorial 
Army, was in the same number. 
35
 Hamilton, Monty: Making of a General, p. 168. 
39 
 
[...]  In modern war organised resistance can only be overcome by 
mechanical means, i.e., tanks, great weight of artillery, etc.‟36 
      Where Montgomery differed from Liddell Hart is that Montgomery‟s 
strategic philosophy emphasised the mobility of modern warfare and the 
strategic philosophy of the concentrated thrust, as opposed to Liddell 
Hart‟s emphasis on mobility and concept of the deep thrust, which 
would always (according to the Liddell Hart theory) produce, or result in 
an armoured exploitation.  Montgomery was always more concerned to 
outfight an enemy than to outmanoeuvre him.  Montgomery did become 
converted to the idea of specialised armoured spearheads, but this was 
not to Liddell Hart‟s idea of tank-only armoured spearheads, in a first 
echelon of heavy tanks, as outlined in his „New Model Army‟ article of 
1924.37  By the end of the Second World War, Montgomery‟s tanks 
would be the spearhead of armoured formations that comprised tanks 
and infantry.  Between the two world wars, however, Montgomery did 
not agree with the notion that armour should be developed to become 
the predominant arm of the army.  The tank, he felt, was only one – but 
a very important – weapon. 
     With his invitation in 1929 to revise the Infantry Training Manual, 
Volume II (IT II) Montgomery at last got the chance to revise the 
pamphlets, booklets and lectures he had given since the War of 
Independence in Ireland in a new form that would, if well done, become 
official army doctrine for the next five years at least.38  The „17th Infantry 
Brigade Summary of Important Instructions‟ and the 49th (Territorial 
Army) Division „Tactical Notes‟ and Training Lectures of 1923 and 1924 
are important, therefore, because of the facet of military service for 
which, in the Inter-war years, Montgomery was to become increasingly 
well known in army circles: training.39  They are also important because 
of Liddell Hart‟s critique of Montgomery‟s approach to tactics – based on 
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Montgomery‟s omission of „Exploitation‟ following a breakthrough by an 
all-arms force based around tanks.  In Montgomery‟s revision of the 
army‟s manual on infantry training, which was published in 1931, he 
acknowledged that there would be cases where tanks, rather than 
infantry, would be used as the primary arm of assault to break through 
static defences.  This view would, however, appear to be very different 
from, for example, the Liddell Hart one of an armoured breakthrough 
followed up and supported by infantry.    
     It was as a particularly good trainer of troops that Montgomery 
increasingly impressed his superiors.40  There were, of course, various 
existing army training manuals and FSRs in print; but, it has been 
suggested, Montgomery recognised the fundamental failing of such 
volumes: they laid down the principles of warfare, but did not give 
methods by which commanders could train their units to achieve these 
principles.41  This is being over favourable to Montgomery.  It is hard to 
find evidence that FSR were supposed to do this.  Thus, one can 
legitimately ask if Montgomery really identified a gap – or was he 
claiming one to advance himself and his own ideas?  There definitely 
were new training methods introduced and attempts began to co-
ordinate and standardise training from 1917.  The evidence appears to 
suggest that as late as 1937-38, Montgomery in his instructions for 
individual training issued as commander of the 9th Infantry Brigade did 
not propose to lay down detailed instructions as to how his subordinate 
commanders should train their battalions „ since the needs of battalions 
vary and what suits one battalion does not always suit another‟ – 
though „[w]ith a view to studying some of the many problems involved 
the Brigade Commander will conduct a study week for officers‟ – and he 
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hoped it would be possible to arrive at a definite doctrine which would 
serve as a basis for further instruction within battalions.42  Secondly, 
setting up Liddell Hart‟s theory of exploitation as the standard by which 
Montgomery‟s revision of IT II should be judged is not helpful.  In fact, 
the British Army – and Montgomery reflects this – distinguished clearly 
between consolidation and exploitation – a subsequent action, which 
might or might not be decided on unless troops and fire-power were 
available for this task.  Further, as will be explained in subsequent 
chapters, the British view – which continued throughout the Normandy 
fighting in 1944 although Montgomery became a convert to the idea that 
there should be a single „general purpose‟ or „battle tank‟ – was that the 
role of armour consisted of two alternatives, infantry-support and 
exploitation, each requiring a different sort of tank. 
     Montgomery, it has been held, simply did not agree that modern 
battle would ever revert to the trench warfare of 1914-18; it was, 
however, largely axiomatic in the British army of the 1920s and 1930s 
that it should not – the development of means of movement utilizing the 
internal combustion engine had increased the basic speed of warfare.  
Montgomery believed that the challenge of modern weapons, mobile 
tactics, combined arms action, and effective command in modern, fast-
moving war meant that it was necessary to study the problem of the 
mobile encounter battle, because: „owing to the immense power of 
modern weapons and to the mobility of armoured units, recovery from a 
bad initial start is very difficult.  It may be possible to recover, but 
against a good enemy, it will only be with heavy losses.  It is for this 
reason that a good enemy is so difficult to fight--he makes you pay very 
dearly for mistakes‟.43  Operational and tactical doctrine had to take 
account of this: „therefore a commander must decide before contact is 
gained how he will fight the battle – only then will he force his will on 
the enemy‟.  The importance of a definite, „proper plan from the very 
beginning‟ was stressed. 44  Montgomery did not agree with senior 
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officers‟ conviction that battles could always be reduced to a set of 
discrete phases – therefore his insistence on fighting to a „proper‟ (i.e. 
appropriate) plan.   
     For Liddell Hart the new concept of war and the revival of the art of 
generalship were both essential for success.  The causes of military 
conservatism were the failure to study military problems scientifically 
and an emphasis on technique rather than art.45  Montgomery argued 
that „we have adopted a material solution in the hopes that it will solve 
for us the problems of the battlefield; but it will not do so unaided.  We 
must also overhaul our tactics – the tactical and material solutions 
must go hand in hand – we must in fact develop a new technique‟.46 
Thus, while warfare involving armour is a struggle for competitive 
advantage mentally as well as materially it was „do-able‟ by all officers 
having „a good knowledge of the technique of staging the many and 
varied operations that their unit may be called on to undertake in war‟.47  
Further, therefore, technological superiority or inferiority alone do not 
make the outcome of war inevitable.  However, Montgomery thought at 
this time that „in thinking out the problem it must be remembered that a 
wholly mechanised unit or sub-unit is easily held up by obstacles 
covered by A.T. weapons, and that in order to defeat these tactics it will 
be necessary to have immediately available sub-units that can operate on 
foot across country, using covered approaches and outflanking the 
resistance‟.48   
     By the late 1930s, a concentration on planning and the commander‟s 
forward presence to an extent commensurate with his responsibility for 
controlling the battle as a whole had become the core of Montgomery‟s 
military thinking.  He must be prepared to command his mobile, 
armoured forces himself rather than leaving it to a specialised cavalry 
commander.49  Effective operational command demanded senior 
commanders‟ forward presence at critical periods, when important 
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decisions might be required.  This would ensure the most effective use of 
information on such things as the enemy‟s whereabouts, capabilities 
and intentions and on any vulnerability to flanking and surprise 
movements.  He must take with him the necessary means to exercise 
command.  British military motorization, together with improvements in 
radio and wireless would, in the Second World War, make it possible for 
the commander to be able to leave his headquarters and move rapidly 
around his command, visiting subordinate commanders to make 
operational decisions immediately and personally, while remaining in 
contact with his staff and his subordinate commanders of the various 
service and support arms. This of course was not always a good thing.  
One has the sense that commanders on both sides swanned hither and 
thither in the Western Desert, 1941-42. The importance of all this is 
that, from 1942, Montgomery would seek to make this the basis of his 
system for controlling formations under his command.  Montgomery‟s 
„Encounter Battle‟ article did arouse some controversy and the following 
year, 1938, he would be asked to reply, in the Army Quarterly, to the 
most important criticisms made of it, but in the article Montgomery did 
not manage to resolve the problem of the need for suitable commanders 
capable of handling armour. 
     „It is important to counter any tendency to regard gas as an 
abnormal feature of war‟, Montgomery wrote that same year in his 9th 
Infantry Brigade Individual Training Instructions.  He had written in 
1926 that gas would drive the horse from the battlefield.  In 1938 he 
believed he had demonstrated that an effective defence was possible: 
soldiers could withstand a gas attack – and go on fighting.  The main 
body of Montgomery‟s Gas Trials Report, of September1938, was a 
thirty-nine page answer to a detailed War Office questionnaire.  But, in a 
seven-page introduction, Montgomery set out the problem, disposed of 
the anxiety surrounding the threat, and set forth the defensive and 
protective measures required to meet it.  The „Report on Gas Trials‟ 
shows that Montgomery was open to the use of „new‟ weapons such as 
gas and tanks.  More importantly, and in parallel with his approach to 
other technical developments, it shows his emphasis on a thoughtful 
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approach over „the tendency [...] to endeavour to provide a definite 
answer to every problem that can arise; this tendency, if proceeded with, 
would merely provide a rigid doctrine which would break down in war‟.50 
     Montgomery‟s prescriptions – the proper responses, as he envisaged 
them, to the challenge of modern weapons, mobile tactics, combined 
arms action, and effective command in modern fast-moving war – need 
to be looked at in the wider context of the British Army‟s attempt to 
predict how the latest technology and weapons might alter the conduct 
of future war.  The British Army was now wholly motorised.  It was 
necessary, Montgomery wrote at this time, to be „thoroughly conversant 
with the handling of the re-organised infantry units and sub-units‟.51  It 
has been said that, by 1925, when Montgomery‟s first major piece of 
writing appeared, ten years of staff duties and study had given him a 
clear idea of the sort of army Britain should have: in the end, he felt, all 
wars become a confrontation between infantry – and the training of this 
infantry, its ability to move with cohesion, and to co-operate with 
artillery, tanks, engineers and aircraft, would determine the outcome.  
By the mid-1930s, it has been suggested, Montgomery‟s tactical concept 
of war had fully matured: „not spectacular for its novel ideas, but for its 
unity of conception and the absolute clarity with which Bernard put 
over this vision‟.52   
     There are issues of substance here about what Montgomery was 
saying and believed.  Some writers, pre-eminently Hamilton, have 
judged Montgomery by the two artificial yardsticks of Liddell Hart‟s 
formula for the „correct‟ use of tanks, and his portrayal of most of the 
senior officer corps as anti-mechanisation „donkeys.‟  A new perspective 
on Montgomery shown here puts him in a different light.   Montgomery 
was not, in fact, coming from, or a contender in this armoured warfare 
debate and whereas Hamilton accepts Liddell Hart as the standard by 
which Montgomery is to be judged this thesis places Montgomery in the 
context of British operational and tactical doctrine, his fellow officers, 
both armoured and infantry, and the challenge of the latest military 
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technology.  This section has shown Montgomery to be a thoroughly 
professional, progressive soldier, undoubtedly – but of great importance 
precisely because he did not allow himself to be marginalised to a 
position of commentating from outside the army or from the sidelines of 
its mainstream development.  Montgomery‟s thoughts and actions can 
fairly be held to have been inextricably bound up with reversing the 
army‟s fortunes in the Second World War.  However, much about 
armoured warfare was new to him; it would take some years, working 
things out, before he arrived at his „winning formula‟ of dynamic 
leadership PLUS straight thinking.      
 
 
 ... and the ‘Uneducated Mind’ 
 
     
     Montgomery arrived in the Middle East in mid-1942 with the 
conviction that what was required was „an armoured Corps; it must 
never hold static fronts; it would be the spearhead of all our offensives‟.  
By the time of the drive for Tripoli in early 1943 he considered that 
„there must be only one type of Corps, and it must be able to handle 
armoured formations, un-armoured formations, or any combination of 
the two types.  There is no such thing as an Armoured Corps‟.53  
Between 1940-41 and his appointment as Commander, 21st Army 
Group in 1943, Montgomery continued developing his own ideas on 
armoured warfare.  They changed from what they had been previously 
and then changed again.  Most importantly for the purposes of this 
thesis, they at first included no clear idea of uniformity of armour-
infantry doctrine: armour and infantry had different tasks to perform on 
the battlefield.  Quite naturally, El Alamein was his template for the 
successful offensive battle.  It began in a highly traditional way with 
infantry attacks supported by artillery.  The need for armour to remain 
„free to choose its own battlefield‟, a point pertaining to the general 
                                                          
53
 S. Brooks, ed., Montgomery and the Eighth Army: A Selection from the Diaries and 
Correspondence of Field Marshal the Viscount Montgomery of Alamein, August 1942 to 
December 1943 (London: The Bodley Head/Army Records Society, 1991), pp. 20 and 121. 
46 
 
conduct of battle operations, supports the argument that he was still 
finding his way with armoured warfare, that is that the tanks could and 
should be freed from the need to defend the infantry.  In Montgomery‟s 
view at this time, „a really heavy concentration of artillery fire, put down 
on a carefully thought out plan, will so neutralise the enemy that 
infantry unsupported by armour will be able to gain their objectives 
without difficulty, provided formidable wire obstacles do not exist‟.54  
While infantry were not always necessary to defend tanks: „armoured 
divisions will always be hampered in battle by enemy anti-tank guns [...] 
artillery fire will be a great aid in overcoming such opposition. [...] ; such 
fire will neutralise the enemy detachments, while the tanks, either alone 
or in co-operation with infantry, manoeuvre so as to destroy the 
detachments with M.G. fire prior to and whilst closing with the anti-tank 
guns‟.55 When it came to the tactics of the offensive battle, thus, 
„armoured divisions should not be used for the “break-in” battle; they 
should be launched for the “break-through”‟; in the „Dog-fight‟ after the 
„break-in‟, „operations will take the form of a hard and very bloody killing 
match, in which you aim to reduce the enemy‟s strength [through 
alternating thrusts] to a state which so cripples him that a final blow 
will cause the complete disintegration of the whole enemy army‟.  
Success would come from „two or three infantry brigades [which] should 
always be in reserve available for such action‟.  Then, „when it becomes 
clear that the time for the “break-through” is approaching, armoured 
and mobile troops must be in reserve ready to be launched into the 
enemy rear areas.  The final blow is then put in on an axis which is 
likely to give good results and where opposition is expected to be weak.  
The penetration thus made must be rapidly developed and the armoured 
forces launched; these armoured forces must be prepared to fight their 
way forward into open country, should the infantry attack not open the 
way completely‟.56  
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     More than problems of doctrine, or organisation, however, Alamein 
confronted him with a problem that is not so much one of leadership as 
it was of command.  Montgomery‟s diary notes for the opening of the 
Battle of El Alamein, 23-24 October 1942 open up the core of this 
problem: 
I gained the impression during the morning that the 
Armoured Divisions were pursuing a policy of inactivity; 
they required galvanising into action, and wanted 
determined leadership.  There was not that eagerness to 
break out into the open on the part of Commanders; there 
was a fear of casualties; every gun was reported as an 88 
mm. 
I was beginning to be disappointed somewhat in LUMSDEN 
[Commander, X Corps, Montgomery‟s corps de chasse], 
BRIGGS (1 Armd Div) and FISHER (2 Armd Bde), and also 
in GATEHOUSE [10th Armoured Division]. 
But the main lack of offensive eagerness was in the North; 
both 9 Aus Div and 51 Div were quite clear that I Armd Div 
could have got out without difficulty in the morning. 
LUMSDEN was not displaying that drive and determination 
that is so necessary when things begin to go wrong; there 
was a general lack of offensive eagerness in 10 Corps.57 
Lumsden and his armoured commanders disagreed with Montgomery‟s 
ideas for the use of armour.  Montgomery‟s original plan envisaged the 
armour of Lumsden‟s X Corps helping to open up a corridor through the 
German defences by night. The armoured commanders were markedly 
reluctant, concerned that if the mines could not be lifted in time, their 
tanks would be caught in daylight hemmed in by mines and easily 
destroyed by enemy anti-tank guns before they could get forward to 
ground where they could bring on a battle with the enemy tanks.  This 
opposition swayed Montgomery into changing his intentions and fixing 
on a plan which would rely on simultaneous attacks by infantry to help 
clear routes through which the armour could advance.  However, when 
daylight came on 24 October, neither 1st nor 10th Armoured Divisions, 
etc. were in a position to exploit.  Montgomery continued to urge his 
armoured commanders to get their divisions through the minefields, but 
little attempt was made to comply and Lumsden did little to bring 
pressure on them to act in accordance with Montgomery‟s commands.  
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Lumsden‟s was outspoken in his disagreement with Montgomery‟s plans 
to use armoured divisions to break through frontally, to which it can be 
added that „Lumsden of course was a completely different character: 
extrovert, coloured scarf, cavalryman, fly-whisk – Monty‟s bête-noir, that 
sort of chap‟.58 
     As Montgomery noted in the Conclusion to his diary notes on „The 
Battle of Egypt 23 October-7 November 1942‟ „the training of 
Commanders by their superiors was unknown; there was no firm 
doctrine of war on which to base training‟.59  Montgomery could 
recognise – perhaps because of the authoritarian streak in his own 
personality – that there was a requirement to shape everybody according 
to the same mental recipe.  But, he also recognised, a lot of the time 
people were not taking any notice of his ideas and not doing things in 
the way he wanted.  This recognition was what was behind his first foray 
into pamphlet literature intended for very senior officers in the 8th 
Army.  As he explained to Brooke: „there is much to be learned from 
these two battles [the defensive battle of Alam Halfa and his offensive 
battle, El Alamein], and together I think they provide the material for a 
very short and quite small pamphlet on the “Conduct of Battle”.  This 
might be given to all Generals, and perhaps Brigadiers, and would be a 
good doctrine for the whole Army‟.60 
     However, the process of teaching his commanders „how we will fight 
our battles, and therefore how we must adjust our training‟ was not 
actually as straightforward as he initially thought it would be.61  At high 
level in the British Army, what official policy was tended to depend on 
who was perceiving it and from what perspective, and senior officers 
were allowed wide latitude to interpret doctrine as they saw fit.  
Montgomery recognised as much in his second pamphlet for senior 
officers: „I do not expect for a moment that all senior commanders will 
agree with what I say‟.62  Further, a military „culture‟ existed  which left 
inculcation of the Army‟s, army commander‟s, or higher commander‟s 
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understanding of the methods of actual fighting and training largely to 
the discretion of unit commanding officers.  So, Montgomery, by 1943, 
was half-way there as a good teacher and trainer because he had the 
conception of the need for it, and a method: „in the Eighth Army I 
concentrate on the Generals.  If they know their stuff, they will teach the 
soldiers‟.63  However, finding ways to get people to buy into his 
conception was equally important.  Montgomery seems to have had 
some difficulty doing that.  Individuals can be representative of 
experience, as well as formations, units and organizations.  Many of 
Montgomery‟s senior armour commanders had a very different past 
experience from Montgomery‟s own, not only because they were tankers 
in background but also because the experience of some stretched back 
to the early fighting under O‟Connor.  Hence the two pamphlets 
Montgomery wrote in North Africa. The fact that the second is so much 
shorter than the first – a mere nine pages – probably represents a 
definite attempt by Montgomery to give commanders a greater incentive 
to read it. 
 
 
 
 
     In retrospect, it is possible to see the views of many of Britain‟s 
senior soldiers between the world wars as ill-founded because of a 
failure to perceive that the army might need not only mobility but also 
the particular combination of mobility and offensive power associated 
with modern, mechanised-armoured forces, that is combined-arms 
mechanised forces.  In the 1920s and 1930s, the army developed 
concepts and an organization to fight a future major war – but not the 
next war.  Nevertheless, the capability of the 1937-43 type of British 
infantry battalion to move by vehicle gave a workable capacity for 
tactical and strategic mobility which was to have significant operational, 
strategic effects in the hands of certain commanders in 1940 and into 
1941.  
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     In the light of the way the German Army fought with tanks and 
infantry early in the Second World War, among the most serious 
shortcomings of doctrine and organization that can be identified with 
respect to the early British armoured divisions until well into 1942 are 
inappropriate initial concepts for the tactical employment of tanks and 
infantry together, the imbalance between the amount of armour and the 
number of available infantry, and the unsuitable organization whereby 
armour and infantry were organised separately.  Montgomery was not 
someone somehow „waiting in the wings‟ with a pre-thought-out „off the 
shelf‟ correct solution for these problems when war came again. 
     For Montgomery, as an army, then army group commander, finding 
really suitable subordinates who were not only content specialists  
having an armour background, but who saw completely eye-to-eye with 
him on the handling of armour, and who also possessed the necessary 
forceful decisive leadership was a challenge that would take some time 
to overcome. 
     It took Montgomery some time to realise what was going wrong.  He 
was not really closely involved with tank developments in the interwar 
period or with directing armour in the battle for France in 1940.  What 
one is looking at is an uneducated mind, arriving at the problem in 1942 
inexperienced in armoured warfare.  Montgomery was half-way there by 
the middle of the war in his conception of the need for training.  
However, even on the eve of and in the course of his great victory, the 
Battle of El Alamein he had trouble getting his armour to deliver what 
he wanted them to.  This was not because of a lack of senior officers‟ 
training.  It might be said that Montgomery‟s experience and mental 
outlook had not prepared him for the challenge of armoured warfare.  
What can be said, however, is that Montgomery‟s „model‟ for armoured 
warfare differed from O‟Connor‟s victories in 1940-41 in its evolution 
during 1942-43. 
     The limitations of development that the formation of British 
armoured divisions around 1937-38 left set up problems that had to be 
faced by people in the war.  The initial development had been to 
motorise the infantry.  The problem had been perceived as mobility.  In 
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North Africa it was still perceived to be the problem there. The solution 
was yet to come.  In North-West Europe it would become clear that the 
problem was not just how to get the infantry from where they were to 
where they wanted to be but how to fight together.  Much that is of 
significance happened between 1940-41 and 1943-44 that produced a 
coordinated doctrine in North-West Europe in 1944-45.  What was 
lacking, what it is that still had to happen, is the subject of the chapters 
which follow, starting with the ill-starred influence of desert-influenced 
fighting methods and doctrine in Normandy. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
‘A TECHNIQUE, A MYSTERY AND ALMOST A VOCABULARY’.1  
DESERT-INFLUENCED METHODS OF COMBAT, ‘D-DAY’ AND 
THE EARLY CAMPAIGN IN NORMANDY 
 
 
     In Normandy, there were eight principal 21st Army Group operations 
in the Anglo-Canadian sector.  They were: PERCH (10-14 June 1944), 
EPSOM (26-30 June), CHARNWOOD (8-11 July), GOODWOOD (18-20 
July), SPRING (25 July), BLUECOAT (30 July-6August), TOTALIZE (7-10 
August) and TRACTABLE (14-16 August).  They are looked at, where 
necessary in the context of overall operational development, to get the 
full view across 21st Army Group of what was working and what was 
not working.  It must also be noted that the issue of selection of 
operations is further focussed by the issues of finding commanders for 
whom primary data could be accessed (see Appendix II).  Furthermore, 
the thesis is not designed to be a comprehensive overview of Normandy 
operations: this story of lessons learned is then contextualised as the 
overall story unfolded through the liberations of the Low Countries and 
the invasion of Germany.  Thus the operations chosen are designed to 
be representative „snapshots‟ of what was going on at that period in the 
campaign.  The early Normandy operations were breakthrough attempts, 
aimed at capturing roads leading to Caen.  Later operations were aimed 
at capturing roads leading on from Caen.  
     Villers-Bocage and the defeat suffered by the „Desert Rats‟, 7th 
Armoured Division (Operation PERCH), has been widely held to 
epitomise the failings of British armour during the early fighting in the 
bocage countryside in Normandy.2  Conventionally, historians have 
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concentrated on the sharp contrast between action before and after that 
time.  Past experience appeared to suggest that what was wanted for 
decisive victory was not only better tanks and tank crews, but also more 
tanks than the enemy.  The emphasis was on manoeuvre by armoured-
only forces to destroy the enemy tank force, employing mobility, speed, 
and surprise.  Once that was achieved there would be little role for 
infantry in the defeat of enemy tanks.  Available firepower prevailed, and 
covered the need to address a flawed armour-infantry doctrine which 
allowed the principle of separately brigaded armour and infantry 
(although there was much more to it than this).  The 7th Armoured 
Division had gained its reputation in open country operations in the 
Western Desert of North Africa but fighting in the close, congested 
terrain of North-West Europe required a very different approach to both 
operations and techniques.3  Historians have highlighted a number of 
„key issues‟ centred on armoured doctrine in the Normandy campaign, 
apparently expressed in the Villers-Bocage experience.  These included 
problems concerning the use of armoured divisions, the precise role of 
independent armoured brigades, and the effectiveness of armour-
infantry co-operation.  Three key arguments or explanations have been 
offered for these failings, relating respectively to the conceptual, material 
and moral elements of military effectiveness.  Further, it has been 
suggested that too much analysis has assumed failure because of the 
way the British fought with armour in 1944, which was not the same 
way as the Germans in 1939-42.4  Furthermore, failure was assumed 
because they did not employ the panzergrenadier model for armour-
infantry organization and structure.  Yet the Villers-Bocage battle was 
just one action and, thereafter, armoured formations proved flexible 
enough to adapt.  It has been argued that both independent brigades 
and divisional brigade groups had developed workable tactics for 
infantry-armour co-operation by the middle point of the campaign in 
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 Buckley, British Armour, Normandy, 44, p. 5.  That way is well summed-up in the phrase 
„the 1940 Panzer way‟.  This author is indebted to D.F.S. Fourie, Professor Extraordinarius 
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Normandy.5  The implications of these new tactics for armour-infantry 
unit organization and structure had yet to be fully explored.  However, 
within this time scale, some change happened faster in the tank and 
armoured brigades and as this chapter will demonstrate the explanation 
hitherto given is incomplete.  After looking at the creation of doctrine for 
the invasion, the chapter will examine how this actually played out on 
the ground, thus moving from a consideration of doctrine at a 
conceptual level to relate this to actual events on the ground.  
     As the war progressed, battle lessons learned by the army in the 
North African and Italian campaigns, commanders‟ experiences of 
fighting in Libya, Tunisia, and Italy, and developments in weapons 
technologies all played a part in the creation of doctrine for the assault 
on North-West Europe.  For three years however, the Western Desert 
was the only active theatre of operations in which the RAC was engaged 
in specifically armoured operations and operations only in support of 
infantry, its two principal roles at the level of major warfare.  The 
important victory at El Alamein in the Western Desert gave Montgomery 
great influence to shape the process of learning lessons from North 
Africa.  Nevertheless, the evidence that is presented suggests that for a 
sizeable number of officers in the RAC many lessons from current 
experience of desert warfare against the Italians and the Germans – even 
after Alamein – served merely to confirm the soundness of doctrine and 
methods deriving from earlier, pre-war thinking and experience.  For 
this reason they held that these lessons must have universal 
application.  Brigadier the Hon. W.R.N. Hinde and Major-General 
G.W.E.J. („Bobby‟) Erskine were representative of this type of thinking.  
Hinde‟s command of 22nd Armoured Brigade, 7th Armoured Division is 
a yardstick for desert-influenced methods of combat in Normandy.  
Further, in a period when doctrine was being changed at lower level, his 
involvement in the process by which it was being criticised, or created, 
may be considered as a baseline against which the involvement of others 
can usefully be compared.  Erskine commanded 7th Armoured Division 
during the Battle of Normandy, having successfully commanded the 
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same division in Tunisia.  He took command of the division there in 
January1943 after service as a commander and staff officer in the 
Western Desert and was a widely respected commander.  However, in 
the later desert war and in the Tunisian campaign the need for more 
infantry was felt acutely, but how this might play out in north-west 
France was by no means clear.  Also, many tank veterans of the Italian 
campaign where all had to be done across narrow fronts, in line ahead 
were absolutely horrified at the idea of fighting en masse „the 1940 
Panzer way‟, or the way the British fought in1941 and 1942.  
     In Normandy, the breakout was preceded by two months of intense, 
static warfare.  It was a trying time for all commanders, at every level.  
There were failings in performance, documented by junior commanders, 
which were recognised very quickly by senior officers on the ground.  
Further, as will be shown, Major-Generals G.P.B. Roberts and L.G. 
Whistler, two divisional commanders of particular importance who made 
their names as highly successful commanders in the Western Desert, 
were important as – respectively – an instigator and a driver of further 
tactical change in Normandy, and, thus, are representative of different 
types of officer than Hinde and Erskine.  Neither Roberts nor Whistler 
was bound by or to the lessons learned from previous victories.  
Furthermore, the first-hand accounts from command at the divisional 
and brigade levels hint at the existence of a group of officers at high level 
who never believed that desert practice was necessarily „best practice‟.  
     Another division in XXX Corps during EPSOM, June 1944 was 49th 
(West Riding) Infantry Division commanded by the equally respected 
Major-General E.H. Barker.  He did not serve in the desert and took 
command of 49th Infantry Division in the UK in April1943.  After 
hearing of Erskine‟s dismissal from command of 7th Armoured Division 
in August 1944, Barker, who had criticised the action at Villers-Bocage 
and believed that „his [Erskine‟s] chaps did make a pretty good mess of 
the party on the right of the British‟, expressed long-standing doubts 
about the relevance of warfare as practised in North Africa to the 
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conditions in North-West Europe. „I always felt that B[obby]‟s desert 
training would not be any good in this form of warfare‟.6   
 
 
The Legacy of the Western Desert, Lessons of North Africa, and the 
Creation of Doctrine 
 
 
     The dissemination of tactical doctrine was, as always, primarily the 
responsibility of the War Office.  In practice, however, senior officers 
were allowed wide latitude to interpret the army‟s understanding of the 
methods of actual fighting as they saw fit.  Further, training to achieve a 
sufficient level of fighting capability was left largely to the discretion of 
unit commanding officers.   
     During his period as Chief Instructor at the Senior Officers School in 
1940-1 Colonel L.O. Lyne found great difficulty in keeping a „reasonable 
balance in our teaching of tactics between the impressive early German 
victories, the evolution of our own army for future operations in Europe 
and the very specialised conditions of the fighting in the Western 
Desert‟.7  High-level commanders could and did disagree both with each 
other and with the War Office on the lessons of battle in North Africa 
and the „correct‟ way to fight with men, tanks and guns at the level of 
major warfare.  Senior officers were allowed considerable latitude to 
interpret doctrine as they saw fit because it was recognised that official 
doctrinal publications could inevitably only present an ideal set of 
circumstances, which might all too infrequently be realised in combat. 
Lyne‟s description of the way in which the army as an institution 
attempted to adjust its doctrine to a variety of different experiences was 
an accurate reflection of the situation at the time.  Official armour 
doctrine was for these reasons still in a state of flux on D-Day. 
     As General M.O‟M. Creagh‟s instructions to 7th Armoured Division 
show, the armoured division of 1940-42 was not intended to assault 
heavily defended enemy positions but to fight tank battles in 
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manoeuvre.  Creagh considered that although „in the main, in the past, 
we have not been engaged in tank versus tank battles; in the future, we 
are bound to be.  The desert lends itself to this form of attack‟.   
Creagh‟s view was that „the attack on a defended position will rarely be 
the objective of an armoured unit, it should be circumvented wherever 
possible‟.8  Reflecting this intended role, armoured divisions lacked an 
integral infantry element beyond the motor battalion attached to each 
armoured brigade.  Nevertheless, adaptation proved possible, utilising 
this (augmented) battalion to provide the nucleus of mixed, light mobile 
forces.   
     In a situation where the enemy was in great strength but largely tied 
to static defences – as the Italians were in Libya, 1940-41 – an 
improvisation in the form of Jock columns developed into a tactical 
system, ideally suited to prevailing conditions.  Named after Major-
General J.C. Campbell, the originator of the idea, the Jock column was 
a mixed force – typically a few light tanks or armoured cars, guns and 
lorry-borne infantry – designed and organised for mobility, surprise and 
combined arms action.  Campbell was commander of the 7th Armoured 
Division‟s Support Group, 1941-42.  His ideas and those of Lieutenant-
General W. H. E Gott, successively commander of 7th Armoured 
Division and then XIII Corps in 1941-2, continued to have a very 
powerful influence even after the initial stages of the campaign in the 
Western Desert.  After Alamein, Major-General Erskine wrote, „I don‟t 
think either he [Gott] or Jock Campbell will ever be forgotten.  Those two 
held the field under terrible conditions for years‟.9  Erskine did not 
actually arrive in the desert until February 1942.  In his view, in the 
absence of a viable armoured force, Gott and Campbell had used their 
guns and infantry „to the maximum extent permitted by the 
circumstances‟.10  Columns had, however, insufficient supporting 
infantry to take and hold ground and were certainly not able to defend it 
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against enemy tanks.  Nevertheless, combining the capability of 
motorised infantry to move over great ranges, and the mobility and 
hitting power of the 25-pdr gun, when used correctly, columns „could 
make themselves a very great nuisance and give the enemy a feeling of 
great insecurity on his open [desert] flank‟.11  Erskine believed that 8th 
Army‟s success in 1941 despite its inferior tanks and poor anti-tank 
guns was entirely the result of Gott‟s skilful methods. „Since we were at 
a disadvantage in a stand up fight we had to adopt other methods‟.12  
Thus, although Erskine did not experience the 1941 desert battles first-
hand he was satisfied that his conclusions, „drawn as a result of those 
who had experience‟, both accurately reflected the challenges faced by 
armour and confirmed the fundamental soundness of the methods 
employed to meet them.   
     However Roberts, who commanded 3rd Royal Tank Regiment (3rd 
RTR), 7th Armoured Division in the Western Desert in 1941 and went on 
to take temporary command of 7th Armoured Division in 1943 prior to 
Erskine, believed that „having had too easy a time against the Italians 
and learnt some rather false lessons, one has to admit, in retrospect, 
that we were still feeling our way regarding armoured warfare and had 
not, even after Battleaxe [15-17 June, 1941], appreciated the important 
factors‟.13  Erskine and Roberts between them commanded two of the 
three standard British armoured divisions in Normandy and Roberts, 
unlike Erskine, was successful in both North Africa and North-West 
Europe.  In North Africa, Roberts recognised that it was mainly the 
enemy anti-tank gun that was damaging and destroying British tanks; 
Erskine did not and thus found it difficult to conserve his tanks to 
engage and destroy the enemy tanks.  The differing lessons drawn by 
these two senior operational commanders from the fighting in North 
Africa 1940-43 influenced their approaches both before D-Day and 
during the early stages of the Normandy campaign. 
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     The methods employed to address the challenges of tank armour that 
was inferior in quality, tank guns inferior in performance and an 
infantry not confident of meeting an armoured attack without tank 
support because of the inferiority of their anti-tank guns involved the 
use of mobility, speed and surprise to attempt to destroy Rommel‟s 
armour in a decisive tank versus tank encounter (e.g. BATTLEAXE), 
having manoeuvred „to force him to attack on our terms advantageous to 
his [i.e. disadvantageous to him]‟.14  For Erskine the principal offensive 
goal was to neutralise the enemy‟s armour and „see it off‟.  This always 
required offensive action relying on tanks‟ mobility more than their 
firepower.  This reflected previous thinking and experience.  This desired 
outcome was not always achieved because „there was too much respect 
of [i.e. for] tanks in the case of our infantry and of 88mm guns in the 
case of our tanks‟.15  The problem was thus one of morale and method 
as well as of technology.  The enemy‟s chief tactic was to use some of his 
tanks as bait to lure the British tanks on to concealed anti-tank 
batteries, then counter-attack with tanks while using more of his tanks 
to find weak spots in the British defence – generally infantry positions.16  
Erskine was able to engender a strong morale but not to solve the 
problem of method.  As he afterwards acknowledged, „we should have 
used the infantry – with their 25 pdrs – to neutralise the 88s and not 
charged on them as we did only too often‟.17 
     The experience of fighting the German army in the Western Desert 
forced a major reappraisal of the structure of an armoured division in 
mid-1942.  British armour was forced to seek methods of engaging the 
infantry protecting the enemy‟s anti-tank guns.  Although War Office 
doctrine still dictated that armour and infantry be kept separate, the 
number of armoured brigades in the armoured division was cut to one 
and an infantry brigade was added.  A further British response was the 
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development of the infantry box, protected by artillery and minefields.  A 
„Brigade box‟ was designed to be a more or less self-contained anti-tank 
barrier, around which British armour would be free to pivot or 
manoeuvre.  In the Alam Halfa battle (31 August 1942), 133rd Brigade, 
44th Infantry Division, provided the „pivot‟ for Montgomery‟s defeat of 
Rommel‟s attempt to break through the El Alamein line.  Brigadier 
Whistler, who temporarily commanded 133rd Brigade during this battle, 
described the role of pivot as follows: „our armour to the West and some 
more to the South East and us for the Boche to bump his head 
against‟.18  To provide 10th Armoured Division with its additional 
infantry 133rd Brigade was detached from 44th Infantry Division and 
re-equipped as lorried infantry in September 1943 – but little appears to 
have been done within 10th Armoured Division to understand the joint 
handling of infantry and armour.  Before D-Day, Whistler was moved 
from command of 131st Brigade, the divisional lorried infantry brigade 
of 7th Armoured Division, in accordance with Montgomery‟s policy to 
put a few experienced commanders in inexperienced formations.  
Therefore, this was less an indication of the success of new techniques 
than of the fact that he was a proven leader with recent battle 
experience.   However, depriving 7th Armoured Division in this way of 
many experienced officers contributed to the parlous state the division 
found itself in at Villers-Bocage.  Whistler proved very capable when 
faced with the new operating environment of North-West Europe.  
     The discussion must now focus again on technology, as well as 
tactics because the introduction of the American M4 Sherman tank in 
time for the Battle of El Alamein greatly helped to ease the problem of 
tank guns inferior in performance, that is the lack of a principal gun 
which allowed British tanks both to engage and defeat enemy tanks and 
anti-tank guns.19  The 75mm dual purpose (DP) gun provided armoured 
divisions with enough firepower to prevail in the Western Desert in the 
manner envisioned by the War Office.  However, it also allowed the 
principle that there should be separate armoured and infantry brigades 
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to be maintained, and find its way into North-West Europe.20  Further, 
in the North African desert campaign after El Alamein more infantry 
were found to be necessary to assist in the cracking and exploitation of 
delaying positions.  However, as Erskine acknowledged later: „I don‟t 
think this means that Armoured Divisions had changed their role [...] I 
certainly always felt the Armoured B[riga]de was the predominating 
element while I commanded 7th Armoured Div[ision]‟.21 
     Turning to Roberts, and how he saw things after the German army 
had intervened in the desert war, it was, as he recognised, mainly the 
German anti-tank gun that was the problem.  Against the less powerful 
German infantry anti-tank guns what was needed was a high explosive 
(HE) shell to defeat them by engaging the defending infantry 
concentrations.  However, where and when the German divisions 
deployed a small number of 88mm guns, this tactic (HE rounds) was 
insufficient since no British tank could close sufficiently to be able to 
deliver a HE round. Thus, the 25-pdr, referred to by Erskine, became a 
fundamental part of the British combined arms mix for armoured 
warfare from mid-1941.  It became apparent to Roberts, however, that 
„what was required was a method of defeating the A/T gun, necessitating 
a greater co-operation between all arms, particularly between the tanks 
and the artillery, and a gun in the tank which could deal with A/T 
guns‟.22        
     The solution was better tactical co-operation between better anti-
tank guns and tanks, and a tank gun capable of firing HE as well as AP 
shot.  In the interim, tanks should no longer lead assaults, although in 
Operation CRUSADER (November 1941 – January 1942), for example, at 
Sidi Rezegh, the newly arrived 22nd Armoured Brigade was lured into 
making a head-on assault against well dug-in anti-tank guns without 
adequate artillery and infantry support, losing a major proportion of 
their new cruiser tanks.  In the absence of an adequate British tank and 
anti-tank gun, however, tanks – particularly the American M3 Grant 
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tank – could still be effective against German tanks.  It is important to 
note that Roberts himself never had to fight with older British 
equipment.23  He was moving from a problem of technology to a problem 
of method.  He was associated particularly with the appearance of the 
Grant tank which had a 75mm gun in a side sponson, capable of firing a 
HE shell.  For a short period from early to mid-1942 the 75mm guns in 
the British tanks (Grants) were superior in anti-tank capability to any 
guns mounted in German tanks.  It was only in mid-1942 that the 
Germans installed a long-barrelled high-velocity 50mm gun on some 
Panzer IIIs giving the resultant PzKpfw IIIJ the same penetration power 
as their 50mm towed anti-tank gun.  This was followed by the 
appearance of the new long-barrelled high-velocity 75mm gun on the 
PzKpfw IVF later in 1942.   
     In early 1942, Roberts endeavoured to put his case „for a [bigger] 
British tank gun which would at least penetrate the front of a Panzer IV 
at 1000 yards‟ to Lieutenant-General G. Le Q. Martel, Commander, RAC 
(MGRAC).24  Martel desired changes in organization and tactics to 
conform to the newer concepts of a combined arms armoured division 
which would lose one armoured brigade but have an infantry brigade 
added.  His ideas did not include planning for a gun larger than a 6-pdr 
on any British tank.  Roberts thought that Martel based his ideas largely 
on the action of a single battalion of infantry tanks in France in 1940, 
took little account of the experience and recommendations of others, 
and was a „menace‟: „he just has no idea of a modern tank battle!‟25  
Roberts envisaged British tanks in firm defensive positions able to 
destroy the most modern German tanks with long range fire with little 
need for co-operation between British infantry and tanks.26  His 
principal offensive goal was the destruction of the enemy anti-tank gun 
and he was prepared to employ his tanks‟ firepower and mobility, in 
conjunction with other arms, to achieve this but to use his (superior) 
firepower to destroy enemy tanks from static positions.  This reflected 
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lessons learned from immediate experience – and Roberts‟s intimate 
connexion with the handling of armour in the field to that time.       
     In late 1942, Roberts came fully to understand the vulnerability of 
armour against strong and well prepared defences after Rommel had 
retreated to a new defensive line at Mersa Brega.27  After Alamein, in the 
offensive pursuit and exploitation phase, even the Sherman was 
vulnerable.  Therefore, infantry were required to lead the assault.  
Roberts himself conceded that he did not have much knowledge of 
infantry but in his temporary command of 7th Armoured Division he 
now realised how important infantry was for offensive armoured tactics. 
At that point – effectively the end of the desert war – Roberts did not 
have a clear idea of how this should work out in practice but he already 
knew it was important.28 
     In Tunisia, Roberts recognised that with the growing availability of 
equipment such as the Sherman which made all the difference to tactics 
and capabilities, he had an opportunity of putting across his ideas, 
which came from his experience with both 8th Army and 1st Army.  In 
April 1943, it seemed to Roberts that there was a good possibility of 
getting through the Kournine pass on a divisional plan, but this would 
require much closer co-operation between armour and infantry, because 
„there would be chaos if the armour alone attempted it‟.29  The problem 
was not now primarily one of equipment deficit or inferiority; it was one 
of devising ways for all arms to operate as a tactical offensive whole and 
in the context of a new operating environment which offered new 
possibilities to the defending enemy, and where it was very difficult for 
armour to operate alone.  What was needed was an improved way of 
working with the infantry. 
     The independent tank and armoured brigades were intended to 
provide, or be available to provide, close support for infantry divisions in 
the assault phase of operations in North-West Europe.  War Office 
doctrine argued that the independent Tank Brigades, equipped with the 
heavily armoured A22 Churchill infantry support tank, were best suited 
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to close assault operations. Some sixteen months before D-Day, 
however, Montgomery held, in a letter to the Vice-Chief of the Imperial 
General Staff, that „a heavy infantry tank is not wanted‟.30  The lessons 
he drew from 8th Army‟s experience of tank-infantry co-operation in the 
desert varied considerably from those reported by 1st Army in Tunisia. 
Its commander, Lieutenant-General Anderson, wrote thirteen months 
before D-Day: 
I think my type of country brought out more things which 
apply to Europe than does desert fighting [:] the great 
importance of night work; use of concentrated art[iller]y; 
need for much more skill in using our mortars; the fact that 
old hands of the last war reacted to the threat from open 
flanks far more actively than did youngsters (we always had 
flanks wide open!); value of Churchills; need for infantry in 
an armoured div[ision] to be intensely pugnacious & quick 
in attack[.]31 
It had been the War Office‟s original hope that all independent brigades 
would be equipped with Churchills but not enough of these could be 
produced.  Consequently, the Sherman was pressed into service, 
creating the distinction between tank and armoured brigades; but 
Montgomery and his 8th Army staff were resistant to any doctrinal 
distinction between armoured brigades largely equipped with Sherman 
tanks and tank brigades equipped with Churchills.32  Subsequently, 
Montgomery overrode the experience of 1st Army and discounted the 
value of its commander.  „I am sorry about Kenneth [Anderson]‟, Barker 
wrote to his wife after D-Day, „but he and M[ontgomery] never got on 
and it would be an impossible situation for everyone if K[enneth] was in 
it‟.33  Attempts which had been made within 21st Army Group to develop 
specific tactics for Shermans to be used in the infantry support role 
were effectively blocked after Montgomery‟s arrival.  
     However, very soon after the invasion of Normandy it was coming to 
be believed that the objectives of an army tank battalion could be to use 
the Churchill‟s cross-country ability to get into positions where it could 
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not easily be seen, with the object of closing the gap between the 
superior performance of the German 88mm or long 75mm guns and the 
Churchill‟s own armament in order better to support the assaulting 
infantry. 34  This could have drawn on the experiences of tank brigades 
in the Tunisian campaign, which also led to the conclusion that „the 
tank must not be tied rigidly to moving at infantry speed but must move 
where they can best support the infantry by fire, either direct or from 
flank and hull-down positions‟.35  This might be considered analogous 
not to the methods of armour-infantry co-operation which had evolved 
in the Western Desert but more to those of air-ground co-operation.  The 
two strands of thought demanded roles for the tanks which would prove 
contradictory.  This was compounded by a failure to resolve the issue of 
what might be the most appropriate tactics for different types of tank. 
     Official doctrine emphasised the idea of close physical proximity.  
The November 1943 pre-Montgomery doctrine of 21st Army Group 
(General Sir B.C.T. Paget, C-in-C) for the co-operation of tanks with 
infantry divisions, authored by Brigadier H.E. Pyman, BGS (Training) 
21st Army Group, was that an all-tank assault echelon would be 
unusual.  Montgomery‟s initial idea was that the tanks should go first, 
well ahead, and the infantry should follow.36  Pyman‟s doctrine appears 
to have made an impact on 6th Guards Tank Brigade and particularly 
on 3rd Tank Battalion Scots Guards in training.37  This was, however, 
before Montgomery‟s intervention and before the problems in Normandy 
had become apparent when doctrine was „unlearned‟ and changed 
again.  However, the doctrine constructed by Pyman and Paget is 
illustrative of competing sets of ideas regarding minor tactics, yet 
another unhelpful obstacle to be surmounted. 
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Early Battles for Caen: Manoeuvre (PERCH) and Pitched Battle 
(EPSOM) 
 
 
     In the process of fighting from 6 June, the supposed lessons of North 
Africa were displaced by new experiences.  It was soon evident to some 
that the methods utilised in the North African desert were not going to 
work in Europe.  Within days of the initial landing it was plain that 
specific operations were not going well.  In the British/Canadian sector, 
gains anticipated on D-Day had not all been achieved.  Expected 
progress in consolidating the bridgeheads established on D-Day had still 
not been made.  There even seemed to be a chance that operations to 
create the conditions for a breakout might stall completely, the military 
situation return to a stalemate such as had existed in the First World 
War and the theatre turn into a campaign of attrition.  Operation 
PERCH (12-15 June 1944), the daring „right hook‟ manoeuvre aimed at 
Villers-Bocage and the vital high ground to its northeast was intended to 
drive a wedge between German forces in western Normandy and Caen – 
preventing reinforcement of Caen.  This was to be achieved by XXX 
Corps with divisions that had served so well in North Africa, foremost 
among them the „Desert Rats‟.  Montgomery argued, however,  that this 
had all been anticipated and was just part of his original plan, namely 
that remorseless pressure rather than remarkable progress by the 
British would force the Germans to commit their armoured reserves on 
the left while he built up for a breakthrough by the Americans on the 
right.38  Villers-Bocage was never in itself an important objective to 
Montgomery.  The defeat at Villers-Bocage was a setback.  However, the 
consequent failure of PERCH set up a pattern which shaped the future 
of the Normandy campaign.  The British were forced to recognise that 
the resolute German defence and the dense anti-tank defences which 
they had put in place in the difficult terrain required new operational 
and tactical methods if they were to be overcome.  The setback at 
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Villers-Bocage was largely created by imprecision as to Montgomery‟s 
subsequent intentions at the interface of concept and execution. 
     The commander of XXX Corps in June 1944 was Lieutenant-General 
G.C. Bucknall, whose previous service had been in Italy where he had 
established a reputation as a successful divisional commander.  When 
Erskine took command of 7th Armoured Division in Tunisia in 1943, 
command of the division‟s 22nd Armoured Brigade went to Brigadier 
W.R.N. Hinde.  The British force at Villers-Bocage was composed of two 
regiments of this brigade and elements of 131st Brigade, the divisional 
lorried infantry brigade.  Hinde was, therefore, the commander „on the 
spot‟ at Villers-Bocage.  It is useful to recall here the idea of Jock 
columns, and the fact that the desert war had been a war where 
movement, speed and surprise were very important, particularly in its 
early stages.  This experience coloured Erskine‟s approach.  The first 
task was to push through 50th Infantry Division on to Tilly.  Erskine 
afterwards described his task thus:  
After some unsuccessful stabs at Tilly, I suggested the use 
of the Division‟s mobility round the right flank of 50 Div.  I 
was sure there was a soft spot here and had in fact 
reconnoitred routes and had a cut and dried plan for a 
swoop on Villers Bocage.39 
     The thrust by 22nd Armoured Brigade at Villers-Bocage on 13 June 
1944 drew heavily for its inspiration on the idea that finding an empty 
or open flank was tactically very important and also on the use of an 
armoured column to drive in the enemy rearguards.  Erskine 
appreciated, however, that if successful, such an armoured manoeuvre 
also deprived the enemy of the possibility of defence in depth, with 
beneficial results that facilitated the subsequent operations.40  Such a 
column would, however, be in a parlous position if ambushed by 
German units with heavy armour as happened on Operation PERCH.  
When it was decided that the situation was becoming untenable and 
that 22nd Armoured Brigade must be withdrawn from Villers-Bocage, 
the Desert Rats contracted into a small defensive box position near 
Amaye.  It was decided that 22nd Armoured Brigade should withdraw 
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from it during the night of 14/15 June.  Heavy artillery fire had helped 
keep the box intact during 14 June.  This was not the desert, however.  
Captain J.R. Brown, serving with 3rd Regiment Royal Horse Artillery., 
the divisional artillery attached to 131st Brigade, 7th Armoured 
Division, recorded: 
Our troops began to feel their way forward over country 
where our O[bservation]P[ost]s found observation difficult 
and by early in the afternoon our forward troops (the tanks) 
were beyond the town of Villers Bocage leaving pockets of 
enemy behind.  Then the trouble started and it was evident 
that one division could not hope to break through the 
strong enemy positions.41  
     Because of the nature of the country it was difficult for the artillery 
to provide accurate fire support.  Even though there was a successful 
anti-tank defence at Villers-Bocage which thus apparently confirmed 
lessons which had been learned by 7th Armoured Division in the desert 
and Tunisia, in particular during the Medenine battle in March 1943, it 
was not what was required.  In Erskine‟s view, „the [Medenine] battle 
proved conclusively that infantry armed with the 6 pdr anti-tank gun 
was a match for the German Mk IV and the days when Inf[antry] were 
constantly over-run were finished‟ and this held true with respect to 
anti-tank defence at Villers-Bocage.42  Success at Medenine had been „in 
fact the end of Rommel and a fitting reward for a 2000 mile chase‟.43  
Reflecting official policy the armour and infantry had been brigaded 
separately and were required to fight the same battle separately: „the two 
Arm[oure]d B[riga]des [22nd and 8th] were positioned […] in such a way 
that they could work in co-operation [… while the infantry] will be 
prepared to fight their own fight with their A[nti-] T[an]k guns‟.44  
Erskine was attempting to use the same North African methods he had 
been using at Medenine and these did not work so well in Europe.  In 
the earlier fighting during Operation PERCH the tanks went first and the 
infantry came up later.  This was found to be ineffective.  It was 
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Bucknall who realised that leading with infantry would pay best in the 
bocage type of country.45  However, at that stage of the campaign it was 
still the norm that senior officers were permitted wide latitude with 
respect to methods.   
     The paradox of Villers-Bocage was that the successful anti-tank 
defence of the box did vindicate lessons learned in the desert and 
Tunisia, in particular during the Medenine battle.  Although no wire or 
minefields protected the British positions at Medenine, the infantry were 
well dug-in, in well-sited defensive positions and well equipped with 
anti-tank guns, including some of the new 17-pdrs.  As Erskine put it: 
„22nd Arm[oure]d B[riga]de were spoiling for  a fight and we had a very 
successful little party in capturing Medenine and some very important 
high ground overlooking it‟.46  This had included defeating a German 
counter-attack which was led by tanks, showing that infantry need not 
be overrun by tanks if they had sufficient, well placed anti-tank 
weapons. While effective  this was, however, incompatible with the kind 
of fire and movement tactics and the quicker tempo for sequencing 
operations as between defence and attack now being demanded by 
Montgomery, who considered Erskine had been „too long on the same 
line‟.47  Montgomery was conscious that the burden of the offensive in 
North-West Europe would have to be carried by 21st Army Group until 
the end of the campaign.  It was also evident to others:  „The whole thing 
is to keep this battle fluid and not allow it to crystallise‟, Barker wrote to 
his wife.48          
     As Bucknall, XXX Corps commander, understood it PERCH „was 
intended to be a sharp blow in the spirit and manner in which F.M. 
Montgomery wished these dog-fights in the struggle to establish the 
Bridgehead [...] and was NOT a major attack with all forces combined to 
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achieve a major Army object‟.49  He viewed the operation only in relation 
to the development of some means of breaking out of the stagnation 
threatening his front.  All this flowed from Bucknall‟s apparent belief 
that  
the main battle was proceeding for the capture of CAEN.  
„PERCH‟ was a subsidiary op[eration] to free the front of 30 
Corps (and incidentally act as a diversion).  [Therefore] 30 
Corps was under restriction as regards art[iller]y 
amm[unition] expenditure & material & was definitely 
precluded from launching at this moment into a „Corps 
Battle‟, which might compromise the Army Com[man]d[er]‟s 
plan, lead to a requirement for additional t[roo]ps to patch 
up or extricate, or increase art[iller]y amm[unition] 
expenditure.50  
He believed that his decisions reflected Montgomery‟s concept of 
operations for this particular operation.  
     Bucknall almost understood Montgomery‟s operational methods, or 
understood them in theory.  However, Montgomery was a very „modern‟ 
commander in the speed at which he moved to change his plan in 
response to changing tactical situations.  Further, more rapid tempo in 
sequencing between phases and operations was a factor in 
Montgomery‟s response to new tactical and operational problems in 
Normandy.  If there was a flaw in Bucknall‟s understanding it was that 
he continued to think of Villers-Bocage and PERCH in terms of a 
subsidiary action or sideshow.  There were no sideshows. 
     Hinde‟s reaction to the Villers-Bocage setback and the failure of 
PERCH was criticism that the close country did not call for the tanks 
and infantry of the armoured divisions‟ armoured brigades but instead 
called for infantry supported by the independent tank brigades.  While 
he drew no lessons from 22nd Armoured Brigade‟s operations from 6 to 
15 June to correct what had been exposed as a flawed approach to 
operations, some middle ranking officers evidently saw the importance 
of doing so, as will be seen in the next chapter.  Further, most modern 
historians accept Montgomery‟s own account and the older accounts 
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that the objective was to seize Villers-Bocage and then advance beyond 
it and into the flank of Panzer Lehr and that for Montgomery and 
General Dempsey PERCH was directly connected with the battle of 
Caen.51  However, Hinde held a significantly different view of the 
operation; to him PERCH „was never connected in my mind with any 
enveloping move against Caen, and I am perfectly clear that it was never 
represented to me that for that reason it was vital that it should 
succeed.‟  It appeared to him that „General Dempsey‟s view of the 
significance of this operation was not appreciated by subordinate 
commanders, and that is possibly understandable in view of the extreme 
speed with which the whole operation was laid on‟.52  Although it was 
Montgomery‟s and Dempsey‟s intention to push 7th Armoured Division 
on to the high ground northeast of Villers-Bocage at Point 213 (in 1944, 
now Point 217) and then on towards Evrécy to envelop the German line 
and make it untenable, this did not filter through to the commanders in 
22nd Armoured Brigade, whose instructions were to capture Villers-
Bocage and Point 213.53 
     Hinde was able to analyse the problem as being one that the 
armoured division was unsuited to address but he was not able to 
propose the solution.  Thus, after D-Day he commented that „the need 
for more inf[antry] was felt at once‟.  However, the fact that „inf[antry] 
can only see to the next hedge and t[an]ks possibly to the next hedge 
but one makes maint[enance] of direction and keeping touch of 
exceptional difficulty‟.  Further, the difficulty encountered in fixing the 
locations of German anti-tank guns and other positions meant that the 
country „was unquestionably one for inf[antry] supported by a few 
t[an]ks and not for t[an]ks with a small supporting component of 
inf[antry]‟.54   In other words, the close country called for infantry 
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supported by the heavy tanks of the independent tank brigades in place 
of the old heavy cavalry, not for the tanks and infantry associated in the 
armoured brigade of an armoured division which should continue to act 
as light cavalry.    
     If what Hinde was saying in 1944 was influenced by „armour-only‟ 
cavalry ideas of the 1930s in this way, then the desert had shown that 
they could work in an ideal set of circumstances. Thus he was able to 
write of „hare-ing after the Bosch [sic] as fast as we can go‟.55  The 
problem was that in northern Tunisia, Italy and Normandy they could 
not work in anything less than ideal circumstances, a conclusion also 
reached by Hinde: for example, the nature of the terrain in northern 
Tunisia and southern Italy favoured the defence.56  However, 
Montgomery‟s ultimate outflanking of the Mareth Line in Tunisia in 
March 1943 which led to the Gabes Gap and Wadi Akarit battles in April 
1943 appeared to substantiate his belief that while strategic surprise 
was not always possible tactical surprise was.  As a cavalryman, Hinde 
would have been very comfortable with just such a manoeuvre: „things 
have gone extremely well and the Mareth line as a line is finished‟.57  
Hinde was made a member of the Distinguished Service Order for his 
role in the advance from the Wadi Akarit to Sfax and secured a bar to 
his DSO during the advance from Medjez el bab to Tunis.  As Erskine 
put it: „we had some very interesting and profitable fighting through Sfax 
and Sousse ...  [T]he tanks never had better fun ...  [W]e cut off a great 
many Germans who were facing 51 Div on the road and did not realise 
we were on their flank and behind them‟.58  One may reasonably infer 
that Hinde shared this view, for he evidently excelled at that type of 
fighting.  
     In Italy, terrain and the way in which the Germans harnessed the 
topographical characteristics of the Italian peninsula meant there was 
no effective way to bring to bear the superiority the Allies enjoyed in 
tanks and artillery and airpower.   If stalemate was to be avoided, the 
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series of German defensive lines running across Italy meant the only 
alternative to hard slogging was to outflank by sea.  There was no other 
alternative.  Thus, battles in Italy could be „static and bloody affairs 
which involved protracted efforts to break strongly-held defensive 
positions.  [...]  On the other hand, these campaigns witnessed bold 
amphibious strokes, accompanied by the innovative application of force 
in complex joint and combined operations‟.59  Eisenhower‟s and 
Alexander‟s conclusion on the advantageousness of an amphibious 
landing near the Italian capital had, as its basis, the concept of applying 
the principal of concentration or mass, to bring to bear Allied superiority 
in tanks, artillery and airpower by outflanking the heavily fortified 
Gothic line. Indeed, the Anzio operation and the Arnhem operation can 
be seen as outcomes of attempts to solve very similar problems at the 
level of theatre strategy, both of which foundered on the practicality of a 
link up of the assault and relieving forces.  In the Sicily and Italian 
campaigns, at the operational and tactical levels however, the use of 
tanks was limited for the most part to close support of the infantry.  
Some infantry and armour commanders saw the necessity of learning 
lessons from this.60  However, as Hinde‟s first letter from Normandy 
after D-Day made clear, he had learned no practical operational or 
tactical lessons from his experience in Italy, commenting „it is an 
infantryman‟s country, far from easy for us and we shall be glad to see 
something a bit more open‟.61  
     At the highest command level, Operation PERCH was understood 
strategically as an armoured exploitation to create an untenable 
situation „in the field‟ for the enemy. However, at the operational level 
and at the level at which the operation translated into fighting this was 
not understood.  The reason for this was a systemic failure to ensure 
that those at all levels of senior command – especially those closest to 
the actual fighting – at once possessed a common approach to 
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operational methods flowing from a common understanding of how to 
fight and at the same time could put into practice moving from 
observation, orientation and decision to action at the pace Montgomery 
now demanded.  Montgomery was asking a lot, but he had to in order to 
get the job done.  Bucknall, the commander of XXX Corps saw the 
operation as a strategic diversion.  Erskine seems to have had a 
conception of penetration as a tactical opportunity to exploit the 
mobility of an armoured division from his experience at Sfax and after, 
but also a limited conception of what Villers-Bocage was all about and a 
practical inability to see how to use his experience in North Africa in the 
face of „infantryman‟s country‟.  The very considerable differences in the 
conception of the operation up and down the chain of command were 
magnified by the differences of experience and of the interpretation of 
that experience which commanders brought into play when called on to 
carry it out. 
     Whereas Villers-Bocage had been an armoured brigade attack, what 
followed at Fontenay-le-Pesnel on 25 June 1944 (Operation EPSOM) was 
an infantry attack with an independent armoured brigade supporting.  
XXX Corps was given the task of covering the right flank of VIII Corps‟ 
advance during the EPSOM offensive with a preliminary, southward 
thrust to secure the high ground overlooking VIII Corps‟ attack area: 
this task carried the codename MARTLET. 
     EPSOM was the operation which took the British over the River 
Odon, creating a distinct salient into the enemy line that was 
nevertheless narrower than was planned.  However, it failed to also 
cross the River Orne and to cut Caen off from the south.  In what would 
become familiar in subsequent operations, well-concealed German anti-
tank guns picked off Allied tanks, whilst longer range 88mm fire from 
high ground blocked the advance.  Further, more and more of the tanks 
and infantry of VIII Corps had to be employed protecting exposed flanks 
rather than securing additional ground.  Furthermore, the operation 
saw „a number of problems emerge over infantry-tank co-operation‟.62  In 
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particular, during EPSOM, no way was found to overcome the German 
gun positions on the ridge tops to allow tanks to capitalize on their gains 
on the lower slopes between the valleys of the River Odon and the River 
Orne.  The operation failed to achieve almost any of its objectives but 
„though it had undermined the German ability to prepare a major 
counterattack in the area, as arriving reinforcements had to be fed 
piecemeal into the battle to block British progress‟.63    
    
 
 
Map 2.1: Operation EPSOM
64
 
 
     
MARTLET (a subsidiary action of EPSOM, 25-28 June 1944) was to be 
carried out by 49th Infantry Division in its first major battle as a 
complete division.  Tank support was to be provided by having 8th 
Armoured Brigade under command.  Lieutenant S. F. Hills, of „C‟ 
Squadron, Nottinghamshire Sherwood Rangers Yeomanry, 8th 
Armoured Brigade, highlighted the differences between North African 
experience and tank warfare in the Normandy countryside:  
How some of our desert veterans longed for the open spaces 
of Libya and Tunisia, where tanks could manoeuvre and 
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fight an altogether different type of battle to this close-range 
slugging match of attrition in which they were now involved 
[…].  The main difference, apart from the ranges at which 
the respective battles were fought was the nature of the 
ground.  In rolling desert, when attacking or defending 
tanks remained hull-down and invisible in small 
depressions, there were advantages for both sides.  
Furthermore, tanks could move at speeds which made 
them difficult targets, and there was no danger of an 
infantryman with a hand-held Panzerfaust suddenly 
popping up from nowhere to fire at close quarters.  The 
bocage therefore posed unfamiliar and disconcerting 
problems, even for experienced crews.65 
     The divisional plan was for an advance on a two-brigade front with 
each brigade supported by tanks: 146th Brigade on the right (west) and 
147th Brigade on the left (east).  The method to be employed for this was 
that „arm[oure]d sq[uadro]ns will move f[or]w[ar]d after b[attalio]ns at 
telescope[periscope] first light to s[up]p[ort] the attack in the villages‟.  
The attack was to be accompanied by an exceptionally heavy barrage, 
including naval guns and the guns of VIII corps – one gun to less than 
ten yards of front –  and strong air support was anticipated „incl[uding] 
rocket[-firing] aircraft which can be over the target within 5 min[ute]s of 
briefing‟.66  The attack went in at 0415 on 25 June in a thick mist which 
it was thought would help the attackers.  An hour and a half later 
Barker wrote to his wife: 
I hear the visibility is bad as there is a thick ground mist in 
the valley but that is to our advantage as his Panthers can‟t 
see.  I gave the chaps a very strong barrage as I wanted to 
see that those going in for the first time had all the support 
I could give them.  […]  It‟s a lovely fine morning with no 
wind so I shall be getting full support from the air which is 
quite large.67 
     In fact, there would be no air support because of bad weather over 
the airfields in England.  Further, the mist did not protect the advancing 
tanks and infantry.  German mortars had been pre-registered on terrain 
features which assaulting infantry would obviously attempt to use for 
cover.  This type of frontal attack where the troops followed a heavy 
                                                          
65
 Hills, Tank into Normandy, p. 102. 
66
 IWM, Barker Papers, P78, 49th British Division Operations Orders, No. 3, 21 June 1944, 
paras. 5, 9 and 15. 
67
 Barker MSS, Maj.-Gen. E.H. Barker to his wife, 25 June 1944. 
77 
 
barrage was reminiscent of 1915-17, and without air support, required 
reserves of infantry on a similarly large scale. It also required that the 
tanks and infantry know what was expected of them and commanders 
knowing what was happening to other brigades of the division if the 
attack was to be successfully pressed home. The infantry led the attack, 
a format which did not accord with the changes that Montgomery had 
brought to established doctrine before D-Day to make it reflect the 
official experience of 8th Army: that in combined tank and infantry 
attacks the tanks should lead and the infantry should follow.68  It was 
essential for infantry and tanks to attack together.  However, according 
to Hills‟s account of the Sherwood Rangers‟ battle „tanks and infantry 
lost contact and everything became confused […] with enemy tanks of 
12 SS Panzer dug in defensively to the east of the town, and we did not 
have enough infantry to take the village.‟69 
     The official history demonstrates the slowness with which the 
operation went forward in its second phase: „for some reason that is not 
explained a second battalion did not go forward to pursue the attack 
until nine o‟clock in the evening‟.70  An important factor explaining the 
slowness with which the second assault was launched was that there 
were problems in marrying up tanks and infantry for it.  An important 
technical issue had not been resolved – using the Shermans for infantry 
support: 
[T]he infantry was in single file on our right, the wrong side 
for our turret-mounted machine-gun.  They were moving 
cautiously, alert to strange noises and trying to pick out 
landmarks in the darkness.  We passed all the ground we 
had passed earlier in the day and still there was no 
response from the enemy.  Perhaps we had taken him by 
surprise.  Then suddenly a machine-gun opened up, the 
infantry scattered and bullets hit the tank like the rat-a-tat-
tat of a hammer.  I ordered the tank to slew right and [the 
gunner] opened up with his machine-gun on the enemy and 
then fired two high-explosive shells which set the two-story 
building alight.71   
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Instead of the tanks and infantry moving together in a group, a more 
appropriate tactic using the fast, thinly armoured Shermans would have 
been for infantry to locate the enemy‟s strong points or tanks first in 
order to direct the Shermans onto them, rather than the infantry and 
the Shermans waiting to receive the enemy‟s fire.  The failure of 
Montgomery and his ex-8th Army staff to develop specific tactics for 
Shermans of the independent armoured brigades in the infantry support 
role was at this early stage of the fighting now rebounding against those 
units of 21st Army Group which had not yet formulated their own plan 
for action.   
     The next day, 26 June, Barker planned a triple attack in a general 
south easterly direction to secure the higher ground between Fontenay 
and Rauray; „the original plan remains in force [...] but for the moment 
without quite such an ambitious tempo‟.72  Armour was to support 
infantry on to their objectives, then to exploit.  As Barker saw it, the 
attack the previous day was the first to break the „strong crust‟ the 
Germans had been able to build up during the delay in getting men and 
equipment ashore following the storm of 19-22 June, which severely 
damaged the infrastructure of the Mulberry artificial harbours.  
Armoured and infantry units had experienced great difficulties in co-
operating with each other, however, over and above an insufficiency of 
infantry.  Thus, while  
[o]n the whole it was most satisfactory [... u]nfortunately 
the Boche took a lot of turning out of FONTENAY & was in 
some strongly fortified houses at the East end and which 
the Battalion in that sector couldn‟t clear so I had to put 
through another B[attalio]n in the evening when they found 
the Boche had withdrawn after the hammering we gave 
them.  We knocked out 6 tigers & 2 panthers and 4 other 
tanks & took quite a few prisoners-all first class troops of 
12SSPzDiv.  I‟m frightfully pleased with my chaps – they 
did excellently and are full of fight.  […]  News just in that 
chaps on my left getting on well & my chaps feeling forward 
against small groups of tanks.  These Tigers and Panthers 
are a nuisance as they have very heavy armour & one has 
to get a side shot at them.73   
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Thus, although acknowledging success regarding the capture of 
Fontenay, Barker recognised that beneath the surface difficulties in 
combined arms co-operation left so much to be desired that the pace or 
tempo at which it had been attempted to conduct operations was 
impracticable despite the qualities of the troops, generally aggressive 
tactics and generous artillery support.  Orders that 8th Armoured 
Brigade with 1st Battalion Tyneside Scottish of 70th Brigade would drive 
in behind the enemy and capture Rauray – that is, exploit – were 
cancelled in favour of a more „deliberate‟ advance.74  
     Barker‟s claims that his troops „knocked out 6 Tigers & 2 Panthers & 
4 other tanks‟ reflects the fact that at Fontenay, the British troops were 
up against some German troops equipped with what Buckley describes 
as „the most feared and infamous German tanks of the Normandy 
campaign [which] were the Tiger and Panther‟.75  Two panzer battalions 
in positions behind the German defenders of Fontenay numbered over 
forty Panthers in their order of battle.  Two companies of Tigers were 
available for defending Rauray, as part of the reserve of I SS Panzer 
Corps.76  German tanks were numerous.  The problem was less the 
virtual impregnability of the most modern German armour to direct fire, 
or even the capacity of the German armour collectively to counter-attack 
and also inflict tactical and operational defeats (as on 7th Armoured 
Division at Villers-Bocage), but rather its apparently endless capability 
to re-deploy even after, as Barker put it, a „hammering‟ to block any 
British strategic penetration as at Fontenay, where the Rauray ridge was 
not completely taken by the time EPSOM was launched.  This happened 
again during Operation CHARNWOOD (8-11 July 1944), when although 
the British and Canadians succeeded in breaking into Caen, they could 
not dislodge 12SS Panzer from positions which denied 21st Army Group 
access to the open country south of the town.  German long-range tank 
fire from excellently camouflaged positions tended to make the security 
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of British tanks a function of their distance from the enemy.  Barker‟s 
tanks were incapable of knocking out a Tiger or a Panther except at 
close-range from the side or back and as he clearly recognised, this 
required first that his infantry locate these tanks, deal with the anti-
tank weapons protecting them and thereby create a secure route of 
advance for the British tanks.  His reference to infantry infiltrating 
forward against small groups of tanks and then his tanks getting a side 
shot at them suggest that tanks and infantry had begun to work more 
closely together in order to deny the German tanks their advantage of 
long range fire.  Initial difficulties in practising combined arms tactics 
were clearly comprehended by the end of June 1944. 
     Shortly afterwards, Brigadier A.D.R. Wingfield was appointed to 
temporary command of 8th Armoured Brigade.  Barker told him that it 
was the army‟s policy that he should learn something about tank 
fighting in this very enclosed bocage country of Normandy so that he 
could  pass on this experience to 34th Tank Brigade when he rejoined it.  
By the end of the day [3 July] his impression was that: 
8th Armoured Brigade […] had learnt some useful lessons, 
such as the need to stay as close to the infantry as possible 
to avoid danger from snipers and bazookas [...] and to spray 
the trees with bursts of machine-gun fire when entering a 
wooded area.   It had also been discovered that the 
Sherman tanks [...] were penetrated by the German 50mm 
[A/T] guns at these short ranges – unlike the long-range 
battles in the Desert – and that the Tiger and Panther tanks 
always scored with their first round [...] due to the 
excellence of their telescopic sights.77 
The shortcomings of the Sherman tank in the infantry support role were 
beginning to be well understood by the end of June-early July.  This 
quotation from Wingfield is further evidence that shows that the process 
of adaptation had begun to deliver lessons over a week before the 
midpoint of the campaign.  Barker‟s acknowledgement of his long-
standing doubts about the relevance of desert-influenced methods of 
combat to Normandy and his sympathetic reference to Anderson and his 
difficulties with Montgomery indicate the existence of a group of officers 
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who did not support the idea that 8th Army practice was necessarily 
best practice – or perhaps, more accurately, were not even influenced at 
first hand by desert practice.   
 
 
     
 
     In June-July 1944 two operations exemplified many of the basic 
problems faced by 21st Army Group in combining, or integrating armour 
and infantry for offensive operations.  Fontenay – although just one 
Normandy action like Villers-Bocage – nevertheless demonstrates many 
of the difficulties faced by 21st Army Group subsequently in operations 
to take Caen using mainly firepower-intensive and attritional methods, 
as opposed to manoeuvre-oriented ones of the kind attempted at Villers-
Bocage.     
     Improved armour-infantry and artillery co-operation could be a 
solution to the problem of the enemy enjoying the possibility of long-
range tank fire from well-camouflaged positions well protected by anti-
tank weapons.  This improvement could be facilitated by a new 
organization and structure.  Innovations in Normandy such as the 
brigade groups composed of mutually supportive infantry battalions and 
armoured regiments introduced by Roberts and 11th Armoured Division 
and the Guards Armoured Division in late July/early August 1944 
would sometimes prove highly effective and successful, as will be shown.  
     British success in the desert and later on clearly owed as much to 
Montgomery‟s imposition of the principal of combined arms co-operation 
on his subordinates as it did to the superiority or otherwise of British 
materiel at the time.  His further attempt to impose 8th Army tactical 
methods on 21st Army Group before D-Day was unfortunate; 
nevertheless, shortcomings were quickly recognised in Normandy by 
many subordinate commanders on the ground – reflecting the general 
approach characterizing the way the British Army attempted to adjust 
official War Office doctrine to new challenges.  Solutions drew from 
general British doctrine.  However, as will be shown in subsequent 
chapters, as the campaign progressed and the problems of fighting in 
Normandy became more apparent a further process would engage both 
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Montgomery and subordinate commanders at many levels in his army 
group. Together they would shape a generic and ultimately successful 
21st Army Group tactical doctrine.  By early July, however, with the 
invasion forces no more than 15 miles or 24 kilometres inland at any 
point, much remained to be resolved. 
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CHAPTER 3  
 
THE DEFEAT OF THE GERMAN PANZERS: FURTHER 
RESPONSES TO THE PROBLEMS OF FIGHTING IN NORMANDY 
 
 
     The problems of fighting in Normandy displaced the supposed 
lessons of previous victories in North Africa.  The consequence of this 
was that much of what people thought would be valuable ceased to be 
so, and was discarded.  Roberts, though he made his name as an 
innovative commander in the Western Desert, was not bound by or to 
his experience there.  An important driver of further tactical change in 
Normandy, he quickly identified the changes in doctrine and 
organization he thought were required.  A study of the creation of War 
Office doctrine alone throws insufficient light on the process(es) by and 
through which doctrine was created in 21st Army Group in action.  One 
important part of that process was the „bubble up‟ of operational 
methods from below which derived not only from the corps and 
divisional levels but which developed at the brigade level.  This is a 
dimension of the experience in Normandy which historians have largely 
hitherto neglected.  Further, a study of War Office doctrine published at 
the time cannot completely elucidate the operational and tactical 
methods utilised by Montgomery‟s army group or the responses to the 
problems of fighting in Normandy.  What people did was not what the 
doctrinal manuals or instructions necessarily said they ought to be 
doing. 
     Although there was a broadly common approach to operational 
methods between Montgomery and his most senior commanders, there 
were differences of approach as well.  Commanders at the corps and 
divisional levels could also differ with each other in their approaches to 
the problems of fighting.  It was at the level of command nearest to the 
actual fighting, that is the battalion COs and brigadiers, that the 
process of seeking to determine the correct lessons from operations was 
often and widely instigated.  The first level of command at which the 
lessons from operations began to be garnered was at this „third level of 
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management‟, corresponding to the level of the brigade commander in 
the command structure.  The role of the brigadier in what proved to be 
the very resilient brigade-divisional-corps structure of the army group 
was of very considerable importance in shaping final doctrine.  This was 
particularly true in the case of brigadiers with independent tactical 
commands, that is the commanders of the independent tank and 
armoured brigades.  Part of their role was to reconcile the expectations 
of the armour and the infantry as to what the other could achieve.   
     Throughout the fighting in Normandy in mid-1944, Montgomery‟s 
overriding and declared aim was the destruction of the enemy‟s armour.1  
This required continuous pressure, taking ground wherever possible to 
secure space in which to manoeuvre in order to maintain that pressure, 
thereby forcing the enemy to commit his armoured reserves.  Whether 
these two aims were always part of an overall concept of operations to 
build up for a breakthrough by the Americans or whether Montgomery 
hoped for a „British breakthrough‟ is not a question that will be 
considered here.  The important factor here is rather that whereas 
merely defensive success in Normandy could be enough for the German 
Army in the West it could not be for 21st Army Group.  Whilst both 
British and German reserves of troops were finite, a lengthy campaign of 
attrition, which might favour the defender, had to be avoided.  For 
offensive operations to succeed, and succeed quickly, the potential 
fighting power of Montgomery‟s legions would have to be applied 
successfully, and always sooner rather than later.  If British armoured 
forces could be driven „headlong into, and through‟ gaps torn in the 
Germans‟ defence, it would be almost impossible for the Germans to 
secure a ruptured front before mobile war overwhelmed their remaining 
forces.2  This required a high tempo of operations, that is the speed with 
which plans were both made and carried out had to be counted in 
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„minutes instead of hours and half hours instead of days‟.3  This, in 
turn, required the active involvement and engagement of middle and 
lower ranking commanders up and down the hierarchy, as well as the 
highest level.  The combined efforts of all levels of command were 
necessary before the challenge of defeating the German panzers was 
tackled and overcome by Montgomery and his legions in the mid-
summer of 1944.  There were new formations and fresh equipment.  To 
complete the picture, this chapter deals first with units and formations 
of VIII Corps during Operation GOODWOOD. 
     This attempt to break out of the bridgehead was not only an epic 
battle but also a major operation which was a strategic offensive as well.  
It was not, however, an operation which was managed in a new way.  
The first part of this chapter deals with a particular vertical slice of 
command charged with undertaking the GOODWOOD battle at the 
sharp end.  It looks at on-the-ground commanders‟ experiences of the 
lack of a British „panzergrenadier‟ vehicle in time for GOODWOOD and 
starts to address the implications this had for limiting the scope of 
armour-infantry co-operation.  This illustrates the dilemmas of middle 
and lower level commanders in providing tactical leadership during the 
operation – from the level of those conducting operations at the brigade 
and divisional levels.  The course of GOODWOOD convinced many 
armoured and infantry commanders in armoured divisions at various 
different levels that tactical and organizational changes were required. 
The combined efforts of all arms were necessary.  This in turn required 
willing, close involvement and engagement from the middle and lower 
level armour and infantry commanders involved.  Montgomery‟s further 
contribution – that the combined efforts of all levels of command were 
also necessary – would be more fully addressed in time as his 
understanding of the need to develop initiative by those lower down 
grew.   
     Focusing specifically on the armoured divisions and their problems 
reflects the important role accorded them in Operation GOODWOOD. 
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Thereafter the armoured divisions sought to apply the lessons of their 
accumulated experience in Normandy, and the independent armoured 
brigades developed the fruits of their ongoing learning in the final 
British 2nd Army strategic offensive in Normandy, Operation 
BLUECOAT.  These lessons were: the employment of the specific 
organization of armour and infantry by 11th Armoured Division and the 
Guards Armoured Division; the advantages of closer armour-infantry co-
operation for independent armoured and tank brigades; and operating 
on a wider front to allow the armour to use its mobility to best effect in 
the attack and not to be tied down in defending flanks.  BLUECOAT also 
shows us the beginnings of a pattern of command changes by 
Montgomery to replace commanders who did not come up to scratch.  
The Anglo-Canadian operation TOTALIZE, likewise „included many 
innovations intended by Simonds to rectify the operational difficulties 
thus far encountered by the Anglo-Canadian forces‟.4  
 
 
GOODWOOD: Infantry and Armour Tactics and Employment 
 
 
     Back in England, in command of 11th Armoured Division for the 
invasion, Roberts anticipated a need for closer armour-infantry co-
operation.  However, he did not foresee the extent to which it would 
become vital.  Before the invasion, he believed that, „due to the fact that 
the t[an]ks can deal with A[nti-] t[an]k guns themselves, the Inf[antry] 
B[riga]de must be all the more on its toes and quick in order to keep up 
and maintain momentum‟.5   
     Thus, unusually, 11th Armoured Division did practise organisation 
for armour- infantry co-operation in England.  As the soon-to-be 
commander of its infantry brigade, Lieutenant-Colonel J.B. Churcher, 
CO, 1st Battalion of the Herefordshire Regiment, recalled: „whilst up on 
the Wolds we started to develop the first armoured infantry cooperation 
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in attack.  It took quite a lot of developing because neither the junior 
leaders in the infantry nor the troop leaders in the armour knew how to 
set about the problem so it had to be worked out more or less from 
scratch.  In the end we got the drill properly organised [in the course of] 
Operations on the Continent‟.6  After reaching the invasion beaches on 
D+9/10, the division‟s motorised infantry brigade, 159th Infantry 
Brigade, and its armoured brigade, 29th Armoured Brigade „practised 
the organisation of armoured-infantry cooperation.  To get this right it 
was essential that Squadron Leaders and company commanders, troop 
leaders and platoon commanders should know the exact drill for 
marrying up with armour and moving into battle.  We found this time 
extremely useful and it was essential for our future operations‟.7  It is 
difficult to get away from the idea that this training was „drill‟-based, 
rather than based on any clear doctrine for co-operation between the 
two arms.  Thus, although training in Yorkshire differed from early 
desert tactics, also – it may be inferred – it was still not quite what was 
right for Normandy, and had to be changed there.   
     The premise that the tanks could deal with enemy anti-tank guns 
themselves would be shown to be incorrect in Normandy.  Yet, during 
EPSOM (the Odon offensive) the gist of the instructions to the infantry 
brigade was to „move on D plus 20 and follow up the advance of the 
armoured Brigade‟.8  As Roberts admitted, the infantry of 15th (Scottish) 
Infantry Division and 11th Armoured Division „rather went their 
separate ways‟.9  This was also the perception of his infantry brigade 
commander; taking over from elements of the 15th Division, thus „the 
Brigade was situated astride the Rover [sic] Odon when at that moment 
the Armoured Brigade decided to withdraw in toto and we were left on 
our own to face the music‟.10     
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     The upcoming GOODWOOD operation was a plan for a breakout 
from the bridgehead which had existed since D-Day east of the River 
Orne.  It was an assault spearheaded on the ground by the massed 
tanks of the three standard British armoured divisions in Normandy, 
grouped in VIII Corps.  I Corps was to attack at the same time and 
protect the left flank of VIII Corps.  Thus, on 18 July 3rd Division took 
part in Operation GOODWOOD, the only British infantry division to do 
so.  Whistler, the division‟s commander wrote afterwards: „(T)he 
op[eration] started with a really terrific air bombardment followed by a 
race forward of the Armour‟.11  Without denying the contribution of 3rd 
Division to the operation, it is the „race forward‟ of the armoured 
divisions brought together under VIII Corps, particularly of the leading 
division, 11th Armoured Division, that is examined most closely here.  
As Churcher explained, „the 11th was to be the leading one and as it 
turned out I myself was the right hand leading Brigade‟.12  To take 11th 
Armoured as the example, the armoured brigade had three armoured 
regiments and a motor battalion, equipped with carriers and armoured 
half-tracks, and the infantry brigade had three infantry battalions 
mounted in troop carrying vehicles (TCVs) and a machine gun company. 
     Events would show difficulties on GOODWOOD that went to the 
heart of the problems of command, doctrine and organization in the 
British armoured divisions.  The GOODWOOD plan established certain 
kinds of objectives for the operation.  These were influenced by 
considerations not only that, because fresh infantry reserves would soon 
not readily be available, armoured divisions would do the job instead, 
but also that, because the ground was good open „tank country‟, armour 
could make a very good job of it.  However, this involved the armour and 
the infantry doing different things.   Roberts, for example, suffered 
considerable misgivings when he learned the plan for GOODWOOD, and 
was critical of the fact that the armour and infantry had been given 
separate objectives.  The objective given to 159th Brigade was to take 
the villages of Cuverville and Démouville, two villages immediately in 
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front of the start line.  His complaint was that he would have little 
infantry to clear the way for his tanks – thus showing that he was 
already revising his pre-invasion ideas of the way armour-infantry co-
operation would operate.13  He was so concerned about the error of this 
decision that he recorded his view in writing, but O‟Connor did not alter 
the plan.  Unbeknown to Roberts, however, O‟Connor‟s original 
instructions to his chief of staff had stated that the „task of 11 
Arm[oure]d Div[ision], [is] to seize the villages of CUVERVILLE and 
DEMOUVILLE, getting their armour through simultaneously‟.14  Thus, 
O‟Connor‟s original concept of operations, which differed from the plan 
that was finally adopted, shows he well understood the need to have 
infantry and armour co-operate more closely together.  In fact, O‟Connor 
wanted them to have armoured vehicles in which they could be carried 
forward across this unusually open battlefield and keep as close up with 
the advancing armour as possible, and „must have also been extremely 
aggravated by Dempsey‟s refusal to let him use armoured gun carriers 
as infantry personnel carriers‟.15  From an infantry perspective, as 
expressed by Lieutenant-Colonel G.R. Turner-Cain, Churcher‟s 
successor as CO of the Herefords, of the  
smaller picture as seen with the Inf[antry] B[attalio]n on its 
feet.  At this stage we had no A[rmoured] P[ersonnel 
C[arrier]s and if we had to get out of our Troop Carrying 
Vehicles (3-tonners fitted with seats) we were on our feet.  
We were not yet closely and intimately associated with our 
Arm[oure]d Reg[imen]ts., they were still Desert War minded 
[sic] and saw themselves galloping forward at tank speed 
leaving their Infantry to mop up and catch up as best they 
could.16   
Thus, in addition to the lack of a practical means to „keep up‟, there was 
an expectation among the infantry that the tanks would move forward 
because this was the fashion in which they had advanced in the desert, 
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and because they had in the past been given orders to do this in 
Normandy.  
     The perception of the importance of the job of the infantry brigade 
commander can be gained from the following comments: „Jack 
(Churcher) has gone up one.  He is a most wonderful leader and in no 
small way responsible for giving the Bosche [sic] a continuous bloody 
nose right across the Brigade front‟.17  This must, however, be 
interpreted through Roberts‟ assessment of Churcher, where Roberts 
had to consider Churcher‟s influence on the performance of the whole 
division:  
Jack Churcher proved to be meticulous in his planning of 
operations, such as crossing a river and forming a 
bridgehead on the other side, in fact at anything set-piece.  
He was not so good in a fluid battle, but the troops under 
him felt that he looked after them and the brigade itself 
went well.  The most difficult problem was that those 
outside his brigade did not always see eye to eye with him, 
in particular the commander of the armoured brigade, 
Roscoe Harvey, and I often had to act as mediator.18 
     Thus, a factor influencing how the plan was carried out was that the 
two brigade commanders did not always see „eye-to-eye‟, leading to a 
lack of understanding between the two brigade commanders, of which 
Roberts was aware.  In Churcher‟s „narrative‟: „there was considerable 
return fire from the Germans but we managed to advance and continue 
the advance all day [18 July] till eventually we reached the area of Le 
Mesnil Frementel where we found that the armoured brigade had come 
to a halt and the whole Divisional attack had not yet got beyond the 
approximate line of the railway line running eastward from Caen‟.19  
Thus, by the time on the evening of 18 July when Robert‟s infantry had 
reached a position near Le Mesnil Frémentil where they were not far 
behind the armour, it was clear that the armoured advance had come to 
a halt, with gains far short of expectations.  That the armoured and 
infantry brigades would initially have to fight separate battles was, of 
course, expected.  What was not planned for was the difficult situation 
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experienced by the armour in dealing with the German strong points, 
gun positions further back and anti-tank guns on their flanks as well as 
German counter-attacks with tanks.  These difficulties were exacerbated 
by traffic congestion in the bridgehead, which delayed the other 
armoured divisions from getting forward and allowing all the armoured 
divisions to operate more or less together and simultaneously.   From 
below, as Roberts recognised, Churcher inspired confidence – such 
commanders are likely to get tasks done.  However, it can be inferred 
from Roberts‟ comments after the war (in his memoir, which, coming 
after his interview at Staff College in 1979, may be held to be his final 
mature reflection on the subject) that he thought Churcher was unable 
to respond to situations spontaneously, in particular to the really 
difficult situation in which the armoured brigade found themselves on 
18 July, even though it was not his fault: 
Cuverville was cleared by 1015 hours, but when this was 
reported to Corps, the corps commander ordered that it 
was to be held by the regiment that had cleared it until 
relieved [...].  I think that, having heard of this order I 
should have got hold of Brigadier Churcher on the radio, 
and instructed him either to use the reserve battalion (4th 
KSLI) or the Herefords who were in the woods on the left to 
take on the task of capturing Démouville.20 
     On the 19th July, although GOODWOOD would not be terminated 
for another day, the division „moved more cautiously‟.21  The three 
infantry regiments of 159th Brigade were now available.  As Churcher 
put it:  
159 Brigade was asked to attack on the west side of the 
railway line and capture the villages of Bras and Hubert 
Folie. ... [C]areful plans were laid on for the armour to 
support them onto their objective.  This was successfully 
achieved ...Meanwhile the Armoured Brigade had tried to 
continue their advance with no success....I was told to 
remain on the ground while the Armoured Brigade was 
withdrawn for refitting.22 
     On the day 11th Armoured moved back across the Orne, Turner Cain 
mused that: „providing the Hun continues to fight us with his present 
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intensity, and we continue to destroy him, it does not seem to matter 
how little distance we actually advance‟.23  However, Montgomery‟s 
strategy was not just about attrition, or static warfare.  GOODWOOD 
was intended to make ground to secure the space in which to 
manoeuvre in order to maintain pressure on the Germans and prevent 
them disengaging their panzer divisions and being able to have in hand 
a strategic armoured reserve.  Thus, while Turner Cain can be said to 
have had part of the final answer – that is Montgomery‟s wish to engage 
enemy armour and „write it down‟ – his somewhat static means of doing 
was neither providing the tempo required nor making the most of the 
armour‟s ability.  The main problem lay in the apparent lack of 
armoured warfare-mindedness on the part of the infantry commanders.  
This was the lack of initiative to be proactive which would, as this thesis 
will show, become the hallmark of all successful armoured commanders.  
That this ran deep in the infantry and was actually there is 
substantiated in the quotes from Turner Cain. 
     Having looked at the consequences for the tanks of the lack of 
infantry it is also necessary to look at the consequences for the infantry 
of having some tanks.  Putting 2nd Northamptonshire Yeomanry (2nd 
Northants Yeo) under command of 159th Brigade was intended to help 
the infantry to take the two villages, Cuverville and Démouville, as 
Roberts explained: 
I thought it might hurry things up a bit if I gave 159th 
Brigade some armour to support them.  So I put the 2nd 
Northants Yeomanry under their command....[T]hey were 
trained as the divisional reconnaissance regiment and 
equipped with Cromwell tanks, but ...I felt they would be of 
some help.  In view of the tremendous hammering these 
two villages would have received from the air and from 
artillery concentrations, I thought they could be dealt with 
fairly quickly.  Consequently, I concentrated my attention 
on the armoured brigade‟s advance.24 
     How this actually worked out on the ground is related by Turner 
Cain, CO Herefords, 159th Brigade:  
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The villages were only about 1km apart and offered good 
protection and concealment for enemy A/Tk guns with their 
Inf[antry]  support.  Additionally there were farmsteads with 
their own fringe of trees every 500m....So our education at 
the hands of the enemy began....Their fire pinned us down 
in the open until we had worked a platoon or a company 
into position to carry out an attack supported by the odd 
Northants Yeomanry tank.  It meant very slow progress 
with the gap between our Arm[oure]d B[riga]de and 
ourselves opening all the time. 
This was until „we were told to get a b----y move on and to catch up with 
our tanks‟.25 
     Roberts „giving‟ of armour to the infantry apparently did not „hurry 
things up‟ at all, and the reason for this was a lack of proper training on 
the part of the armoured reconnaissance regiment that he gave them.  
However, while this deprived the armoured brigade of its armoured 
reconnaissance regiment, a further important technical issue could be 
resolved which did not require new equipment, which was that 
armoured reconnaissance did not especially require the Cromwell 
because the Sherman was essentially of equivalent performance in this 
theatre. Yet, there was more than one reason for depriving the armoured 
brigade of its armoured reconnaissance regiment happening.  Once the 
decision had been taken to abandon their reconnaissance role, the way 
was clear for the armoured and infantry brigades to set up new 
structures and a new organization.   
     But providing the infantry with untrained armour did not help them, 
while depriving the armour of infantry support resulted in great tank 
losses.  When Roberts tried – or was forced to try – to fight the battle 
with great weight of armour unsupported by infantry from the infantry 
brigade, this did not solve the problem of dealing with the enemy anti-
tank guns: „there were so many 88s around and about the various 
villages that they were all inter-supporting with their long effective range 
and we were quite unable to advance without the guns on the flanks 
being neutralised‟.26 
     The lesson of GOODWOOD as seen by Turner Cain was that  
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releasing Arm[oure]d Reg[imen]ts to operate on their own 
with only light Inf[antry] protection (8RB in 29 Armd Bde) 
had been finally learned on the Caen-Bourgebous ridge. [...] 
The Tanks realised that for their close protection Infantry 
had to be with them at all stages of an attack or advance.  
The Armour could not afford to wait for Infantry who, 
embossed in Troop Carrying Vehicles completely 
unarmoured, were a mile or more behind and had to 
disembus and move up on their feet.  [...] The solution to 
close co-operation in 11 Arm[oure]d Div[ision] when 
Infantry and tanks operated together in Squadron and 
Company groups, was to mount the Infantry on the outside 
of the tank and to travel as such until it was essential for 
the Infantry to get off and operate on their feet to protect 
the tanks or clear the enemy from dugouts.27 
     Afterwards, Roberts recognized further flaws in the plan: „the real 
set-back was the enemy gun position along the Bourguebus ridge .... 
These were scarcely touched by the bombing and were out of range of 
the majority of the Corps artillery which was on the west side of the 
River Orne‟.28  As Turner Cain put it: „with the German A/Tk defence in 
great depth it is not easy to know when you are through their defences 
as there always seem to be more A/Tk guns further back to take toll of 
our guns [i.e. tanks]‟.29  In other words, the layered German line of 
resistance, consisting of both fixed and mobile anti-tank defences, 
extended much further back than anyone had really allowed for. 
     However, GOODWOOD set Roberts thinking.  Further organisational 
changes were required to make closer the co-operation between the 
armour and the infantry.  This had now to come down to lower levels, to 
the troop/platoon level, if the organisation was to reflect the minor 
tactics for the attack now necessitated by the situation.  However, it had 
to go up as well, and take in the two brigadiers in charge of each 
brigade.  Their job would not be co-operation, so much as coordination 
of armour, infantry, artillery and tanks for and in the attack.  This was 
an ad hoc, flexible organisation, not a permanent establishment, 
dictated by the situation „on the ground‟ and responsibility devolved to 
either brigadier on the ground.  This did not mean a defensive 
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operational strategy would not sometimes be appropriate.  However the 
potential was there for a different kind of offensive action when the time 
was right because everyone now knew what to do. 
  
 
BLUECOAT: Middle-Level Command Responses to New Problems of 
Combat 
 
 
     The adjutant of an infantry regiment correctly reflected on the earlier 
part of the campaign that, particularly when it involved moving away 
from official War Office doctrine, „nobody would learn from the 
experiences of others‟ who were in contact with the enemy.30  In 
Normandy, it was coming to be believed that the Churchill tank‟s cross-
country ability had to be used to get into positions where it could not 
easily be seen, with the object of closing the gap between the superior 
performance of the German tank and anti-tank guns and the Churchill‟s 
own armament.31  Despite Peace‟s observation above, from the rank of 
Captain, some middle-level commanders were open to learning from 
ongoing experience.  Brigadier G.L. Verney, who commanded 6th 
Guards Tank Brigade, saw the value of learning lessons – „the idea‟ [that 
an officer go to Normandy as an observer of tank fighting] came from, I 
believe, our Brig[adier] Verney and he must have persuaded Commander 
30 Corps Gen[eral] Bucknall‟, Major C. O‟M. Farrell, who was thus 
selected, recalled.32  Verney sent Farrell to report to 6th Guards Tank 
Brigade before the brigade embarked for Normandy.  Farrell tried to 
convey the newly emerging conclusions in separate talks to the other 
officers of the 6th Guards Tank Brigade‟s three battalions.  In them he 
tried to put across the need to forget at all costs their training based on 
manoeuvres on Salisbury Plain and the Yorkshire moors, itself drawn 
from Western Desert tactics.  Armour-infantry co-operation depended, in 
Farrell‟s asseveration many years later, on the human networking and 
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common agreements and understandings of tactical procedures between 
the officers of the armour and infantry units.33  „Nearly all the fighting‟, 
he explained, „was at Squadron level – detached to an infantry 
brigade‟.34   However, as a result of 6th Guards Tank Brigade‟s initiation 
into combat in support of the 15th (Scottish Division), with whom they 
had trained intensively, during the Caumont battle as part of Operation 
BLUECOAT (30 July-8 August 1944) it became apparent that indeed 
what was required was that tanks and infantry co-operate symbiotically 
to best effect rather than necessarily closely on the battlefield.   
BLUECOAT involved a British thrust south from Caumont, intended to 
increase pressure on the Germans and prevent them from transferring 
armour against the Americans. „It seemed that the only hope was to take 
a chance and push on alone, and follow up with infantry later as best 
we could,‟ Verney later recalled, referring to the activities of 6th Guards 
Tank Brigade at Caumont.35  Verney was referring here to Phase Three 
of the operation. On another occasion he explained that during the 
second phase „first the [4th Tank Battalion] C[oldstream] G[uards] CO 
and then the S[cots]G[uards] CO called me up on the RT and asked if 
they were to stay with the Inf[antry] or go on close to the Barrage‟.36  
This latter manoeuvre, in which Verney was willing to implement ideas 
that had come to be accepted in 6th Guards Tank Brigade as the right 
ones, was, when viewed purely from the point of view of the published 
War Office pamphlets, „highly unorthodox‟.37  This demonstrates not 
only the substantive content of 6th Guards Tank Brigade‟s learning in 
the early part of the campaign but something of the on-the-spot 
decision-making involved as well.  Contrary to some opinions, 6th 
Guards Tank Brigade did not act more in the nature of an armoured 
brigade than the infantry support brigade they actually were, thereby 
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abandoning their task of tank-infantry co-operation.38  The tanks were 
pushed on ahead of the infantry but they were not out of touch.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Map 3.1: Operation BLUECOAT
39
 
 
 
They were still co-operating with the infantry but in a different way than 
the „textbook‟ suggested.  Thus, although the CO of the 3rd Tank Scots 
Guards asked to press on without the infantry, this was because he 
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believed „the infantry was not now meeting serious opposition‟.40  Nor 
was there a feeling among the tanks that the infantry was not required, 
indeed „the battle would not have been a success if they had not been 
determined to fight their way up to us‟.41  
     The innovation in late July 1944 of brigade groups composed of 
mutually supportive infantry battalions and armoured regiments of 
armoured divisions was particularly associated with Major-General 
A.H.S. Adair of the Guards Armoured Division and Roberts of 11th 
Armoured Division.  However, while the practice of co-operation was 
improving, unit organization and structure still left much to be desired 
in mid-August, at least in the case of the Guards Armoured Division 
with their particularly exclusive regimental traditions, for whom the idea 
of cooperation between the different arms of infantry and „cavalry‟ was 
„revolutionary‟.42  According to Lieutenant R.T. Boscawen, a Troop 
Leader who commanded a Sherman tank in the 3rd Irish Guards/1st 
Armoured Coldstream Guards group, Guards Armoured Division during 
Operation GROUSE (10-13 August 1944): „there was no real plan except 
just keep behind the infantry.  I had fully expected the battle to go like 
this‟.43  The Guards Armoured was a Sherman-equipped armoured 
division, and as Captain the Earl of Rosse, serving with the Guards 
Armoured Division‟s 32nd Brigade Headquarters, put it: „it was felt that 
the Guards Armoured needed some strengthening. Consequently the 3rd 
Scots Guards with their Churchills were put in support of us, and gave 
invaluable assistance in the small but difficult operation which 
culminated in the capture of the village of LE BAS PERRIER by the 5th 
Coldstream and 1st Welsh‟.44  At Chênedollé and Le Haut Perrier the role 
of 3rd Tank Scots Guards‟ „S‟ Squadron (Maj. Farrell) was to support two 
companies of 1st Battalion Welsh Guards (an infantry battalion of the 
Guards Armoured Division) in their attack on Le Bas Perrier, then to 
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support 5th Battalion Coldstream Guards (another infantry battalion of 
that division) to a further exploitation to dominate the line of the Vire-
Chênedollé-Vassy road, which appears at the bottom of map 3.1 on page 
97.  At Chênedollé 6th Guards Tank Brigade did not operate with 15th 
Infantry Division; the Welsh Guards had not been trained in armour-
infantry co-operation let alone with 6th Guards Tank Brigade.45  
However, the attack succeeded when Chênedollé was reached in the 
evening of 11 August, the Churchills of „S‟ Squadron having progressed 
in line in front of the infantry to protect them.46  Farrell‟s contention, 
therefore, that 6th Guards Tank Brigade (independent as opposed to the 
Guards Armoured Division or any other armoured division) did not have 
to push for this integration – „we [i.e. 6th GTB] already had it with 15 
Scot[ish] Div[ision] and anyone else who we supported‟ – would appear 
to have some substance to it. 47  It is helpful at this point to consider 
some of the possible reasons for this. 
     It will be recalled that the separate armour and infantry brigades 
notion was allowed to find its way into Normandy, having been taught 
before D-Day as a universal armour-infantry technique to 21st Army 
Group in England preparing for the invasion.  The infantry and the 
armour in an armoured division were separate.  It will be remembered 
that the infantry brigade had three infantry battalions mounted in 
lorries and a machine gun company and the armoured brigade had 
three armoured regiments and a motor battalion, equipped with carriers 
and armoured half-tracks.  Thus, both had the „triangular‟ structure or 
organization with which the British armoured divisions started the 
campaign.  However, as the example of Roberts and 11th Armoured 
Division makes clear, throughout the war the tactics used within an 
armoured division and its organization were continually changing.  
While Roberts had earlier perceived a need for closer armour-infantry 
co-operation, the way it would work out in practice, the particular 
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reasons for the need for it, and the ramifications for unit organization 
and structure would not be those which he had foreseen.  This 
highlighted wider shortcomings in the way battles were fought during 
the EPSOM offensive.  This was unsatisfactory, particularly after his 
corps commander, O‟Connor, had made it clear that „you may find that 
for a period you may be forced to do the work more properly allotted to 
an [independent] Armoured Brigade‟.48  This was the same problem 
Erskine had been faced with less than a month before.  Hinde had also 
identified the problem with respect to 7th Armoured Division.  The 
problem being threefold: the need for more infantry, difficulties caused 
by lack of training with the infantry, and the difficulty encountered in 
fixing the locations of German anti-tank guns: in short, the close 
country called for infantry supported by the tanks of the independent 
tank and armoured brigades, not for the tanks and infantry associated 
in the armoured brigade of an armoured division, which were better 
suited to exploitation.     
     The role of an independent armoured brigade charged primarily with 
infantry close-support did not greatly appeal to Roberts, just as it did 
not appeal to Erskine and Hinde, as it seemed to rob the armoured 
division of the opportunity for exploitation.  At that point, early in July, 
however, Roberts continued to think that „with closer co-operation 
between the infantry and the armour, we might get along reasonably 
well‟.49  Operation GOODWOOD in mid-July was the turning point.  
Roberts thought that it was not until Operation BLUECOAT in late 
July/early August that the organization of the division was got right, 
and that was an organization of complete flexibility which at the shortest 
possible notice could be altered from an armoured brigade and an 
infantry brigade to two mixed brigades, each of two armoured regiments 
and two infantry battalions (see Figures 3.1 and 3.2 on p.102).   
     The armoured regiments and infantry battalions of 11th Armoured 
Division already co-operated on a troop/platoon basis.  This was 
standard co-operation procedure for minor tactics in the attack, 
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practised to a greater or lesser extent and in broadly similar ways in all 
the armoured divisions, as Roberts later acknowledged.50 
     Nevertheless, when O‟Connor then directed Roberts that he must be 
prepared for the very closest of tank-infantry co-operation on a 
troop/platoon basis Roberts recognised the order as a seal of approval 
on the organization he had already set in place.51  This new type of 
tactical formation, which Roberts christened „homogeneous brigades‟, 
embodied the principle of tactical co-operation in a way its author 
thought most appropriate in the light of 11th Armoured‟s experience in 
Normandy.52  Roberts‟s homogeneous brigade groups also embodied 
beneficial insights that related to the principal of the economy of force. 
As British tactical doctrine made clear, application of the principle of the 
economy of force – and concentration of superior force at the decisive 
time and place – required a proper appreciation of the balance between 
offence and defence.  For offence and defence we can substitute „tank‟ 
and „anti-tank‟.  What Roberts had set in place was an organizational 
development, a type of force structure designed to facilitate the 
combined arms tactics necessary for success in the bocage and bocage-
like countryside of Normandy.  The triangular armoured and infantry 
brigade-structure that permitted for example, two armoured regiments 
or infantry battalions „up, one in support‟ was changed to one similar to 
what is known in modern military parlance as a „square‟ configuration – 
a mutually-reinforcing one of one armoured regiment and one infantry 
battalion.  Finally, while it is incorrect to say that 6th Guards Tank 
Brigade acted during BLUECOAT more in the manner of an armoured 
brigade of an armoured division it can properly be said that from 
BLUECOAT onwards 11th Armoured Division was equally capable of 
both infantry-support and exploitation.  
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Fig 3.1: The „old‟ or standard organisational structure 
 
 
Fig 3.2: The „new‟ or emergent organisational structure 
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     The Guards Armoured Division, newly arrived in the Caumont area 
for BLUECOAT, would, O‟Connor assumed, be able to emulate the 
flexibility of the other armoured division in VIII Corps.  Adair, 
recognizing that the Guards Armoured‟s tanks might indeed have to 
fight in the bocage, had already begun to contemplate the need for „a 
system whereby the infantry was always right up with them‟.53  Rosse 
and Hill state that „experience gained [in BLUECOAT – the Caumont 
offensive] led us to adopt a different organisation from any that we had 
ever practised; during the years of training we had found increasingly 
that under European conditions, as opposed to those of the desert, 
tanks and infantry needed to work in close co-operation down to the 
lowest level‟.54  However, an account by Rosse written 
contemporaneously with events must be interpreted as implying that 
they were trained in one way in the UK prior to Normandy, which did 
not equip them with the right organisation or an understanding of the 
organisation which would have worked, and that thus, when they got to 
Europe it differed from both desert and training.55  Some commentators 
suggest that the Guards Armoured‟s new structure reflected that of 11th 
Armoured Division.56  There is little doubt that the Guards also had 
some success with their new structure during the closing stages of the 
Normandy campaign.  It was not until after the fighting in Normandy, 
however, that „it was considered that each brigade should control an 
equal proportion of infantry and armour‟.57  In this instance the earlier 
of the two versions is followed as it appears to throw new light on why 
the Guards Armoured did not adopt the same organization as 11th 
Armoured at once.      
     The Churchill-equipped fighting regiments in Normandy were mainly 
supplied with Mk IVs and Mk VIs.  However, the availability within 6th 
Guards Tank Brigade of Mk VII and VIII models, the so-called „heavy 
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Churchill‟ with maximum armour thickness increased, meant the 
„survivability‟ of these tanks was greater than the Sherman tanks of the 
Guards Armoured Division.  Three quarters of 1st Armoured 
Coldstreams‟ Shermans were lost during GROUSE in an area defended 
by numerous anti-tank guns and several tanks.  This serves as a 
reminder that equipment, as well as doctrine, training and organization, 
has to be taken into consideration in explaining failure or success.  As 
Rosse, serving with Guards Armoured, reflected at the time: „this type of 
operation, against dug-in enemy with tanks and anti-tank guns, is 
impossible for the Shermans with their thin armour to compete with, 
and we were tremendously impressed by the performance of the 
Churchills‟.58 
     Turning now to the independent armoured brigades later in the 
Normandy campaign, developing the fruits of their earlier learning, over 
and above these questions of organization and equipment there was a 
lesson that had been learned about co-operation between all arms.  As 
4th Armoured Brigade‟s Brigadier, R.M.P. Carver, expressed it: „whereas 
I found that my lack of previous direct personal experience of tank-
versus-tank fighting in the desert was no handicap to me, it was clear 
that the greater knowledge I had of the characteristics of other arms, 
derived from my experiences on divisional and corps staffs, stood me, 
my regiment and my supporting infantry, gunners and sappers in good 
stead‟.59  This supports the view that to some extent the key to success 
in integrated tactics was not what you knew but who you knew how to 
work with.  Nevertheless, in Normandy, Carver was also faced with new 
problems of combat, which were linked to further equipment and 
organization issues and how best to utilise the forces he had at his 
disposal.  As a result of experience fighting in Sicily during the Italian 
campaign, Carver appreciated that 
speed [i.e. the „mobility‟ of mobile warfare] is not attained so 
much by actual m.p.h. as by […] above all a spirit in all 
ranks that every minute is vital if the war is to be won in 
time and that there is always a way of solving every 
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problem if you are determined to do so.  … It is just as 
necessary to make a plan to combine fire and movement 
with tanks as it is with infantry.  The big difference is the 
speed with which the plan is both made and carried out. 60     
     At the beginning of July 1944, 4th Armoured Brigade was part of VIII 
Corps, engaged in close support and counter-attacking in defence of VIII 
Corps‟ salient. In early July Carver identified the problem of creating an 
effective anti-tank defence where „a[nti-] t[an]k guns or tank pos[itio]ns 
1000-3000yds on the flanks which are the real menace to tanks 
accompanying the infantry‟ had not been effectively dealt with and then 
when the enemy counter-attacked British defences the British tanks 
had to „rush up in a hurry, knowing next to nothing of what is going on‟ 
and also the conditions for further action by the armour, that is that 
tanks would not get shot up by enemy anti-tank guns from the rear as 
they went forward.61   
     During Operation JUPITER (10-11 July 1944) to extend the VIII 
Corps bridgehead over the Odon towards the Orne, the „exploitation‟ role 
was to be undertaken by 4th Armoured Brigade, for the first time.  
Second in command of 44th Battalion Royal Tank Regiment (44th RTR), 
4th Armoured Brigade was Major R. Leakey, an outstanding commander 
whose first-hand account serves to put the problem identified by Carver 
in its context within JUPITER: 
It was towards the middle of July that we had our worst 
spell.  It started with an attack against a hill called Point 
112 in which we were supporting an infantry Brigade.  
Although the attack was successful, the Germans counter-
attacked, and retook the vital hill.  By this time the infantry 
and ourselves were so reduced in numbers and so tired 
that it was all we could do to take the lower slopes.62 
On 10 July, Carver fought for and secured assurances of ample medium 
and heavy artillery support „[Major-General G.I.] Thomas [GOC 43rd 
Infantry Division] having tried to fob me off with smoke screens‟. Smoke 
screens were regarded as one of the quickest and most economical ways 
of achieving results.  Carver also insisted that Thomas‟s infantry and the 
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Churchill tanks of 31st Tank Brigade should clear and secure the wood 
on the reverse slope of Hill 112 before he would launch 4th Armoured 
Brigade, led by the Scots Greys‟ Shermans and 2nd Battalion King‟s 
Royal Rifle Corps (2nd KRRC) to take the village of Maltot beyond the 
hill.63  In the event, the infantry and their supporting tanks suffered 
considerable losses.   
     In addition, 2nd KRRC and a battery of self-propelled guns from 91st 
Anti-Tank regiment, under command 4th Armoured Brigade, failed to 
eliminate the threat from the flanks posed by the enemy‟s anti-tank 
guns.  The Greys too, lost a considerable number of tanks, although the 
self-propelled guns of 144th Anti-Tank Battery (144th SP A/T Bty) 
helped their Shermans knock out two German Panther tanks.  On 11 
July the Greys with 5th Battalion Duke of Cornwall‟s Light Infantry from 
43rd Infantry Division succeeded in reaching Hill 112.  They were 
nevertheless ordered to withdraw in the evening because of losses of 
men and tanks, despite the Greys with the assistance of the self-
propelled anti-tank guns successfully destroying four German self-
propelled anti-tank guns.64  Experience in the Italian campaign, Carver 
believed, showed that the advantages associated with the Sherman‟s 
capability to fire 75mm HE, which had provided British armour with 
sufficient firepower to prevail in the open operating environment of the 
desert in the manner envisaged by the War Office, could be substantially 
offset when close, congested country constituted the operating 
environment „as few targets were seen and the shells exploded on 
contact with the nearest tree or bush‟.  Further, Carver believed „such 
targets [tanks or anti-tank guns in forest cover] were never accurately 
located and could not be seen from the tank‟.  Rather, he thought, they 
were dealt with more accurately and more effectively by concentrations 
from the supporting artillery, with no loss of speed.  Fire from tanks 
could not cover the area nor produce the concentration needed.65  An 
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additionally important point is the distinction Carver drew between 
supporting the attack by the infantry of 43rd and 15th Infantry 
Divisions and the direct support of the infantry: 31st Tank Brigade did 
most of the direct support of the infantry.  This is an example of the 
further bubbling up of appropriate tactics for the Shermans in the 
infantry-support role.  
     The utilization of self-propelled anti-tank guns is interesting here 
because they were initially in short supply in 21st Army Group, and, in 
fact, there was only one weapon, the American M10 (also known as the 
Wolverine).  Many M10s were adapted, like the American Sherman tank, 
to take the British 17-pdr anti-tank gun, an extraordinarily potent 
weapon which, in 1943 replaced the 6-pdr as the main British anti-tank 
gun.66  In this form they were known as the 17-pdr SP gun „Achilles‟.  
They equipped 144th SP A/T Bty.  The M10 „Wolverine‟ and Achilles 
were mainly issued to anti-tank units in armoured divisions at this time.  
Due to their relative scarcity initially, they were operated by members of 
the Royal Artillery before D-Day and throughout the fighting in North-
West Europe.  While it was recognised that the self-propelled 17-pdr was 
not so effective an answer as the only answer in tanks, the Sherman 
Firefly, nevertheless „Second Army was compelled to reckon in every 17-
pr to redress the balance‟.67  Thus, while „in theory and usually in 
practice, the artillery was an arm of remote fire-support‟, in this 
particular case this was not so.68  The 17-pdrs had proved their worth 
and were being utilised well in the operations at the beginning of July, 
for example assisting the tanks to restore infantry positions which were 
being over-run by tanks.  One of the reasons for failure on JUPITER did 
not lie with the weapon itself but with those responsible for tactical 
leadership, who had failed to utilise its full potential offensively.  This 
became apparent to Carver.  „If we all start thinking hard and pool our 
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ideas,‟ Carver suggested in his appreciation of German defence methods 
of 25 July 1944, „we shall outwit the enemy‟.69   
     The key problem was that of converting an initial break into the 
enemy‟s defensive system into a breakthrough.  The British Army 
distinguished clearly between consolidating the gains made as the basis 
for further offensive action, and exploitation – a subsequent action 
which might or might not be decided upon depending on whether troops 
and firepower were readily available for this task.  Carver identified key 
weaknesses in implementing this doctrine.  He appreciated that „if our 
tanks succeed in penetrating his [the enemy‟s] main A[nti-] t[an]k 
defence, he relies on bringing further progress to a halt by cutting off the 
tanks from their soft stuff, guns and supporting infantry‟.70 
     The armoured and infantry brigade COs offered different answers to 
the problem of how the process of defending against enemy tanks could 
be made dynamic so that defence itself became mobile rather than 
static.71  If anti-tank protection was the „framework of defence‟ as official 
British 1943 doctrine had it – and all were agreed that it was – then in 
the words of Lieutenant-Colonel A.A. Cameron of the 3rd County of 
London Yeomanry „to knock out enemy tanks in general terms needs the 
17 pr gun‟.  This, however, left aside or sidestepped the important 
question of whether the anti-tank gun was primarily an armour or an 
infantry weapon.  Proceeding from the above point of agreement, 
however, Lieutenant-Colonel G.P. Hopkinson, commanding 44th RTR 
recommended that „the infantry should be accompanied in their attack 
by S[elf-] P[ropelled] A[nti-] t[an]k Art[iller]y which in our opinion should 
be an infantry as well as an Arm[oure]d Div weapon.  The early 
introduction of HE will also produce for the Inf[antry] their own Inf close 
support gun‟.  The CO of 2nd KRRC Lieutenant-Colonel R.B. Littledale‟s 
preferred solution was for „anti-tank fire to be provided by tanks or SP 
anti-tank guns, until infantry weapons [towed 17-pdrs] are dug in‟.  
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Hopkinson, therefore, wanted the infantry to be able to look after their 
own protection, leaving the armour free for what was, in effect, the 
armoured division‟s role of exploitation.  From an infantryman‟s 
perspective, Littledale not unnaturally wanted to keep the protection of 
the tanks. 
     Within 4th Armoured Brigade it had „become abundantly clear in 
recent operations that the only anti-tank weapon in which all arms and 
particularly the infantry have full confidence is the 17 pr on a tracked 
chassis whether it is called a tank or a SP anti-tank gun.‟72  In other 
words, the Sherman Firefly, armed with the 17-pdr gun or the British-
modified M10 Achilles, also armed with the 17-pdr, were the only 
weapons in which the infantry had complete confidence.  Normally, the 
main target of an anti-tank gun was indeed the tank although the 17-
pdr did latterly fire a useful HE shell, and was therefore also effective as 
a field gun.  The general teaching was that tanks which had led or 
supported the advance to an objective should be relieved there as soon 
as possible by self-propelled anti-tank guns, which should in their turn 
be relieved by towed anti-tank guns dug in.  This reflected the doctrine 
intended to govern the employment of self-propelled anti-tank artillery 
as laid down in the 1943 War Office Military Training Pamphlet No.41 
The Tactical Handling of the Armoured Division and its Components, in 
force throughout the fighting in Normandy: that „the light armour 
provided, together with good cross-country performance, make such 
guns suitable for employment in support of the attacking brigade, 
especially for consolidation, and as a mobile reserve‟.73  
     This was not helpful because of the distinction made between 
consolidation and exploitation.  Carver‟s criticism of the sequencing 
outlined was that it had seldom been possible or effective because there 
simply were not enough self-propelled 17-pdrs to relieve the tanks, it 
was seldom possible to bring up towed anti-tank guns and dig them in 
in daylight, and it was very difficult to site towed anti-tank guns so that 
they were both concealed and able to cover the ground in front of and on 
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flanks.  Even when dug in, however, the towed 17-pdr was very 
vulnerable to HE fire.  This all added up to one thing, Carver noted: 
„under present conditions effective anti-tank defence of the infantry‟s 
forward positions can NOT be provided by anything else but tanks or SP 
guns equipped with the 17 pr‟, that is, in practice, the Sherman Firefly 
or the Achilles, and Carver found himself „forced to use up tanks for the 
anti-tank defence of static positions for lack of SP anti-tank guns‟.74 
Therefore, he thought the War Office doctrine was wrong.   
     The conclusions Carver drew from all this were firstly – as 
Hopkinson, the commander of 44th RTR had suggested – that anti-tank 
regiments of infantry divisions should be equipped with self-propelled 
guns.75  Carver went out of his way to accommodate the demands of 
Littledale, the infantry commander of 2nd KRRC, by stressing that the 
tanks would continue to defend the infantry from enemy tanks in the 
absence of an adequate number of self-propelled guns until the number 
and quality such guns could be increased, in spite of the wastage in very 
valuable tank commanders which it imposed as a result of casualties 
from mortar and HE fire.76  Secondly, self-propelled anti-tank gunners 
must get out of their heads the idea that their true role was as a mobile 
reserve as per War Office teaching, and that anti-tank protection of 
forward defence lines was the job of the towed gun.77  The tanks, in 
other words, were best trained and equipped to provide the mobile 
reserve, and what self-propelled anti-tank guns there were should be 
used to release as many tanks as possible for this job.  Thus, instead of 
being used in an offensive mobile role operating in support of friendly 
tanks chasing and eliminating enemy tanks, the self-propelled anti-tank 
gun‟s tactical role according to Carver should be flank protection and 
reinforcement of the anti-tank defence of armoured and infantry units in 
a largely static role the role in fact envisioned by the War Office for the 
towed 17-pdrs.  These should now be relegated to the role of creating an 
anti-tank defence in depth, where they would not be subject to accurate 
                                                          
74
 TMA, RH5 4AB: 1938, „Anti-tank defence‟, paras 2, 3 and 4. (Emphasis original.) 
75
 Ibid., para. 5. 
76
 Ibid., para. 8. 
77
 Ibid., para. 5. 
111 
 
mortaring or HE fire from tanks.  Self-propelled anti-tank gunners 
should act offensively.  Their role was not to „sit and wait‟ but to carry 
out continuous observation, and generally be offensive by, amongst 
other things, carrying out indirect HE shoots using the capability of the 
17-pdr to fire a HE shell.  All these were appropriate tactics, in the light 
of the vulnerabilities of the towed 17-pdr, often towed forward by an 
unarmoured - or at best lightly armoured - vehicle with the added 
difficulty for the crew of  manoeuvring a gun of over 4000lbs weight after 
the towing vehicle withdrew.  Finally, Carver recommended the design of 
a self-propelled anti-tank gun armed with the best possible anti-tank 
gun, that is the 17-pdr, and included a specification for the weapon.78  
     The Valentine tank went out of production in 1943, but a number 
were adapted to carry the 17 pounder gun in an open, rear-facing 
fighting compartment. The resultant vehicle was given the official title of 
SP 17-pdr Valentine, although it was usually referred to as the Archer.  
None saw service in Normandy.  It can be surmised that reports and 
requirements such as Carver‟s were subsequently heeded at the highest 
levels of command as existing Archers were issued to the anti-tank 
battalions of the British armoured divisions in the autumn of 1944. 
  
 
TOTALIZE: High Level Command Responses     
 
 
     On 8 August 1944 1st Canadian Army launched Operation 
TOTALIZE, an offensive aimed at Falaise.  TOTALIZE included many 
innovations, intended to rectify the difficulty met until then by the 
Anglo-Canadian forces: „how to get the armour through the enemy gun 
screen to sufficient depth to disrupt the German anti-tank gun and 
mortar defence, in country highly suited to the tactics of the latter 
combination.‟79  A successful break-in – Simonds knew – would bring 
his forces almost immediately into contact with the Germans‟ armoured 
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second line of defence.  In the preparations for D-Day Simonds had 
given considerable thought to the problem of breaking into the strong 
German line, breaking through, and exploiting this into a breakout.80  
He also appreciated that a number of 21st Army Group‟s operations had 
achieved break-ins but had been unable to maintain the advance. 
     The attack, Simonds believed, „must be carefully organized and 
strongly supported by all available artillery‟.  He knew that „the essence 
of the German system of defence is the counter-attack‟.  Thus, „the 
defeat of these counter-attacks must form part of the original plan of 
attack which must include arrangements for artillery support and the 
forward moves of infantry supporting weapons – including tanks – on 
the objective‟.  Further, as „there is bound to be a pause during this 
phase when the leading troops on the objective are going to be without 
the full support of the artillery [t]his is the period at which the 
employment of all available air support is most useful to tide over the 
gap‟.  Simonds saw the infantry division as the „sledge hammer‟ in the 
attack.  The armoured division was to be a „weapon of opportunity‟, 
capable of dealing with enemy rearguard positions and developing a 
breakout, but too weak in infantry to carry out an attack in depth and 
„still retain fresh infantry to co-operate with the armour in more fluid 
operations for which it is specially designed‟.81     
     Simonds‟ plan addressed the problem of breaking through the 
German defences in three ways.  First and most significantly for the 
purposes of this thesis, II Canadian Corps‟ leading forces did not suffer 
from inadequate levels of infantry support.  The initial penetration was 
made by infantry and armour together.  In TOTALIZE, the direction and 
objectives of the operation could not be disguised.  Nevertheless, 
Simonds was keen to effect surprise.  Thus, the operation began at 
nightfall and Phase One continued through the hours of darkness.  The 
assaulting infantry was carried forward in half-tracks and armoured 
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vehicles specially modified to carry infantry (Kangaroos).  His instruction 
to his divisional commanders amplified his plan: „the infantry 
accompanying the armour to first objectives in Phase One must go 
straight through with the armour.  [...]  The essentials are that the 
infantry shall be carried in bullet and splinter-proof vehicles to their 
actual objectives‟.82  Second, airpower would play a more complete and 
integrated role by providing fire support deep into German-held territory 
when the advance would be carried beyond the range of the artillery.  
Third, there was also an aerial bombardment, intended to deal with the 
main, second German defensive line.  With these factors in place 
Simonds hoped to achieve a breakthrough, at which point his two 
armoured divisions would be introduced into the battle in an 
exploitation role. 
     TOTALIZE was the first operation that British or Canadian troops of 
infantry divisions would be carried into battle in vehicles with 
comparable armoured protection and mobility as the tanks they 
accompanied.83  However, although TOTALIZE was innovative in this 
and other respects, it was also a strictly timetabled operation, as well as 
one in which Simonds retained tight control of the forces employed.84  
On the morning of 8 August, II Canadian Corps had in effect breached 
the German lines.  The advance was halted until the second bombing 
raid had taken place.  A considerable delay ensued, allowing the 
Germans to plug the gap created by British-Canadian forces.  Further, II 
Canadian Corps also required time to reorganize and gather itself for 
further operations.  Momentum may have been lost, but it would have 
been contrary to Simonds‟ approach not to take the time to bring up the 
Canadians‟ anti-tank guns, coordinate their defences, so as to be ready 
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to meet a German counter-attack.  Furthermore, the inexperience of the 
two armoured divisions, intended to spearhead Phase Two of TOTALIZE, 
further militated against success.85  Finally, the fact was that no one on 
the Allied side was aware of the presence of a number of 88mm guns 
south of the general line from Bretteville-sur-Laize to St. Sylvain.86  
 
 
 
Map 3.2: Operation TOTALIZE
87
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     Looking from the outside in, among many experienced middle-level 
commanders there was a recognition that what was the right thing to do 
could now be accepted: in particular, getting everyone to sing from the 
same hymn sheet by instructing and integrating replacements in 
battlefield tactics; allowing subordinates to understand as much of the 
big picture as could be understood; and disseminating useful 
innovations as widely as possible.88  As a Squadron Commander of the 
Sherbrooke Fusilier Regiment who took part in TOTALIZE put it, „men 
fight their battle on what they‟re told to do, and you‟ve got to keep 
ensuring in the back of your mind that they do understand what they‟re 
supposed to do‟.89  The most significant thing TOTALIZE tells us is the 
failure of the top-down control and execution of operations.  Simonds‟s 
great contribution was to mould a form of co-operation for the advancing 
armour and infantry, whereby they were given the technical means to 
attack together, which could be successfully exploited by tactical 
commanders.  However, the big-picture problem in terms of operational 
technique was getting everyone up and down the levels of command to 
sing from the same hymn sheet.  Simonds browbeat his commanders, 
the armoured commanders in particular, for what he saw as a lack of 
aggressive spirit, if not something far worse.90  TOTALIZE is a classic 
example of how responsibility for failure was put onto subordinate 
commanders rather than understood by the higher commander involved 
as endemic to the system for tactical command and control.  
     On 14 and 15 August 1944, as part of Operation TRACTABLE, the 
continuation of TOTALIZE, 4th Armoured Brigade was under 53rd 
(Welch) Infantry Division, which was struggling through very dense 
country to cut the main road from Condé to Falaise.  Major-General R.K. 
Ross, GOC 53rd Infantry Division wanted to advance by moving one 
infantry brigade through another in a series of coordinated, set-piece 
infantry-cum-armour attacks.  Carver, however, appreciated that if the 
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armour could push on as fast as possible to seize objectives that would 
increase the pressure, tightening the encirclement of the enemy, the 
results would justify the risks.  The 44th RTR dashed ahead of the 
infantry of the Welsh division and by last light on 15 August had cut the 
Falaise road from the west, leaving 4th Battalion Royal Welch Fusiliers 
to catch up as best they could during the night.  In a very different 
context, this was the same decision Brigadier Verney had taken at 
Caumont.  It shows, moreover, that Carver no longer felt bound by or to 
the need for an anti-tank effort involving all arms to create the 
conditions for exploitation by the armour which he had previously 
identified would be usual.  By that point however, the German front in 
Normandy was breaking up, so, as the War Diary reflected the need to 
create these conditions no longer existed.91 
 
 
 
 
     The insights, imagination and initiative of commanders at the 
hitherto largely neglected divisional level thus played an important part 
in shaping final doctrine.  In these two chapters in particular the 
selection of operations looked at could influence the analysis.  However, 
different operations in Normandy show different things.  All these 
actions demonstrate many of the issues discussed: while some show the 
need for change, importantly, some show lessons being learned.  What 
Roberts and Adair had set in place was a force structure to improve 
armour-infantry co-operation within armoured divisions in order to 
facilitate the combined arms tactics necessary for success in Normandy, 
themselves organised around the concepts of tank-cum-infantry 
offensive action and anti-tank defence.  This organizational development 
was also an innovation, and a highly effective and successful one.  
Further, the homogeneous brigade concept, which was also adopted and 
adapted in TOTALIZE/TRACTABLE, interacted with what Montgomery 
believed was required – as would be brought out more fully in The 
Armoured Division in Battle (December 1944) – and that was the 
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ubiquitous use of armour, that is all armoured brigades, whether 
independent or in divisions to be equally capable of undertaking the 
roles of close-support of infantry, pursuit and exploitation.  
     The roles played by the creative brigadiers of independent armoured 
brigades identified and discussed here provide a further demonstration 
that the creation of doctrine was a much more general, collaborative 
process than many historians have supposed or been willing to concede.  
Although Carver and 4th Armoured Brigade‟s purpose remained that of 
close co-operation with infantry divisions, his solution, in which 4th 
Armoured Brigade concentrated on close co-operation tactics between 
its Sherman tanks and its „own‟ infantry, with this motor battalion in 
M5 and M9 half-tracks, would be conducted at a speed of thought and 
action which was new and not necessarily in close proximity to other 
attacking infantry from infantry divisions.  This was an answer in-part 
to the problem of how the process of defending infantry – but also the 
tanks – against enemy tanks and anti-tank weapons could be made 
dynamic so that defence itself became mobile rather than static.  It 
applied particularly to the independent armoured brigades.  Unlike the 
independent tank brigades, they could field this twin-attack team by 
employing their supporting motor battalion of infantry.  The key weapon 
in this was the 17-pdr gun, however mounted, rather than the general 
War Office teaching that tanks which had led or supported the advance 
to an objective should be relieved as soon as possible by self-propelled 
anti-tank guns, which should in turn be relieved by towed anti-tank 
guns dug in.  The key ingredient of Carver‟s thinking was to compress 
consolidation and exploitation into one phase.  He realised that in 
British attempts at a breakthrough the real problem was the fragility of 
flank protection.  His overall solution of a combined and integrated 
armour-infantry assault interacted with Montgomery‟s ideas coming 
from the top and helped remake the template for the operation of tanks 
and infantry in the set-piece battles conducted by 21st Army Group.  
Tanks would abandon their concentration on supporting fire from the 
flanks.  The self-propelled guns would do this, being got forward quickly, 
while the tanks would be released for a further advance.  Doctrine did 
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not come from the top: it is possible to see in the doctrine Montgomery 
worked out in December 1944 resonances, echoes and elements of their 
ideas or perhaps, more accurately of ideas which had come to be 
accepted as the right ones among brigadiers and the COs of armoured 
regiments of independent armoured brigades.  Thus, the argument that 
the rigidity of hierarchy and line of command in general and an 
authoritarian, top-down control of operations was significantly harmful 
to the efficiency of armoured units in action in Normandy has to be 
weighed against the evidence for this essentially collaborative creation of 
doctrine. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
FROM ‘ANARCHY’ TO PROBLEM-SOLVING (1):  DIMENSIONS OF 
OPERATIONAL PRACTICE IN LATE 1944 AND BEFORE THE 
RHINE CROSSING 
 
 
     In the process of fighting from D-Day, many ideas were displaced by 
new experiences.  What some commanders within 21st Army Group 
thought would be valuable ceased to be so.  In response to the problems 
of fighting from the beaches of Normandy to the borders of Germany, in 
mid- to late 1944 armour doctrine was being challenged, criticised and 
changed in 21st Army Group by commanders at lower level.  This 
somewhat anarchic situation persisted throughout the fighting in 
Normandy and during the subsequent fighting in Belgium and southern 
Holland, up to the end of 1944.  The two-way interaction between lower 
level commanders and those alongside and above them continued to 
operate to shape operational doctrine.  Montgomery‟s efforts to elucidate 
the lessons of the campaign played no small part in creating this 
doctrine; though contributors below the higher levels of command also 
played an important part in producing the ultimately successful 
methods of combat which would later take 21st Army Group across the 
Rhine to the Baltic and the Elbe in 1945.  The creation of doctrine was 
the result of the interaction of several factors: the actions of 
Montgomery, who „managed‟ the output, of other officers at differing 
levels in the chain of command, and of „circumstances‟.   
     Montgomery emphasised the need to learn from combat experience, 
in part expecting his commanders to learn from their own experiences.  
However, he believed that, from his experience, he had the 
fundamentals of an effective operational doctrine.  He was, therefore, not 
so much interested in the acquisition of operational lessons; he was 
more interested in ensuring the assimilation of tactical ones.  He was 
interested in people who could tell him what would work.  The 
interaction of Montgomery, key commanders and circumstances led to 
the emergence of a new framework for action through which previous 
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experience could be successfully reinterpreted and brought to bear 
effectively.  This framework drew its inspiration from the general way the 
British Army attempted to adjust official doctrine to lessons learned 
from operations.  Whilst being unique to Montgomery and 21st Army 
Group, it appears to have been generic within the whole of that Group 
under Montgomery‟s command.  
     Circumstances have consequences, which produce new 
circumstances.  There had been heavy static fighting in Normandy.  
Then there was an advance at tremendous speed into the Low 
Countries.  September 1944 is the first time there was a pause in which 
to take stock.  The defeat at Arnhem had significant consequences for 
the operational and tactical methods of 21st Army Group.  Montgomery 
had his ideas – those of 21st Army Group, and he developed them in 
doctrinal pamphlets in November and December 1944.  In these 
pamphlets, which he designed to be authoritative aids to the 
implementation of this „new‟ doctrine, he identified the problems of 
fighting with the tools at his disposal and indicated how he believed they 
should be tackled in the remainder of the war against Germany.  
Although the pamphlets appeared over Montgomery‟s name and with his 
authority, he worked with others to produce them.  Montgomery‟s 
pamphlets on the armoured and infantry divisions of late 1944 may 
thus be seen as an outcome of a process that both embodied and 
reflected the desired doctrine and one in which senior officers at higher 
levels were less involved.  Further, the pamphlet writing process itself 
provided the intellectual and doctrinal substance of his command 
system.   
     The other part of his command system was actually managing the 
people to do it.  The uniformity of 21st Army Group doctrine at any one 
time is sometimes confused with assumptions that it was constant over 
time.  In a similar way, while there was a general dynamic in which 
Montgomery sought to impose his view and while that view was 
ostensibly accepted at corps and divisional level, a more complex set of 
relations between people, circumstances and equipment developed 
which meant it was not that simple.  In this process, in shaping a new 
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framework for action through which previous experience could be 
successfully reinterpreted the importance of contributors below the 
higher levels of command has hitherto been largely overlooked.  The 
most modern historiography still describes the approach to tactical 
doctrine as apparently anarchic.1  Rather, it was Montgomery‟s adoption 
of a problem-solving approach – which he adopted in response to the 
problems of fighting in Normandy and through the Low Countries – in 
which he emphasised the importance of context but also, importantly, 
allowed for the diverse views of other commanders to be managed, which 
led to success in North-West Europe.   
   
 
The Strategic and Operational Scene after Arnhem 
 
  
     The circumstances that transpired during September 1944 had 
important consequences, both for Montgomery and for the British Army, 
which would affect the strategic and operational scene in late 1944.  
September began with Montgomery‟s promotion in rank to Field-Marshal 
but his effective demotion with regard to planning, from the role of 
overall Allied commander on land which he had exercised throughout 
the fighting in Normandy, to that of commander of the Anglo-Canadian 
21st Army Group.  Eisenhower assumed the role of Land Forces 
Commander, in addition to his role as Supreme Allied Commander.  
Also, against all expectations, the Germans managed to re-establish a 
front.  This brought to a head disagreements between Allied 
commanders over strategy.  The month ended with Arnhem: the 
attempted opening up by airborne troops of a narrow corridor to include 
the vital bridges over the Dutch waterways, along which the armour of 
XXX Corps could quickly pass to burst into the north German plain.  It 
was now clear that the war was not likely to be over by Christmas and 
the end of 1944.2 
                                                          
1
 T. Copp, „21st Army Group in Normandy: towards a new balance sheet‟ in Buckley, ed., 
Normandy: Sixty Years On, p. 15. 
2
 General Sir David Fraser, And We Shall Shock Them: The British Army in the Second 
World War (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1983), pp. 342-43.  
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     After his failure at Arnhem, Montgomery realised that to make the 
final assault on Germany – that is, for the crossing of the Rhine to be 
successful – it would first be necessary to destroy the German forces 
between the Maas and the Rhine.  Nevertheless, it was, he explained to 
Eisenhower and other high Allied commanders at Maastricht on 7 
December 1944 „essential that we force mobile war on the Germans by 
the spring or early summer [of 1945].  They have little transport, little 
petrol, and tanks that cannot compete with ours in the mobile battle.  
Once the war becomes mobile, that is the end of the Germans‟.3  The 
fighting in the Ardennes confirmed that the pursuit phase of the 
campaign post-Normandy was over.  The increasing numerical 
superiority of the Allies in armoured fighting vehicles and transport 
vehicles as well as improvements to the armament, protection and speed 
of British tanks, and the rapid Allied advance across France to the 
borders of Germany itself could not, though, obscure deficiencies in the 
British practice of mobile combined-arms tactics with tanks, anti-tank 
artillery and infantry which had highlighted command, doctrinal and 
organizational shortcomings.   
     From the end of September 1944, Montgomery‟s aim was to improve 
the performance of his armoured and infantry divisions in battle in 
order to wrest the initiative back from the German Army now that, 
contrary to  expectations, it had managed to re-establish itself as an 
effective fighting force.  The backdrop was the operations of 
Montgomery‟s 21st Army Group in North-West Europe in the last three 
months of 1944 to clear the Scheldt estuary of enemy forces and make 
possible the opening of the large Belgian port of Antwerp to Allied 
shipping, consolidate the narrow corridor retained by Allied forces after 
the survivors of Arnhem had been withdrawn, and also secure better 
positions for his forces from which to advance into Germany in 1945.  It 
is in the relationship between Montgomery‟s general theories and the 
actual physical circumstances that commanders – and their ideas – 
faced that the answers to the questions of how the creation of doctrine 
                                                          
3
 Montgomery, Memoirs, p. 302.  
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depended on personalities, which personalities, and with what 
consequences are to be found.    
     Different units and formations tended to lay the blame for their 
troubles on one another.4  In reality, outcomes were the consequence of 
the inter-relationships between three variables which were in play 
throughout this period: „generalship‟, or operational art and tactical 
skills; the impact on the Germans of the imposition of relentless 
pressure via mobile war; and „ground‟, or best utilization of time and 
space factors.  Together they resulted in the infantry supporting the 
tanks with quick action and an altogether more intimate armour-
infantry co-operation being achieved during the advance through 
Belgium and Holland into Germany in the last three months of 1944.  
Montgomery‟s goal was the highest possible attainment on each of these 
variables and the best balance of all three by the time of his offensive 
into the Rhineland in February and March 1945. 
 
 
Interactions within the Corps-Division-Brigade Hierarchy 
 
 
     Montgomery had earlier decided that Lieutenant-General B.G. 
Horrocks was the man to command the pursuit of the German armies 
defeated in Normandy.  He recommended Horrocks be appointed to the 
command of XXX Corps and had regrouped it for that task and for 
MARKET-GARDEN.5  O‟Connor and VIII Corps were to play an important 
but subsidiary role and operate on the right of XXX Corps.  O‟Connor 
had played just such a pursuit role following up a retreating enemy in 
1940-41 so he „began to wonder whether he was out of favour‟ with 
Montgomery.6   
                                                          
4
 Exemplified in the two accounts by 11th Armoured Division and by the East Yorkshire 
Regiment, a part of 3rd Infantry Division, of the liberation of Overloon and Venraij in 
October 1944: Anon. [Maj. Edgar Palamountain], Taurus Pursuant: A History of 11th 
Armoured Division (Germany: Privately published, c.1945), p.70; Lieut.-Col. P.R. 
Nightingale, The East Yorkshire Regt.(Duke of York‟s Own) in the War 1939/45 (Howden: 
Mr. Pye Books, 1998 [1952]), p. 227.  
5
 Baynes, Forgotten Victor: O‟Connor, p. 225. 
6
 Ibid., p. 226. 
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     During the Winter of 1944-45 O‟Connor‟s VIII Corps carried out what 
the corps history calls useful though unspectacular operations and 
closed up to the line of the River Maas.7  The first of these operations 
was CONSTELLATION, the last of VIII Corps operations to be launched 
in North-West Europe under his command.  Afterwards Roberts, a 
leading subordinate of O‟Connor, charged him with not understanding 
the relationship between armour and ground in late 1944 Europe and 
supported Montgomery‟s decision to prefer Horrocks because this was 
just the sort of operation Horrocks „would like and excel at‟.8   
     The professional criticisms of the abortive Operation GATWICK 
demonstrated O‟Connor‟s perceived shortcomings.  Coming immediately 
before CONSTELLATION, Operation GATWICK was to clear the 
Reichswald by using 3rd Division (VIII Corps).  When O‟Connor visited 
Whistler, one of his divisional commanders, in the early days of October, 
Whistler told him that he would require extra troops because the ground 
was so obviously unsuited to the employment of armour as a „force 
multiplier‟.  Whistler‟s tirade in his diary against „chinagraph warriors 
who make marks on the map without reference to sense‟ reflected his 
misgivings that GATWICK would require more troops than O‟Connor 
appeared to envisage.9  Whistler‟s view of Horrocks was that „he is 
moderately practical‟, compared to O‟Connor, „our chinagraph king [who] 
fights all his battles on it and they are generally inaccurately marked 
into the bargain‟.  „I take a dim view and would sooner have a different 
master‟, he concluded.10  As with GOODWOOD, neither Roberts nor 
Whistler fully recognised just how little leeway O‟Connor had to alter 
Montgomery‟s master plan in the case of GATWICK.  It was not until 
Montgomery decided, after due consideration, that it would require too 
many troops in view of the current operations farther west to clear the 
Antwerp approaches that the operation was cancelled.  This episode 
raises questions both about the extent to which a genuine consensus on 
                                                          
7
 Anon. [Lieut.-Col. J.G. Hooper], The River Rhine to the Baltic Sea: Operations of Eighth 
Corps, March-May 1945 (Germany: Privately published, c.1945), p. 7. 
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 Hastings, Overlord, p. 275; Roberts, Desert to Baltic, p. 196. 
9
 WSRO,Whistler Papers, 9/48, personal diary, 6 October 1944. 
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(Emphasis in original).  
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operational methods existed at high level and about what events such as 
O‟Connor‟s departure tell us of Montgomery‟s method of command. 
     The critical factors were now different and to conduct military 
operations successfully now needed different structures.  Roberts 
correctly identified the important factors and the related process-
challenge issues involved.  Military operations were now „quite different 
to anything we had met before‟, he explained; „now we came up against 
natural obstacles, sometimes fortified and sometimes not, but when 
held by the Germans they needed a lot of effort.  To deal with this 
situation, we organised ourselves again into „mixed‟ brigade groups‟.11  
The related concerns of the maintenance of  high morale and the 
avoidance of heavy casualties were further issues to address, and 
achieving objectives which needed a lot of effort was „not very easy‟.12  In 
the middle of December 1944, Whistler reproached himself with „now 
finding fault with a unit [in 8th Brigade] that takes too great care of the 
lives of its men.  I am sure it results in heavier casualties and lower 
morale somehow‟.13  In his Christmas message, Whistler declared: 
„Splendid as has been the support given by all arms of the Division, it is 
that small number of men in the Rifle Companies of the Infantry 
Battalions who have to take the ground and hold it‟.14  Behind this lay 
the belief that by holding back a commander might actually incur more 
casualties, likely to be heaviest among the infantry.  Yet, everywhere 
there was a shortage of trained infantry replacements, so that in mid-
December he could see „no way of producing the result‟.15   
     Objectives could, however, be achieved at least cost.  3rd Division‟s 
task in CONSTELLATION was to attack southeast from Oploo, seize the 
two small towns of Overloon and Venraij set among the woods on the 
outskirts of marshland, and thus draw in enemy reserves.  There were 
thus to be two parts to 3rd Division‟s task: first the capture of Overloon 
and then the capture of Venraij.  The Division‟s part in 
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CONSTELLATION was planned at Divisional HQ on 10 October, orders 
going out that afternoon for the next day.  Bad weather postponed the 
operation until 12 October.  8th Brigade was to carry out the first task 
and 9th Brigade the second.  Concentration of force on a narrow 
frontage with units echeloned in depth ensured the maximum offensive 
power at the point of break-in.  Having fresh units ready to exploit the 
success gained was also important, and 185th Brigade would be ready 
to assist either phase and exploit the success of the second.  The 
countryside was flat and suited the defence.  It was to be yet another 
close-quarter infantry slogging match.  It was equally obvious that these 
attacks would require the strongest support.  To provide it, the division 
had two battalions of 6th Guards Tank Brigade, with whom they had 
practised crossing water obstacles and dealing with counter-mortar 
problems in September.  „Unless something funny happens very soon I 
am going to have a very satisfactory battle as far as planning is 
concerned.  I expect to set the troops off on the right foot anyway and 
that is all I aim to do ever‟, Whistler noted.16  
     Whistler‟s interpretation of the principle of concentration relied on 
artillery and air power rather than fire power from armour to carry the 
attack forward.  The guns of 25th Field Regiment and all the guns of 
11th Armoured Division, 15th (Scottish) Infantry Division, and VIII 
Corps‟ Army Group Royal Artillery (8thAGRA) were added to that of the 
division‟s three field regiments.  Fire support from the air was to be 
provided by Typhoons of 83 Group RAF and Marauders of the USAAF.   
     At this point, it is appropriate to look at how O‟Connor handled 
CONSTELLATION.  Strikingly, this was the one occasion on which 
O‟Connor operated outside of the straightjacket imposed by Montgomery 
and his methods.  CONSTELLATION was not a typical „Montgomery 
plan‟.  It placed great emphasis on the element of surprise, for example: 
attacking first in one sector and drawing off enemy forces would 
facilitate the success of a surprise attack in another sector.  Similarly, 
O‟Connor planned to mask the presence of 15th Infantry Division and 
take full advantage of the element of „surprise‟ by drawing the bulk of 
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the enemy northwards before a thrust by this division came in from the 
south, that is from the enemy rear.  In so doing he was reprising his 
Operation COMPASS (September 1940), when nobody had expected the 
British to come from behind, that is the major turning of a flank – the 
sort of move O‟Connor performed in 1940.  The initial three phases 
would take the town of Venraij, and place 11th Armoured Division and 
7th US Armoured Division in positions from which they would be able to 
carry out the fourth phase, when the two armoured divisions and 15th 
Division were to converge on Venlo.  11th Armoured had made several 
thrusts into the Peel marshland from the north, towards Venraij, at the 
end of September.  From these it was apparent before CONSTELLATION 
began that terrain was a factor which would impact adversely on 
armour‟s ability to carry out its intended role of rapid exploitation.  As 
Roberts put it: „it became clear that we were not going to get anywhere 
until a carefully planned full scale attack was made‟.17  Roberts‟ „full 
scale attack‟ is taken to mean a well supported assault including all 
arms (and possibly also across a wider salient).  It was becoming 
apparent to these two divisional commanders, Whistler and Roberts, 
that it was difficult to conduct new-type operations, where the infantry 
and their supporting tanks faced a resourceful enemy who contested 
every inch of ground, without incurring heavy casualties.  The solution 
that would emerge emphasised closer tank–infantry unit and formation 
organization and structure and anti-tank artillery co-operation tied in 
appropriately to tactical fire plans and support from field, medium and 
heavy artillery as well as from the air.  
     On 12 October and for the next three days, in appalling weather and 
over adverse terrain, 3rd Division and 11th Armoured Division 
manoeuvred into position and drew the enemy northwards, as intended.  
By 16 October, elements of the two divisions were ready to catch the 
Germans in a pincer movement around Venraij and 7th US Armoured 
Division was about to be launched into action when 15th Division was 
withdrawn to take part in the clearance of the Scheldt estuary.  Limited 
advances were made on 17 October, and Venraij itself was captured.  
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However, without 15th Division, further movement in the Maas pocket 
was impossible and VIII Corps adopted defensive positions along its 
extended front.  Roberts thought that the operation went well „until 15th 
(Scottish) Division had to be withdrawn‟.18   
     This view sits uneasily with Whistler‟s description of the operation: 
„bags of mines and desperate mud.  Churchills bogging down 
everywhere.  Bridges collapsing – in fact every bloody thing quite 
bloody‟.19  The infantry and their supporting tanks faced an enemy who 
contested every inch of ground. Whistler thought the Commanding 
Officer of 6th Guards Tank Brigade „first class‟.  However, in conditions 
which impeded armoured movement, infantry of 8th Brigade went on 
without the tanks of 4th Grenadier Guards „which was particularly good 
show‟.  The tanks of 4th Grenadier Guards took a long time to get 
forward, however, and the infantry had to push on by themselves – 
partly because the ground was so unsuitable for tanks and had been 
heavily mined.  Whistler tried to get one of the Grenadier officers who 
had been „pretty poor‟ replaced, and felt that the Commanding Officer, 
armoured-trained but with an infantry background, could not be relied 
on „to do the right thing‟.  At one point, he noted: „had all my guns taken 
from me and now have lost the air support.  Life is a little difficult when 
such things happen in the middle of a battle‟.  
     What frustrated Whistler, was that he could control and manage only 
the components of which he was in command.  This compares with 
Barker‟s creation of Clarkeforce later in October 1944 (see below), as an 
important step which broadly pointed in the direction of the creation 
and employment of proto modern „battlegroups‟.       
     In response to what he considered an arbitrary intervention to 
remove one of his subordinate commanders, General Lindsay Silvester, 
commanding 7th US Armoured, O‟Connor asked to be relieved of his 
command on 20 October.  In the meantime, Whistler‟s relations with 
O‟Connor had begun steadily to improve: „since [O‟Connor‟s Chief of 
Staff] Harry Floyd has left the little man [O‟Connor] has completely 
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changed [...] he and I are now very good friends and begin to understand 
each other‟.20  Thus, support among and between fellow commanders 
seems, by this time, to have been based chiefly on the ability to get the 
job done.  Factionalism would appear not to have been as important in 
O‟Connor‟s removal as has been suggested.21  On 27 November 1944 
O‟Connor received his official posting as GOC-in-C Eastern Army India 
and on 30 November started to hand over his command to Lieutenant-
General Barker, formerly GOC 49th Division.  In December, VIII Corps 
held the entire 2nd Army front on the Maas from Culijk in the north to 
Maesyck in the south.  Constant patrolling, minefield reconnaissance 
and shelling were carried out to harass the enemy, but apart from this 
VIII Corps was again static.22   
     The ability of the British Army to overcome the Germans continued 
to depend on its ability to mount successful combined arms operations.  
It is therefore appropriate at this juncture to begin to make some 
assessment of the generalship at the end of 1944 of the particular 
subordinate commanders discussed hitherto and its interaction with the 
other variables at play.  O‟Connor had had little leeway to alter 
Montgomery‟s master plan as Montgomery allowed his corps 
commanders little scope in the planning of operations.  Equally, when 
O‟Connor did gain a certain amount of leeway in the planning of 
CONSTELLATION he showed the insight, imagination and dynamic 
leadership that he had shown in desert warfare against the Italians.  
Further, although it can be fairly concluded that O‟Connor had vast 
operational experience and although this was not exploited to the full by 
Montgomery, whether in the conditions prevailing in Europe in late 1944 
this was a wrong experience – and therefore not actually exploitable at 
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that time – is a moot point, as will become apparent.23  The existence of 
a genuine consensus on operational methods at high level – irrelevant at 
the time by virtue of Montgomery‟s salience at every level of command 
and the way he sought to mediate his ideas through his corps and 
divisional commanders – also becomes questionable.  The importance of 
the example of O‟Connor – not the only one because Bucknall was also 
deemed to have performed badly but very interesting in the light of 
O‟Connor‟s undoubted ability – is in how it illuminates Montgomery‟s 
method of command.   
     Montgomery‟s way of trying to produce „the result‟ was ruthlessly to 
remove from command officers he thought were likely to be in 
disagreement as he sought to impose a mould of agreement or 
consensus.  Thus he got rid of people who seemed to question the 
methods he promulgated or could not perform them.  His treatment of 
O‟Connor was an example of the former, and of Bucknall of the latter.  A 
key question, therefore, is whether O‟Connor‟s record of handling VIII 
Corps indicates any real differences between him and Montgomery.  
While the operational methods both men adopted were the same in basic 
character insofar as neither had any option but to employ operational 
techniques that put a premium on minimising casualties, there were 
also at least three important differences in their respective approaches.  
     First, they differed in their views on the way infantry accompanying 
armour should be tactically mounted.  As the British armoured division 
moved towards a balance of fewer tanks and more motorised infantry, 
the lorried infantry, or Motor Brigade appeared.  Back in England after 
Dunkirk, Montgomery and Brooke organised things so that each of the 
new armoured divisions had at least one brigade of lorry-borne infantry.  
These were based on standard battalions, carried in a new type of 
vehicle – soft-skinned and not armoured.  The concept of mechanised 
infantry in their own bullet-proof cross-country vehicles was one to 
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which O‟Connor became a convert to during the Normandy fighting, 
championing their introduction.  It will be recalled that, before 
Operation GOODWOOD began he had anticipated the need for the 
infantry to keep up with the tanks and at the same time be protected 
against enemy fire, which made movement by lorry unsatisfactory. On 
16 October 1944, as CONSTELLATION was moving into what should 
have been its final phase, he wrote to his old Cameronian friend Major-
General J.F. Evetts, a special adviser to the Ministry of Production, 
asking him to press for the development of an „armoured carrier for the 
carriage of infantry into battle‟.24  This was a „hard‟ or engineering 
approach to problem-solving.  Montgomery, on the other hand, rather 
than wait to explore whether or not there was sufficient time to develop 
new vehicles, put his faith in the first instance in what a member of his 
staff has described as his „ “training‟ philosophy” ‟, a common doctrine 
incorporating better techniques of armour-infantry co-operation, widely 
understood and brought to an adequate level of efficiency through 
training.25  This „soft‟ approach – the view that it is not what you have 
but how you use it – reflected Montgomery‟s method of command.  If the 
ideal technical equipment had been available it might be argued that 
Montgomery would not have needed to have gone down this road of 
„being better‟, as opposed merely to „having better‟.  The solution that 
would emerge in actuality emphasised morale and addressed equipment 
and numbers as well as the way the Germans were now fighting.  
     Secondly, the two men differed over what Montgomery termed „the 
Initiative‟.  Where O‟Connor was prepared to work within existing norms 
and practices, and leave decisions on the actual methods of fighting to 
unit commanding officers, Montgomery was not.  Thus, for Operation 
SPRING (25 July 1944), even though he believed his armoured 
commanders had not developed the knack of combining armour and 
infantry in a mutually supporting manner, O‟Connor felt the need to do 
no more than advise Adair to „remember what you are doing is not a 
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rush to Paris – it is the capture of a wood by combined armour and 
infantry‟.26  During BLUECOAT, both Roberts and Adair divided their 
divisions into two brigade groups.  The new „mix‟ of infantry battalions 
and armoured regiments in mutually supporting combinations worked.  
O‟Connor was extremely pleased with these armoured commanders, 
praising Adair and Roberts – the latter who he recognised had been 
„bewildered at the start by infantry‟ – to his confidant, erstwhile BGS 
and now Alexander‟s Chief of Staff in Italy, Lieutenant-General Sir John 
Harding, not only for doing well but also for learning a great deal.27  
Ultimately, however, what constituted „good tactics‟ was left to the 
discretion and judgement of unit commanding officers.  O‟Connor was 
much more prepared than Montgomery to work in this way.  
Montgomery, by contrast, was seeking more of a step-change within the 
existing culture and the norms and practices of the Army.  As will be 
seen in the next chapter, to Montgomery the Initiative meant that 
operations developed according to a predetermined plan.  It was 
necessary quickly to gain the Initiative, and then to keep it by 
„ascertaining the facts of the situation at that time, and then making [...] 
plans to deal with the problem‟.28  Of course, at high level this would 
likely involve major decisions.  For Montgomery, however, each 
commander, however senior or junior, must be clear as to the points 
which mattered on his own level.  It was crucial for a commander to 
position his ready reserves appropriately so as to block anticipated 
enemy countermoves swiftly.  Skill in grouping, and the precept that 
initiative in quick re-grouping to meet the changing tactical situation 
played a large part in successful battle operations, ensuring that 
operations developed according to plan.  Thus, the Initiative was also 
one of Montgomery‟s general principles and a central part of his doctrine 
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of command.  It was, he believed, by the „initiative of subordinates that 
the battle is finally won‟.29   
     A final difference between Montgomery and O‟Connor was in the 
nature of the role the two envisaged for the armoured division in battle.  
In CONSTELLATION 3rd Division was to operate towards Overloon and 
Venraij; 11th Armoured would pass through them and advance on 
Amerika to the right and Horst on the left, after which a further thrust 
was envisaged in the direction of Venlo.  O‟Connor was thus prepared to 
contemplate an exploitation of this „empty‟ flank by the armoured 
division.  However, a sizeable number of the tanks of 15th/19th King‟s 
Royal Hussars (15th/19th H) which tried to operate unsupported 
towards Amerika on 19 October were destroyed by Panzerfausts or 
Panzerschreck anti-tank rocket-launchers, or anti-tank guns.  They 
could perhaps gain, but certainly not hold, their objective.  By this time, 
Montgomery opposed the concept that armoured divisions should 
operate independently to attempt the major turning of a flank and any 
idea that tank units should manoeuvre independently and unsupported.  
Instead, he saw the armoured division as a combined arms force that 
would seize key terrain in order to use the advantages of being on the 
defensive when the enemy counterattacked.  Montgomery‟s was the 
more integrated concept.  But, this meant changing the „geometry‟ of the 
whole system, and putting aside the separate armoured brigade and 
infantry brigade structure of armoured divisions in favour of more fluid 
arrangements, while still maintaining „balance‟.  Thus, Montgomery‟s 
solution to the problem of balance with this organisation of forces – and 
indeed now generally – was to change the existing notion of a force 
balanced by reserves to one so balanced that there will never be any 
need to react to enemy thrusts with large reserves.  The homogeneous-
brigade organisation had been put in place by several armoured 
divisional commanders.  This approach used up what had traditionally 
been considered reserves.  Montgomery‟s contribution was to make the 
homogeneous brigade concept reconcilable with his concept of balance. 
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     In Roberts‟ view, O‟Connor‟s handling of CONSTELLATION was „the 
best he had shown in the campaign‟.30  O‟Connor‟s biographer believed 
that his record of handling VIII Corps in battle indicated that he merely 
had to catch up with tactical lessons missed during his captivity as a 
prisoner of the Italians.31  Later, he revised that judgement, believing 
that O‟Connor „learnt much in N.W. Europe, but was too old, and could 
not have gone on any longer than he did‟.32  Roberts‟s praise for 
O‟Connor‟s handling of CONSTELLATION, when, in comparison with 
earlier operations, he was under Montgomery‟s control, confirms that 
O‟Connor – for whatever reason – had some difficulty operating within 
the straightjacket imposed by Montgomery and his methods.  This fits 
with Baynes‟s later insight, which seems the more perceptive judgement. 
Thus, Montgomery seems to have decided that O‟Connor was 
somewhere in a grey area between seeming to question the emerging 
methods and „failing‟.   
     However, in assessing how effectively O‟Connor overcame the enemy 
opposition in the Maas pocket and achieved the objective of clearing it 
set for him, account must be taken of the fact that the temporary 
removal of 15th Division to support the Tilburg offensive was due to 
circumstances entirely beyond his control: the shortage of trained 
infantry.  The withdrawal of 15th Division in turn underlines the 
pressure Montgomery was under, in the face of increasing American 
numerical predominance, to secure not only the defeat of Germany but 
also a high profile role for Britain in that defeat.  Time was not a tool at 
his disposal: the terrain was against his troops; and the Germans were 
fighting with determination and skill.  O‟Connor was most definitely not 
incompetent, but Montgomery‟s readiness to let him go has been widely 
accepted as the equivalent of relieving him of his command.  Barker‟s 
apprehension that he too „might be pushed off to India or some bloody 
place with no interest like this‟ is evidence which supports this view.33  
More importantly, it shows that there was a more general feeling in the 
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air that this is what happened to people who did not toe the line and 
operate within the mould of uncritical consensus which Montgomery 
was trying to create.   
     Barker was the only divisional commander in Montgomery‟s 21st 
Army Group to be appointed to corps command during the campaign in 
North-West Europe.  Without looking back too far, it is necessary to 
investigate the particular kind of past experience Barker represented 
and how that combination related to that amalgam of qualities, 
capabilities and attitudes that Montgomery wanted in his corps 
commanders.  It will be recalled that in the 1920s and 1930s the British 
Army experimented to produce an army capable of mobile combined 
arms action.  These were not experiments in which Montgomery was 
directly or even closely involved.  Others, such as Barker, were more 
closely involved in the practical combination or integration of the 
various arms.34  The decision had been taken to discard the tank lead in 
favour of motorising the entire army.  Thus at the start of the Second 
World War the British Army was entirely motorised but lacked a large 
modern armoured force.  A large British armoured force had then been 
built up, and by mid- to late 1944, the pressing question was how to use 
not only the armoured divisions but also the independent brigades 
which were its largest component part.  Experience and practice from 
the Western Desert informed training in the UK.  It was official policy, 
however, and recognised in the Home Forces that the application of 
lessons from the desert needed some caution. The appointment of 
Barker (by Brooke on Montgomery‟s recommendation, and over a 
number of other candidates who were considered) can be seen as 
representing the re-emergence of the influence of that part of the army 
which had never been committed in the Mediterranean theatres, as 
opposed to the (ex-) 8th Army in North Africa and Italy, and with it of 
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pre-war concepts of more balanced tank-inclusive mixed forces and of 
the light infantry tradition rather than that of mechanised infantry.   
     On 26/27 October 1944, the Germans launched a counter-attack  in 
the Meijel area in O‟Connor‟s VIII Corps sector, striking the thinly held 
positions at Meijel, southeast of Eindhoven with two mechanised 
divisions.  Strong German attacks westward from Meijel on 28 October 
were broken up by artillery which O‟Connor had sent to the 7th US 
Armoured.  On the most crucial day of the battle, 29 October, it was 
once again concentrated artillery fire that decimated the attacking 
Germans.  O‟Connor was content with merely pushing the enemy back 
towards the Maas until a proper operation could be organised to clear 
the whole of the Maas pocket.35  On this date also, Barker on his own 
authority as the infantry divisional commander, decided to launch 
Clarkeforce in an attack on Roosendaal as part of the ongoing struggle 
to capture the Scheldt estuary in south-western Holland in the face of 
fierce enemy resistance.36  The British I Corps (49th Division attached) 
had been tasked to clear the large rectangle some forty miles wide and 
thirty miles in depth of southern Holland to the line of the river Maas, 
while II Canadian Corps cleared the Scheldt estuary.  On 20 October, I 
Corps advanced with 49th Division, which had 34th Tank Brigade under 
command in the centre, directed on Roosendaal (Operation REBOUND).  
The axis of 49th Division‟s advance was from Wuestmalle, through 
Brecht, Wustwezel, Nieumoer and Esschen to Roosendaal, a distance of 
about twenty miles.  Barker‟s plan was to launch an armour-cum-
infantry force through a gap made by the division supported by the 
tanks of the tank brigade, to gain ground and act as a spearhead to the 
division whose main bulk would follow up and take over as opportunity 
occurred.  In the operations that took place (Operation THRUSTER), 
Clarkeforce performed as envisaged.   
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     Both these apparently minor operations were of considerable tactical 
and operational importance.37  Despite its inevitable failure after Allied 
numerical superiority was brought to bear, the German attack on Meijel 
with two mechanised divisions demonstrated that the German Army 
could still mount a surprise counterstroke against weakly defended 
sections of the Allied line.  Even though Barker‟s armoured force was 
held up by German self-propelled guns and anti-tank ditches „so we 
didn‟t get the rush through we hoped‟, the performance of Clarkeforce 
showed Montgomery a way in which his numerical superiority in tanks – 
most of them in independent brigades – could be brought to bear, 
opening up again the possibility of mobile operations on a decisive 
scale.38   Equally, Barker knew how Montgomery wanted him to fight: he 
seems to have needed no convincing.  Barker, who as a then divisional 
commander appears to have had no direct involvement in the drafting of 
the pamphlets which Montgomery was soon to produce, thought that 
their content was self-evident as a result of his own experience of the 
fighting.39  Thus, the thinking of subordinate commanders, derived from 
their experiences of actually fighting on the ground with these tools, was 
congruent with Montgomery‟s thinking.  
     The raid by two troops of 9th Royal Tank Regiment (9thRTR) during 
REBOUND-THRUSTER to harass enemy positions on the right flank in 
the Hiebart-Steenhoven area on 22 October can be seen as a move 
conforming to Montgomery‟s alternate thrusts technique.  Like Whistler, 
Barker relied on artillery and air power to ensure success without taking 
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heavy infantry casualties.  In the face of a determined German counter-
attack in the Aerle-Nieukerk area earlier in October, he recorded that 
„my guns have had a lot of shooting these last two days and I‟ve had the 
RAF loose on several targets to help keep the Boche in order‟.  In 
November he noted: „I fear the Yanks do it with undue casualties – they 
simply don‟t know how to use their artillery.‟40  The employment of 
9thRTR in support of 56th Brigade to create an initial breach in the 
enemy defences was in accordance with prevailing British principles for 
the employment of a heavy tank unit armed with heavy, or infantry, 
tanks.  It is important to note however that, in Clarkeforce, Barker 
believed he had created a separate „armoured force‟, to be employed in a 
different manner from that of a conventional tank brigade.  In his 
farewell message to 49th Division he spoke of a „classic advance‟ 
towards Tilburg, and later to Roosendaal and Willemstadt.  This should 
be taken literally to refer to the „classic‟ fast-moving British tank-
infantry advances of April 1918.  The speed at which the phases of the 
operation were pursued to attempt to keep up the momentum of 
advance is what is particularly important here.  And while, clearly, 
command was not decentralised to the armoured commander, equally 
clearly Barker understood Clarke‟s command to be an independent one 
in battle, with the overall command of all the elements of Clarkeforce 
resting with the tank formation.  Clarke‟s verdict was that „under such 
circumstances the fullest tank-inf[antry] cooperation could only be 
natural and automatic‟.41 
     While Roberts and Whistler were both trying to deal with the problem 
of how to win their battles without heavy casualties in this unfavourable 
operating environment, their divisions were actually fighting separate 
battles within the single VIII Corps plan.  Whistler‟s 3rd Division was 
fighting its battle with its „own‟ armour, 6th Guards Tank Brigade, in 
accordance with the prevailing British tank-infantry co-operation 
doctrine, that is that an infantry division would fight with an 
independent armoured or tank brigade.  Furthermore, Whistler, because 
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he believed the infantry‟s role was the hardest, was prepared to push 
infantry forward without tanks and rely only on artillery and airpower 
when he thought this was absolutely necessary for success.  In the flat, 
low lying land between rivers and canals – themselves important 
barriers to movement – tanks were prey to anti-tank guns firing at long 
range, while the Germans‟ extensive use of minefields between these 
water obstacles further enhanced the security of the fixed anti-tank 
defences they had prepared.  However, reliance on artillery firepower, 
while an important ingredient of the solution, was actually increasingly 
incompatible with the fluid, mobile, armour-cum-infantry operations 
which Montgomery now additionally wished to impose on the enemy as 
soon as possible.   
     Doctrinally and organisationally, therefore, there were still problems 
that had to be solved.  The earlier innovation of mixed brigade groups 
composed of mutually supporting infantry and armour only applied to 
the armour and infantry of the armoured divisions.  The infantry 
divisions had to rely on the independent tank brigades for support.  
Montgomery‟s idea was to make all the tank brigades into armoured 
brigades each capable of tactical infantry co-operation and exploitation.  
Barker‟s contribution – the lessons inherent in the two operations 
described – was to develop the role of tank brigades away from simply 
the close support of infantry in attack or defence.  It was, therefore, an 
innovative tactical application of the armour of a tank brigade which tied 
in very well with what Montgomery envisaged as the new role for 
tank/armoured brigades.  This was the employment of armour-with-
infantry in fluid mobile warfare of the kind Montgomery thought most 
appropriate in the circumstances, as opposed to the kind O‟Connor 
wished to impose on the Germans.  Montgomery‟s solution to realise his 
operational level aims was ingenuity or conceptual superiority, and the 
outfall of this, at the tactical level, was that he saw the need to manage 
the expectations of infantry and armour as to what the other could 
achieve in order to ensure effective coordinated armour-infantry co-
operation.  Although the process of co-creation of doctrine was a process 
which was open to new ideas, once the new doctrine was formulated 
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there was little scope for further Initiative (that is at the level of doctrine) 
which would result in methods, or the Master Plan being altered.  There 
was however always scope for individual initiative at the level of problem 
solving to suit the context.  Lines of command were invariably inflexible 
but the new doctrine of command stressed the requirement for this kind 
of initiative at every level.  Changing tactical problems emphasised the 
necessity for subordinates to be problem-solving in terms of the general 
intentions expressed in the given plan within a methods framework that 
would now be set out in Montgomery‟s pamphlets which encapsulated 
21st Army Group thinking and practice and subordinates were 
encouraged to go beyond the official War Office textbook approach. 
 
 
Command, Doctrine and Organization For and In the Advance to the 
Rhine    
 
 
     By the winter of 1944-45 the putting into practice of operational 
doctrine on the ground had changed.  To understand and illustrate in 
detail what had happened requires exploring practice in four 
dimensions: that of an independent armoured brigade (Carver and 4th 
Armoured Brigade) operating as the armoured brigade of an armoured 
division (Roberts and 11th Armoured Division); of an armoured division 
(Lyne and 7th Armoured Division); of an independent armoured brigade 
(Clarke and 34th Armoured Brigade) operating in the infantry-support 
role; and of an independent armoured brigade (6th Guards Armoured 
Brigade) operating in a new way. 
     New „best practice‟ was embodied in the methods employed by 4th 
Armoured Brigade, and its activities provide a checklist of these 
methods.42  By early 1945, 7th Armoured Division had recovered from 
its „stickiness‟ in time to play a significant part in the battle for 
Germany.  For this reason, 7th Armoured Division‟s performance (out of 
the three British standard armoured divisions in 21st Army Group) is 
selected for most attention.  Substantive progress in a process of 
improvement was because of its new commanders and the new 
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methods.  By the time of the assault across the Rhine, at the end of the 
„into Germany‟ phase, the situation for 21st Army Group‟s final advance 
to the Baltic and the Elbe was as follows: for some significant players of 
sufficient importance to have made them members of a small group of 
commanders for the purpose of a study of operational and tactical 
development and innovation, the new offensive techniques replaced the 
old.  Further, key examples make it clear that new and replacement 
commanders coming to prominence were tending to adopt the new 
methods. 
     Since mid-December 1944, 4th Armoured Brigade had been the 
armoured brigade of an armoured division, under command 11th 
Armoured Division in place of 29th Armoured Brigade which had gone to 
re-equip with British Comet tanks instead of their American 
Shermans.43  This shows that the Sherman-equipped independent 
armoured brigades were now regarded as being completely 
interchangeable with the armoured brigades of armoured divisions.  In 
Normandy, tank-mounted 17-pdrs had been in short supply but this 
new development reflected the growing availability of Sherman Fireflies: 
each of 4th Armoured Brigade‟s armoured regiments now had twenty-
four, a proportion which had doubled since D-day and Fireflies now 
made up half of each troop.44  It was now possible to engage and defeat 
the German heavy tanks and tank destroyer variants on more equal 
terms.     
     Operation VERITABLE and its subsequent development Operation 
BLOCKBUSTER, launched into the Reichswald Forest east of Nijmegen 
on 8 February 1945 with a view to possessing all the ground west of the 
Rhine during the Anglo-Canadian offensive into the Rhineland, and 
which culminated as British and Canadian forces reached the river 
Rhine, constituted the scene for the further testing of the new offensive 
techniques.  VERITABLE/BLOCKBUSTER began on 26 February 1945 
when II Canadian Corps started its attack on the Germans‟ defensive 
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system east and south-east of the Reichswald.  Carver‟s brigade was 
operating as the armoured brigade of 11th Armoured Division, the right 
division of II Canadian Corps.  The new homogeneous armoured-
infantry division now consisted of two brigades, each of two armoured 
regiments and two infantry battalions.45  In conformity with this, to 
create the  homogeneous armoured-infantry organization, 4th Armoured 
Brigade‟s 3rd/4th County of London Yeomanry armoured regiment 
(3rd/4th CLY) were „loaned‟ to 159th Brigade, 11th Armoured Division‟s 
„in-house‟ infantry brigade, in exchange for the 4th Battalion King‟s 
Shropshire Light Infantry (4th KSLI) coming to 4th Armoured Brigade.  
The15th/19th H from 11th Armoured‟s Armoured Reconnaissance 
Regiment was employed as the „fourth‟ armoured regiment required to 
make up the two homogeneous brigade-structure.  4th Armoured 
Brigade participated in the attack on „the Schliessen [sic. Schlieffen?] 
line‟ (1-3 March 1945) during BLOCKBUSTER when it found itself in 
„thick woods, full of bazookas [sic] and infantry, supported by a few 
SPs‟.46  This attests to the Germans‟ continued extensive use of tank-
hunting parties as in the Reichswald.  It also provides clear evidence of 
the nature of the techniques now being employed to overcome terrain 
and enemy.  In their main characteristics they were those which were 
generalised by Montgomery.  The exposition of the combat narrative 
demonstrates that the methods employed in breaching the Schlieffen 
line embodied new best practice. 
     The importance which Montgomery and others attached to achieving 
a higher tempo of operations has already been noted.  Montgomery‟s 
obsession with remaining „balanced‟ throughout his operations was a 
product of his need to keep the Initiative, and constantly to create new 
reserves so that he had the troops on hand to mount the next thrust.  
Thus a most important way momentum was maintained during the 
Schlieffen battle entailed moving armoured regiment-infantry battalion 
groups through each other: that is passing each group through its 
predecessor.  In the fighting in Normandy, even experienced 
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commanders had sometimes been caught out this way.  Thus, Major-
General T.G. Rennie who had commanded 6th Black Watch in the 
desert, 154th Brigade in Sicily and 3rd Division on D-Day had assumed 
that the capture of Tilly-la-Campagne during TOTALIZE [7-8 August 
1944] – once it had been bypassed and cut off – would require only one 
battalion of 152nd (Highland) Brigade, without tank support.47  The 
other two battalions of the brigade as well as the other brigades, were 
given other tasks.  In the VERITABLE operation, Rennie‟s 51st 
(Highland) Infantry Division was tasked with clearing the south-west 
corner of the Reichswald on a 5,000 yard from a start line east of 
Nijmegen, for which he employed 154th Infantry Brigade with 5th/7th 
Gordon Highlanders in support. 
 The 1th Battalion Black Watch start the attack, and 
occupied Breedeweg. […]  It was dark as she come on the 
surroundings of the forest, and come in heavy fightings 
with the German 122th Grenadier Regiment and the 
advance was stop here.  One Battalion of the reserve 
brigade, the 7th Argylls and Sutherland Highlanders take 
over the attack [.]48   
Thus, by the time of his penultimate battle, Rennie had learned from 
earlier mistakes. 
     Early in the evening of 26 February 1945, the Royal Scots Grey 
(Greys) and 4th KSLI crossed their start line and soon made their first 
objective.  The attack was continued through the night of 26/27 
February.  By the morning of 27 February, they had reached the railway 
line south-west of Udem.  At first light, 44th Royal Tank Regiment (44th 
RTR) and 2nd KRRC passed through the Greys and 4th KSLI.  Thick 
woods ran all along an open right flank.  About midday, 3rd/4th CLY 
and 3rd Battalion Monmouthshire Regiment (3rd MONS) passed 
through 3rd Canadian Division, which had taken most of Udem, to 
capture the ridge south-east of the town.  By late afternoon, they had 
reached the upper slopes of the ridge, 44th RTR and 2nd KRRC clearing 
the woods on the right flank and linking up with them.  Fighting 
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continued during the night.  By early afternoon the following day, 
3rd/4th CLY and 159th Brigade Group succeeded in forming a 
bridgehead over the stream beyond the ridge.  The 159th infantry, (1st 
Herefords) and 2nd KRRC were then relieved by infantry of 3rd 
Canadian Division.  In late evening, 15th/19th H and the Herefords 
passed through and just beyond the forward positions they met the first 
Schlieffen defences. 
     On 1 March, 4th Armoured Brigade concentrated east of the stream, 
under cover of smoke, its supporting artillery coming into action.  
Following an unsuccessful attack by a single squadron of 159th Brigade 
Group to break out of the bridgehead east of the small stream beyond 
and south of the Gochfortzberg feature earlier in the day, it was decided 
that a hard blow should be launched in accordance with the principles 
of surprise and concentration.  In mid-afternoon, 4th Armoured Brigade 
attacked the Schlieffen line, 44th RTR and 2nd KRRC on the right and 
the Greys and 4th KSLI on the left.  While the right group made slow but 
steady progress, the left group was unable to get forward until they had 
turned north, established a new start line and re-started their advance.  
This took till well into the night.  Meanwhile 44th RTR and 2nd KRRC 
had closed right up to the line.   
     The dispositions and manoeuvres by means of which contact was 
made with the enemy are as significant for present purposes as are 
those which are part of the fighting.  Thus 4th Armoured Brigade, 
concentrated in full-strength east of the stream, attacked the line mid-
afternoon in two groups, seeking to gain surprise through unbalancing 
the enemy with this method of attack and confusing him as to ultimate 
plans and intentions.  The essence of Montgomery‟s military doctrine 
was to „unbalance the enemy by manoeuvre while keeping well balanced 
[oneself]‟.49  The emphasis he placed on employing the alternative 
thrusts approach flowed from all of this, as did his view of the armoured 
division. 
     During the night the Greys and 4th KSLI attacked southwards.  It is 
significant that, having seized the Hochwald feature and the high 
                                                          
49
 Montgomery, A History of Warfare (London: Collins, 1968), p. 22. 
145 
 
ground north of Sonsbeck on the morning of 2 March, the Greys and 4th 
KSLI prepared to receive, then decisively defeated, a counterattack by 
the enemy and consolidated their gains, creating a firm base for a 
further bound forward, because of Montgomery‟s view, seen earlier, of 
an armoured formation as a combined arms force that would seize key 
terrain in order to use the advantages of being on the defensive when 
the enemy counterattacked.  In the afternoon, that night, and the 
following morning, 44th RTR and 2nd KRRC successfully cleared the 
southern end of the line, which effectively ended 4th Armoured Brigade‟s 
battle of the Schlieffen.  The whole battle epitomises what will later be 
seen as the classic „new style‟ action in the spirit of Montgomery‟s 
pamphlets, where he would write that the armoured commander must 
therefore have: „a clear tactical picture in his mind at all times in order 
that he may grasp quickly a fleeting opportunity‟.50 
     It is important to note that Operation TOTALIZE (7-9 August 1944), 
mounted by Lieutenant-General Simonds‟ II Canadian Corps – to which 
4th Armoured Brigade was now attached for BLOCKBUSTER as part of 
11th Armoured Division – had involved a plan for a daring tank-cum-
infantry night attack  in conjunction with aircraft which took the enemy 
by surprise.  Simonds‟ concept for TOTALIZE was to crack the German 
defences in two phases and then to exploit towards Falaise with his 
armour.  The idea that fighting around the clock with armoured forces 
could be an answer and should be usual was something new.  British 
armour in Normandy usually withdrew just behind the front line to 
laager once darkness fell; also, the overnight „First Phase‟ advance was a 
one-off in the plan for the TOTALIZE operation.51  In the present battle, 
4th Armoured Brigade operated by day and by night.  The initiative of 
Roberts and Carver in pressing the advance by day and by night was 
new best practice.52  In Carver‟s and indeed, the other accounts of this 
                                                          
50
 Armoured Div. in Battle, para. 2. 
51
 Canadian Military Headquarters Historical Section, Report No. 169, (Operations Totalize 
and Tractable), 7 January 1949 http://www.dnd.ca/hr/dhh/Downloads/cmhq/cmhq.169.pdf 
[accessed 6 December 2005] (para. 18).   
52
 Armoured Div. in Battle, paras. 41 and 46. 
146 
 
combat episode by those at this middle level of command „all went like 
clockwork‟.53 
     After completing his work for Montgomery on The Infantry Division in 
Battle (November 1944), Lyne commanded 7th Armoured Division for the 
remainder of the war against Germany.  In October 1944, Whistler 
asked himself „what can have happened to the Desert Rats.  Their name 
stinketh to heaven‟.54  Although they had played a prominent role in the 
advance across France and Belgium, there was a widespread perception 
among 21st Army Group commanders that when it came to anything 
but the exploitation role – as during the „Great Swan‟ across France and 
Belgium – 7th Armoured was a „problem‟ division.  This was the 
situation Montgomery sought to address in November 1944 with Lyne‟s 
appointment.55  Lyne‟s career was unique among Montgomery‟s 
lieutenants – he was the only commander in 21st Army Group to 
command infantry divisions and then an armoured division – and it is 
intensely interesting for this reason.  Certainly, the weight of evidence 
suggests that, so far as re-organization and changes in respect of 
armour were concerned, Lyne was an „implementer‟ rather than an 
„innovator‟. 
     From an analysis of Lyne‟s command and operational decision-
making it is possible to further establish how Montgomery wished the 
armoured divisions to function in the remainder of the war.  If the 
Sherman-equipped independent armoured brigades were now regarded 
as interchangeable with the armoured brigades of armoured divisions, 
the corollary was the expectation that the armoured brigades of 
armoured divisions would now be able effectively to discharge the 
independent armoured brigades‟ role of infantry support.  It had 
previously been thought that to compensate for their slow movement 
whilst closing the range, as the role of infantry support demanded, a 
heavily armoured tank would be required.   
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     The first task Lyne set himself was to return 131st Infantry Brigade 
to full strength.  By this time the shortage of trained infantry was so 
chronic that the number of rifle companies in each battalion had fallen 
to two, of between one and three platoons each.  Informal, more direct 
communication with Montgomery apparently allowed Lyne to fill out the 
four rifle companies in each battalion to full strength, each composed of 
three platoons.56 
     For Lyne, the most important thing now was „to get the relationship 
between infantry and armour back onto a proper basis‟.57  He quickly 
realised that a certain amount of mutual distrust existed between 
infantry and armour.  From his past experience in Normandy, Lyne had 
concluded that „the importance of infantry working with tank units, with 
whom they have previously trained and been able to establish a basis of 
mutual confidence, cannot be too strongly stressed‟.58  Accordingly he 
now started a system of affiliation between armoured regiments and the 
„new‟ infantry battalions – 2nd Battalion Devonshire Regiment (2nd 
Devons) and 9th Battalion Durham Light Infantry (9th DLI) – to ensure 
closer co-operation.  This reflected past British experience and was now 
standard practice. 
     In Normandy, the infantry brigade in 7th Armoured Division and the 
armoured brigade co-operated at times very closely.  This was not as 
close as the level of co-operation developed in Roberts‟ 11th Armoured, 
however.  Nevertheless, elements of the two brigades had been mixed so 
that they formed armour-infantry groups of mutually supporting 
individual tanks and infantry.59  In Normandy, these were not formally 
brigade groups as such, but they were in essence.  A reasonable case 
can be made that they reflected a view among the armour in 7th 
Armoured that co-operation with the infantry would always be a 
temporary arrangement.  Towards the end of 1944, Montgomery‟s 
removal of „blockers‟ such as Erskine and Hinde represented a definite 
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and determined attempt to replace people who had one kind of past 
experience as practitioners.  In spite of this, Lyne was aware of „a 
tendency in some quarters [i.e. among the armour] to regard the 
Division as so veteran and battle-worthy that re-training to meet new 
conditions was unnecessary‟.  This Lyne „firmly stamped on‟.60  Brigadier 
A.D.R. Wingfield was CO 22nd Armoured Brigade from November 1944.  
His view at that time was that   
an armoured division is the modern strategic cavalry; and, 
as such, is designed for strategic reconnaissance and 
exploitation.  In these operations (Alan and Colin) the role 
of 7th Armoured Division was exploitation; but in the early 
stages of the attack (Alan) its tanks were used for close 
support of the infantry assault.  This was justifiable in the 
event as the enemy resistance had not been unduly strong, 
and had been brief.  Heavy tank casualties had not been 
incurred and the tanks had been released from that role as 
early as possible.  Furthermore, the distance to the final 
objective was comparatively short.  Had those factors not 
prevailed I doubt whether an armoured brigade could have 
completed the two tasks successfully.61 
This was a concept which among other things still reflected the „cavalry 
concept‟ of armoured warfare and the doctrinaire British view of the 
roles of armour as alternates – either infantry-support or 
cavalry/exploitation – requiring two different types of formation each 
equipped with a different kind of tank.  Lyne was trying to implement a 
different view: that these must be seen as alternating roles of all 
armoured formations.  Finding a fourth armoured regiment by moving 
the 8th Hussars (8th H), whose task had been reconnaissance, into 
22nd Armoured Brigade, Lyne adopted the homogeneous brigade group 
structure – in practice, if not in theory. 
     By this stage, there was nothing particularly new in this.  This type 
of brigade group was associated with Roberts particularly but also with 
Adair of Guards Armoured, as well as with 4th Canadian and 1st Polish 
armoured divisions.  But in at least two significant ways, re-organization 
of 7th Armoured under Lyne involved or reflected new best practice, as 
                                                          
60
 IWM, Lyne Papers, 71/2/4, unpublished autobiography, Ch.X, p.3. 
61
 IWM, Wingfield Papers, PP/MCR/35, Brig. A.D.R. Wingfield, 22nd Armoured Brigade, 
notes on operations ALAN and COLIN (October 1944), quoted in his unpublished memoirs, 
1980 [on microfilm], pp. 294-95. 
149 
 
enunciated by Montgomery formally in his pamphlets, as we shall see in 
the next chapter. 
     The first was the attempt by Lyne to address, if not once and for all 
then certainly before the resumption of mobile operations and the final 
assault on Germany, what an armoured division like 7th Armoured was 
for.  This involved addressing the position adopted by Hinde following 
the early difficulties in Normandy, that the country was „unquestionably 
one‟ for the infantry supported by tanks, not for tanks of an armoured 
division such as 7th Armoured with a small supporting component of 
infantry.62  Lyne conceded that „the country [ahead] did not hold out 
much hope of successful armoured Divisional tactics as usually taught 
in the training pamphlets‟.  However, this was not what was now being 
taught in 21st Army Group.  Lyne was at pains to rub in that „our job 
was to fight and succeed in any kind of country under any conditions‟; 
and to make it clear that the shortage of trained infantry everywhere 
meant an armoured division could not „allow itself the luxury of keeping 
a certain type of formation [i.e. the armoured brigades] “on ice” for a 
particular form of operation‟.63  Close co-operation with infantry had 
hitherto been primarily the responsibility of 21st Army Group‟s tank 
brigades – mainly equipped with the Churchill.  Montgomery had long 
decided that this was unsatisfactory.  In November 1944, Lyne duly 
established the 7th Armoured Division Battle School „with much 
enthusiasm‟.64  From his viewpoint, it „played a particularly important 
part in training junior leaders of both armour and infantry in a common 
doctrine‟.65  What was required, Montgomery believed, was armoured 
formations capable of „ubiquitous‟ use, equipped and trained 
accordingly.66  Lastly, as a result of experience gained during 7th 
Armoured Division‟s participation in Operation BLACKCOCK (15-21 
January 1945) to eliminate the German salient south-west of the river 
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Roer between Roermond and Geilenkirchen, Lyne reorganised the 
(131st) Infantry Brigade H.Q. and included the necessary command 
tanks and signal facilities to put it on an equal footing with the (22nd) 
Armoured Brigade and capable of commanding any combination of 
infantry and armour.67  In Lyne‟s view, during Operation BLACKCOCK 
„the tanks had succeeded in giving really good close support to the 
infantry‟.68 
     What Lyne did was to reorganise the two arms in a force structure 
which embodied a better balance between armour and infantry, while 
simultaneously attempting to encourage in each arm a better, more 
realistic expectation of what the other could achieve, through nurturing 
a common doctrine.  However, the ubiquity of role of the Sherman-
equipped armoured brigades did not bring about the eclipse of the tank 
brigades equipped with the Churchill that Montgomery had anticipated.  
The example of Clarke and 34th Armoured Brigade operating in the 
infantry-support role during Operation VERITABLE demonstrates 
further good coordination and makes it clear as well that this was also 
perceived to come from „training together and getting to know the 
inf[antry]‟.69  However, the Churchill-equipped brigades‟ role was also 
undergoing a process of redefinition to go with their re-designation as 
„armoured brigades‟.  Churchill-equipped armoured brigades took on a 
new lease of life.  It will be recalled that in Normandy it had come to be 
believed that the objectives of a Churchill-equipped tank brigade could 
be to use the Churchill‟s cross-country ability to get into positions where 
it could not easily be seen, with the object of closing the gap between the 
superior performance of the German 88mm or long 75mm guns and the 
Churchill‟s own armament in order better to support the assaulting 
infantry.  The example of Greenacre and 6th Guards Armoured Brigade 
also makes it clear that for and in the advance from the Rhine new and 
replacement commanders coming to prominence were tending to adopt 
these new methods. 
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     For VERITABLE, two of 34th Armoured Brigade‟s armoured 
regiments were placed under command 53rd Division and the third was 
put under command 51st Division.  Ross, GOC 53rd Division, laid it 
down that armour would predominate in the attack over the open 
ground from the start line to the forest, and would put the infantry into 
the Reichswald.  However, it was also laid down that 34th Armoured 
Brigade would support 53rd Division „in all phases of the op[eration]‟, 
that is not just in the tank brigades‟ traditional role of assisting the 
infantry to break into the enemy‟s fixed defences and then retiring.70  
Ross wanted close tank support to the infantry inside the forest both by 
day and night.  The task of 9th RTR, therefore, lay solely in the forest, in 
support of 160th Infantry Brigade.  This required not only the closest co-
operation between tanks and infantry but also posed new problems of 
method (forest fighting tactics and night advances through bush, a type 
of terrain „reckoned as tank-proof hitherto‟).71  A number of Brigade 
Conferences were held by Brigadier Clarke to „determine means of 
overcoming the several particular problems of the attack‟, which 
included participation of the representative of 30th Armoured Brigade, 
79th Armoured Division (specialised armour).72  Relevant factors in the 
approach to the Reichswald included not only the importance of the 
actual ground (open) but also its state (mud and mines).  Clarke was 
determined, if necessary, to expend a complete squadron of tanks 
from147th Regiment RAC (147th RAC) getting through the mud and 
mines before giving up the attempt to lead the infantry to the edge of the 
Reichswald.  The „going‟ was such that 79th Armoured Division units 
failed to cross the start line on 53rd Division‟s front. 
     The 34th Armoured Brigade history singles out for particular 
prominence the performance of 9th RTR in the Reichswald during the 
night 8/9 February, 1945, when the regiment carried out a fighting 
advance of 2000 yards with 160th Infantry Brigade to capture the 
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Stoppelberg feature, arriving on the objective „up with their infantry‟.73 
However, to put the infantry on to their objective – that is into the 
Reichswald – it had been necessary to attack across an „open‟ area.  In 
this process, tanks of 147th RAC which had got across an anti-tank 
ditch took up firing positions in buildings, conforming to the new 
methods of tank fighting with Churchill-equipped armoured brigades 
practised by 6th Guards Tank Brigade.  Later, in the south-eastern 
corner of the Reichswald, tanks of 147th RAC took up fire positions and 
fired heavily from the west on a well-sited, well-defended position which 
had resisted all attempts to take it the previous day, while infantry from 
7th Royal Welsh Fusiliers attacked from the south-west.  Both these 
actions can be seen as representing the convergence of the experience of 
the two armoured brigades (34th and 6th Guards), that is, that the 
official doctrine which emphasised the close physical proximity of the 
two arms was inappropriate in these new sets of circumstances. 
     At first sight the formations and tactics employed by 34th Armoured 
Brigade in the battle of the Reichswald apparently had the outward 
appearance of best practice as enunciated in official doctrine and even 
Montgomery‟s own pre-D-Day doctrine.  However, closer inspection 
reveals a multi-layered set of reactions to circumstances, which drew 
both from the more recent experience of Churchill-equipped armoured 
brigades in Normandy and the encouragement to commanders at lower 
level to exercise their initiative and be proactive when confronted by new 
circumstances and new problems of fighting.  Thus, it can be seen to be 
illustrative of the doctrine recently institutionalised by Montgomery.  
Lieutenant-Colonel P.N. Veale, CO, 9th RTR, in a report – endorsed by 
Clarke – on close support to infantry in forest fighting, concluded that 
„f[or]m[atio]ns and tactics must be varied as much as conditions allow‟.74  
This reflected the new general doctrine or best practice for tank-infantry 
unit organization and structure in Montgomery‟s army group.75  
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     However, to return to the issue of the typicality or otherwise of each 
or any of these Churchill-equipped independent armoured brigades it is 
helpful to compare the tactics and performance of 6th Guards Armoured 
Brigade with those of 34th Armoured Brigade.  These two brigades were, 
in effect, representative of the „heavy‟ armoured brigades of 21st Army 
Group, and the development, post-Normandy, of specific operational 
tasks and generic tactics for them is critical.  It is important to also bear 
in mind that 6th Guards Armoured Brigade had, since the Battle of 
Normandy, a new commander, Brigadier W.D.C. Greenacre, who 
succeeded Brigadier Sir W. Barttelot (killed in action), who in turn 
replaced Verney.  
     With the renaming of the Churchill tank brigades as Independent 
Armoured Brigades came a re-organization, for which appropriate 
concepts of tactical handling, as well as suggestions to further improve 
the new organization, were developed through informal communication 
between Churchill armoured brigade commanders.  These drew on their 
reflections on recent experience, as well as on the new general 21st 
Army Group doctrine for armour-infantry co-operation, which itself drew 
upon the interaction of ideas of those closest to the actual fighting with 
those developed at high level, including, ultimately, Montgomery 
himself.   
     Thus, during a visit by the MGRAC, G.W. Richards, Montgomery‟s 
Tank Advisor, to Greenacre at 6th Guards Armoured Brigade 
Headquarters on the morning of 7 March 1945, Clarke (34th Armoured 
Brigade) was also present.  Back at his own 34th Armoured Brigade 
Headquarters later that day, Clarke wrote to Greenacre referring to an 
agreement the two of them had made during or after Richards‟ visit  „to 
“belly ache” in unison on our joint woes‟, enclosing an account of 34th 
Armoured Brigade‟s participation in VERITABLE.76  We can deduce that 
Greenacre and Clarke were of one mind – and that that was why Clarke 
was sending him the description of 34th Armoured Brigade‟s „recent 
ramble in the woods‟, because: „what befell there might interest you in 
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certain places‟.  They were thinking along the same lines: „we shall be in 
different Corps for the next operation [PLUNDER – the Rhine Crossing] 
but shall no doubt continue to have the same difficulties‟, that is ones 
common to Churchill-equipped armoured brigades.       
     „I think‟, Clarke wrote, „we impressed the MGRAC [Richards] with the 
need for an overall increase [...] so that we may, for a change, own our 
own [specialised armoured and engineer equipment such as armoured] 
bridgelayers‟.  They agreed in that aim, and also on the desirability of 
increasing the firepower of the new armoured brigades: „I will attack 
Jorrocks [Horrocks] next time I see him on the score of one separate 
field regiment [of SP artillery] to one tank brigade‟.  This was what would 
later become a recognised „establishment‟ norm for the Independent 
Armoured Brigades.77  
 
 
 
 
     The exposition of the combat narratives in this chapter shows that 
the methods employed by 21st Army Group came to demonstrate new 
best practice.  After Arnhem Montgomery realised there would be no 
easy or rapid advance into Germany.  The ability of the British Army to 
overcome the Germans continued to depend on its ability to mount 
successful combined arms operations.  Command, doctrinal and 
organizational shortcomings had to be addressed.  His aim was to 
improve the performance of his infantry divisions and armour in battle 
across all three of the variables at play throughout this period.  To 
realise his operational level aims Montgomery chose to rely on ingenuity 
or conceptual superiority.  Following on from this, at the tactical level, 
he sought to shape and manage the expectations of infantry and armour 
as to what the other could achieve in order to ensure effective 
coordinated armour-infantry co-operation.  He was interested in people 
who could tell him what would work.  His main idea was to be so quickly 
responsive to circumstances as to be able to bring about a change of 
circumstance. 
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     While there had been a general dynamic, or process in which 
Montgomery sought to impose his tactical view, and while that view was 
ostensibly accepted at corps level and at divisional level, a more complex 
set of relations between people, circumstances and equipment meant 
that contributors from below higher levels of command – and below the 
corps and divisional levels in the case of the commanders of 
independent tank and armoured brigades supporting divisions – were 
also important in the course of shaping the final doctrine.  To a greater 
extent than might hitherto have been supposed, the development of 
armoured-cum-infantry tactical doctrine was collaborative among these 
commanders and between commanders and the Commander-in-Chief: 
this co-creation, by Montgomery and key members of a small group of 
21st Army Group commanders, of doctrine for the final assault on 
Germany was the main factor which both influenced and helped bring 
about the outcome whereby all corps commanders and divisional 
commanders utilised the same methods.   
     Commanders who realised that these lessons were the right ones, 
such as Barker, needed no convincing.  Further, therefore, the thinking 
of „rising‟ subordinate commanders not directly involved in the drafting 
of Montgomery‟s pamphlets, derived from their experiences of actually 
fighting on the ground with infantry and armour, was congruent with 
the thinking expressed therein.  Furthermore, however, the way in 
which Montgomery sought to achieve a uniformity of practice was 
through the effective dismissal or removal of those „blockers‟, that is 
those with a different kind of past experience; another process was also 
in operation: how Montgomery commanded, and tried to ensure that his 
system worked with „everybody singing from the same hymn sheet‟ by 
means of his pamphlets, through his conferences, through what he said 
and wrote to his commanders on other occasions, and through 
arrangements such as Lyne‟s 7th Armoured Division ad hoc „Battle 
school‟.  There is a complementarity between the processes.  They were 
simultaneous and interlocking. 
     Montgomery thus intervened in several ways.  One was to 
institutionalise doctrine – intended to be the vital articulation between 
156 
 
previous thinking, past experience and the present military problem to 
be solved.  Another was to remove from the pool or team those with past 
experience as practitioners who had been found wanting.  The most 
modern historiography still describes the approach to tactical doctrine 
as apparently anarchic.  This may indeed be correct for early to mid-
1944.  However, by the end of 1944, it would be more accurate to say 
this apparent permissiveness remained only within the actual 
parameters of a more ordered 21st Army Group approach to tactics as 
well as to operational-level tasks that had developed as events unfolded.  
Further, once it had developed within 21st Army Group those who could 
not or would not work within it, among whom Bucknall was in the 
former category and O‟Connor in the latter, either were removed or 
effectively removed themselves from command and were replaced with 
those who could.  „Rightness‟ can be seen in the later actions of Adair, 
Carver, Barker, Roberts, Clarke, Greenacre and Lyne, particularly in the 
role of Lyne as an implementer closely tied to Montgomery.  Whistler 
could follow and adapt. 
       Thus, the apparent permission which remained was actually only 
permission to act within a commonly understood set of guidelines.  
These guidelines required the subordinate commander to act according 
to Montgomery‟s principle of war, The Initiative, and his principle of 
command, the initiative.  Thus, the view that Montgomery moved from 
prescription to an authoritarian approach in and after Normandy is a 
gross over-simplification.  What he laid down was the necessity to be 
problem-solving.  This allowed for a „crossover‟ to War Office doctrine, 
but only in so far as this was not incompatible with 21st Army Group 
doctrine at any one time. 
     Finally it has to be made clear that Montgomery‟s belief that it was 
by the initiative of subordinates that the battle was finally won did not 
mean the subordinate commander altering the master plan.  Rather, it 
meant his ascertaining the facts of the situation, then making plans to 
deal with the problem.  It was a problem-solving approach within the 
given plan. 
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     The apparent problem posed by the historiography, of whether it was 
a top-down dominated scene or a superficially subordinate but actually 
quite anarchic scene, is an incorrect way to look at the problem as far as 
doctrine and operations are concerned.  The suggestion in Carver‟s 
account of BLOCKBUSTER and others by those at this middle level of 
command that everything went „like clockwork‟ indicates a clear 
connection for them between the ideas behind the conduct of this 
operation and its outcome.  The simple conclusion which can be drawn 
is that the separation of Montgomery and the innovators and the drivers 
of innovation on the one hand and the implementers on the other had 
now reduced so much that asking if change came from the top down 
only or whether it was the product of a superficially subordinate but 
apparently „anarchic‟ situation, so far as the process of innovation was 
concerned, is simply a redundant question by this time.  All were doing 
something new but they were interpreting it and doing it in their own 
way. 
     This achievement of Montgomery‟s goal of a widening spiral of 
improvement across operational and tactical skills, in conducting the 
type of operations he now thought were necessary, in the given battle-
space, at the tempo he desired led to the emergence of a new framework 
for action, through which previous experience could be successfully 
reinterpreted and brought to bear effectively.  This was a different way to 
bring experience to bear.  The orientation that previously sufficed was 
experience of „what to do‟ but by late 1944 and into early 1945 the 
experience of „quick thinking‟ within the goals of the master plan was 
the solution rather than any specific course of prescriptive action. 
     Terrain and conditions – including the very bad weather, which 
deprived the attackers of really effective air support – together with 
ferocious opposition from the Germans and in particular the threat 
posed to British tanks by the Germans‟ extremely clever tactical use of 
self-propelled guns and hand-held, hollow charge weapons, all 
hampered rapid progress during the Winter 1944-45 battles.  However, 
whether the result of operational decision-making was a decision to 
mount a series of infantry and armoured attacks as Roberts and Carver 
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did with 4th Armoured Brigade, or to find a way around, as when Lyne 
decided to attempt to achieve surprise by a break-in on the British 
advanced left flank with 7th Armoured Division and thus take the main 
enemy positions astride the Sittard-Roermond road from the rear, 
lessons learned by British commanders from armoured-cum-infantry 
operations in the final months of 1944 show a dynamic relationship 
between problem-solving and the framework within which problems 
could and should be solved.  This framework reflected what had come to 
be recognised as the „right‟ tactical methods.  It owed much to 
Montgomery‟s efforts to further elucidate what he regarded as the really 
important operational lessons to be learned from the campaign, and to 
his attempts to enforce a mould of consensus. 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
 
FROM ‘ANARCHY’ TO PROBLEM-SOLVING (2): MONTGOMERY’S 
MANAGEMENT AND ITS PRACTICAL EXPRESSION, SEPTEMBER 
1944 TO APRIL 1945 
 
 
 
     Following on from the apparent „anarchy‟ or lack of control in the 
summer of 1944, divisional, corps and brigade commanders responded 
to Montgomery‟s command system and reflected in their methods the 
way that had become accepted and that way he now wanted them to 
fight.  The „set-piece‟, or large-scale deliberate assault battle employing 
the full concentration of offensive resources, was what we may now call 
„Montgomery‟s strategy‟ or selected military method, that is, his adopted 
style of war-fighting.  This was a recognizable strategy: as Montgomery 
and his legions fought their way into Germany, the maximum use was 
made of all available firepower.  At the operational level, Montgomery‟s 
emphasis on the set-piece battle as his chosen style of war-fighting 
placed the relative superiority of the British Army in matériel against the 
relative weaknesses of the Germans in matériel. 
     The weight of firepower and emphasis on other material factors 
which the British were able to employ in a highly organised, intricate 
and balanced way by that late stage of the campaign were not capable of 
being equalled by the Germans.  However, the Germans had shown 
themselves to be adept at accommodating their material inferiority and 
achieving effects out of all proportion to their actual weapon power.  In 
addition, the delayed launch of the converging American operation, 
GRENADE meant that fighting during VERITABLE (8 February-10 
March 1945) took on an attritional quality.  The problem was to regain 
the Initiative by resuming more mobile operations.  This, in turn, 
required subordinate commanders to exercise their initiative to be 
proactive. 
     Institutional practices were still highly resistant to a commonality of 
practice, and to a uniformity of practice in combining or integrating 
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armour and infantry.  Combining and recombining, in a flexible and 
rapid manner was to prove to be required in a situation where it was 
necessary to overcome the dense anti-tank defences which the Germans 
had put in place in North-West Europe.  To make the „model‟ fully 
explicatory the previous chapter has filled out the substance of 
Montgomery‟s active contribution: how he intervened to institutionalise 
a meld of those ideas that had come to be widely agreed upon by him 
and key commanders.  It is now necessary to turn to how that meld of 
ideas – not War Office doctrine – was expressed, and fed or translated 
back into the expression of doctrine in 21st Army Group.  The operation 
of a military culture which permitted apparent anarchy became 
translated into a new framework for action, which at the most basic level 
gave rise to standard operating procedures or routines.  The core value 
became the Initiative/initiative because, as Montgomery recognised, 
there was no such thing as a „normal‟ battle.    
     A process existed for feeding „lessons learned‟ into a corpus of many 
different types of doctrinal publications.  This reflected the perceived 
need for the importance of doctrine.  In the Second World War, 
Montgomery was not alone in comprehending the importance of the 
Initiative in planning and conducting operations.1  However, in his 
pamphlets, at the end of 1944 Montgomery attempted to systematise his 
methods.  We can thus speak of, and identify, his „principles of war‟.   
This format drew its broad inspiration from the general way the army 
attempted to adjust official doctrine to lessons learned from operations.  
This was an approach with roots in the previous thinking and 
experience of the British military, as first expressed in FSR of 1920 
where initiative was considered not to be a principle of war in its own 
right.  However, by late 1944, gaining the Initiative had become one of 
Montgomery‟s principles of war.   
     Carver, reflecting Montgomery‟s views, further developed his views 
post-Normandy, as demonstrated in his command of 4th Armoured 
Brigade.  It was essential to prevent the Germans regaining balance and 
                                                          
1
 Slim did so too: „in war it is all-important to gain and retain the initiative, to make the 
enemy conform to your action, to dance to your tune‟, Field-Marshal the Viscount Slim, 
Defeat into Victory, unabridged ed., (London: Cassell, 1956), p. 292 . 
161 
 
securing a ruptured front before mobile warfare overwhelmed their 
remaining forces in the final phase of the campaign.  Carver was 
thinking strategically: 
The great art is first to be able to judge correctly which are 
the most important factors at any one time: secondly to 
choose the right moment for decision, decide then stick to 
it.  [...]  When the decision is to be made, it must be made 
immediately, which it can only be if you have kept yourself 
well informed and have been looking ahead all the time.  
[...I]f a commander has not the mental courage to make 
decisions without delay and to stick to them, if he hovers or 
constantly changes his mind, the result will be a loss of the 
initiative and confusion.2 
It can be seen that responses were becoming more rapid in terms of the 
speed with which plans were being both made and carried out and 
hence more effective.  This was not a rising tide which „raised all boats‟ 
in terms of a fast decision-action cycle by all commanders across the 
board.  A problem remained from the time of the early fighting in 
Normandy when, still trying individually to learn from and to apply War 
Office doctrine „nobody would learn from the experiences of others‟ and 
instead in practice applied principles at a remove from current practical 
lessons.  In the later stages of the campaign, in the case of a division 
such as 52nd (Lowland) Infantry Division which had not seen action in 
the Normandy fighting or indeed in the pursuit phase thereafter, there 
were also problems learning quickly enough from current experience.  
This had created a gulf between the ideas that those responsible for 
tactical leadership were looking for and what was said in official written 
doctrine.  It still did not solve the problem of everybody „singing from the 
same hymn sheet‟ of a strong common doctrine of all arms.  The fall out 
of this was that Montgomery, aware that superiority in matériel on its 
own was not enough to guarantee success, also sought conceptual 
superiority in the area in which doctrine, actual systems and their 
proper utilization on the battlefield. 
     Montgomery sought to edge his legions away from repetitive tactical 
repertoires, not only with the intention of imposing mobile war on the 
                                                          
2
 IWM, Carver Papers, Lectures and Articles on Armoured Warfare 1940s, Brig. R.M.P. 
Carver, „Command Of An Independent Armoured Brigade – Some of the More Important 
Points‟, p.5. 
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enemy per se but also of creating the relationship between conceptual 
and material superiority which would bring material superiority to bear 
to greatest effect in changing circumstances.  There would thus be a 
vital interplay between securing the Initiative in operations and the 
institutionalization of tactical conceptions which, against the baseline of 
the standard tactical methods which best comprised the action of all 
arms, emphasised decentralised on-the-spot decision-making, and 
required commanders to exercise their initiative to be proactive.  This 
was intended to reduce the need for orders.  Always, however, whatever 
was done had to be within the aims and objectives of what Montgomery 
called „a master plan‟: this was a design for operations, utilizing the 
dimension of the air as well.  In this way, Montgomery hoped to bring 
tactics into line, or as much into line as was necessary, to realise his 
operational conception of mobile war as a further development from the 
set piece battle, once the conditions for break out had been created: 
where the opposition was organised, but not continuous, either in a firm 
front, or in depth.  Finally, there would be a pursuit, presenting even 
greater opportunities for speed of thought and action.  New „best 
practice‟ within the ground-rules Montgomery had laid down in the 
pamphlets was seen to be embodied in the methods employed by 
Carver‟s 4th Armoured Brigade, Greenacre‟s 6th Guards Armoured 
Brigade, and Barker‟s VIII Corps after the Rhine Crossing.  
     The advance into Germany and the breaching of the Rhine barrier 
itself preparatory to the advance from the Rhine was important for the 
command, operational and tactical development that took place.  Under 
Montgomery‟s general direction, this yielded a specific doctrine as a 
framework for action and – more importantly – a specified manner or 
general style of command as the framework of action.  The reason this 
took as long as it did, in addition to circumstances in the progress of the 
campaign, lay in the historical experience of the Army as an institution.  
Nevertheless, the western defences of Germany were successfully 
breached in late 1944-early 1945 and the Rhine reached in early 1945. 
     Montgomery‟s belief that adaptability depends almost entirely on 
people and their training was to be made a precept or key part of what 
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the doctrine actually said.  The armour to hand was a factor influencing 
the development of the new tactical doctrine which was being created.   
Thus, the shape of final doctrine was influenced by adaptations at lower 
level to employ the different types of tank available to best effect.  
According to Montgomery‟s „capital tank‟ idea, making the Sherman 
tank – and all other models of tanks – a multi-role tank would best 
match tactics and a tank that was available to operational aims and 
intentions.  What the Churchill-equipped armoured brigades did was 
thus indicative of what was acceptable new practice rather than being 
illustrative of Montgomery‟s preferred organization and best practice for 
all armoured units.  The different type of tanks available was an 
important factor affecting both the shape and application of the final 
doctrine. 
 
 
New Circumstances and New Ideas  
 
 
      There was a powerful sense of the need for speed, strategically, 
operationally, tactically, and individually if the war was to be won in 
time; in order to achieve this it was necessary to maintain a pattern of 
action that was offensive.  Montgomery exercised personal command.  
He communicated either directly or through senior intermediaries with 
his senior commanders.  Thereafter, within the general limits of the 
framework of his instructions or plan, these subordinates could do as 
they liked to realise his intentions.  Frequently, however, the lack of 
accompanying detailed, specific written orders from Montgomery had 
allowed confusion to creep in as to his actual aims and intentions, and 
created the exact opposite of gaining and holding „the Initiative‟ that 
Montgomery wanted.    
     Innovation with respect to integrating and combining armour and 
infantry was initiated primarily in the armoured arm.  This was where 
the need was greatest.  The processes by and through which doctrine 
was created in 21st Army Group in action involved the brigade and 
divisional levels because, as the levels of management closest to the 
actual fighting, they were in the first instance the level of learning how 
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to do it with the equipment to hand, and the available manpower.  
Within the command chain the drive for operational and tactical 
innovation was push-pull, and went in both directions.  Commanders at 
lower level had challenged, sometimes criticised and were also changing 
previous doctrine in response to the problems of fighting in Normandy.  
      While the need for speed permeated the entire command structure, 
commanders at different levels could be working from different planning 
systems towards different planning objectives because of different past 
experiences which were in play.  Some were simply bound by or to the 
lessons from previous victories.3  Further, this dynamic sometimes led 
to a lack of new thinking by more junior officers.4  However, operational 
and tactical challenges provided the seedbed for the growth of new 
ideas.  The reasons for the genesis of ideas were both operational and 
tactical.  Operationally, manoeuvre-oriented methods instigated on the 
basis of previous experience in the armoured arm had failed: thus a 
„business-as-usual‟ approach was clearly not going to be sufficient.  
Tactically, the Germans could be well dug-in, they were well-protected in 
well-camouflaged positions, and their tanks still enjoyed some 
advantage of long-range fire.  They were not going to be easy to dislodge 
and their dense anti-tank defences were not going to be overcome by the 
use of armour alone.  What Montgomery wanted from his commanders 
was the introduction of better combined-arms practice and for all 
officers proactively to exercise initiative in order to secure the Initiative.  
Figure 5.1 provides a diagrammatic representation of where the three 
experience groups were in mid- to late 1944, at the start of the process 
of new doctrine being developed under Montgomery‟s direction.  The 
three groups had become two by mid- to late 1944 as the value of both 
„desert training‟ and War Office related doctrine were increasingly 
discarded in favour of new solutions to new problems of combat, learned 
at first hand, or from those who were in contact with the enemy.  These 
new solutions were tried out and found sufficient and acceptable 
practice.  
                                                          
3
 Bucknall, Erskine, and Hinde, for example. 
4
 For example, the actions of 52nd Division at Drierwalde and Hopsten, as shall be seen later 
in this chapter. 
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Successful commanders from N.Africa who did not change
… new commanders who looked to N.Africa experience alone
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Figure 5.1: The development of new doctrine, mid- to late 1944 
 
 
     The large British armoured force fielded by 21st Army Group in June 
1944 had been a force divided by doctrine.  War Office policy was 
officially to accept the doctrines of two contending schools of thought as 
to the „true‟ purpose of armoured formations; that tanks might be used 
in close co-operation with infantry, or that they might operate 
independently.  However, in practice the functions of tanks were seen as 
alternatives: either infantry-armour co-operation or exploitation, each 
requiring a different type of tank: the type of tank, cruiser tanks or 
infantry tanks, with which a formation was principally equipped made 
its intended battlefield role clear.   
  
 
The Perceived Need For and Importance of Doctrine  
 
 
     Within a military culture which emphasised the learning of the 
correct lessons – which higher leaders (brigade commanders and above) 
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were regarded as being able to learn for themselves, then teach 
subordinates – doctrinal publications appeared in a number of different 
series, each with its own function within the overall purpose of doctrinal 
dissemination.  Doctrinal publications – of which there were many – 
inevitably presented ideal sets of general circumstances, and also 
principles or methods by which it was understood that certain results or 
objects might be achieved.  Although it was emphasised that, in order to 
follow through the lines of doctrine, principles should be adapted to 
situations according to the circumstances, in practice junior officers 
were taught to reason according to a series of prescribed steps to form 
an appreciation of the situation.  There was often a lack of adequate 
guidance for junior commanders on how to apply principles of war at 
their level, according to the circumstances of the moment.  This meant 
that they leaned on heavily formulaic principles of war.  Traditionally, 
junior commanders had little freedom of action.  This can be contrasted 
with senior officers‟ planning procedures.  Senior officers, often brigade 
commanders and above, had been traditionally allowed great latitude to 
permit maximum possible freedom of action so that nothing was allowed 
to interfere with the intention to complete the particular task in hand 
which was part of an overall and wider plan.  As the early stages of the 
Battle of Normandy had demonstrated, this freedom had frequently 
resulted in failure by corps commanders to gain and hold „the Initiative‟, 
and loss of initiative and confusion by even divisional commanders, let 
alone their brigade commanders.  This doctrine, or lack of it, did not 
empower subordinates to act in the way Montgomery now wanted after 
Arnhem.  
     In 1940 and 1941, as a commander in the UK, Montgomery‟s 
predilection for teaching people „lessons‟ led him to organise „study 
weeks‟.  Between 7 and 12 October 1940, for example, all unit 
commanders down to battalion COs were required to contribute to, or at 
least participate in Montgomery‟s V Corps Study Week: 
The study week was a huge success.  I think everyone 
enjoyed it; it went with a “bang” from start to finish and we 
all learned a great deal.  The night operation scheme was 
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voted great value and I am grateful to you for the 
preliminary work you put into it.5 
     His determination that the lessons of his campaigns should be 
properly understood and disseminated has been duly noted: 
Ensuring that the right lessons were spread as widely as 
possible was clearly a task to which Montgomery was 
deeply committed.  He carried out this duty through his 
pamphlets and memoranda; by means of letters and the 
circulation of his diary notes, containing his thoughts on 
the lessons of his battles, written as soon as they were won; 
and through his lectures and personal contacts.6 
However, the army‟s doctrine had to adjust to a variety of different 
experiences, the importance of which was not easy to work out.  In 
expounding his „lessons‟, Montgomery did not shy away from putting 
himself at loggerheads with official policy and established doctrine.  For 
example, Major-General L.O. Lyne had witnessed a visit by Montgomery 
to the Senior Officers‟ School, Minley Manor, Camberley on 25 October 
1940 when   
a student brandished one of the military training 
pamphlets, which the War Office produced as a guide on 
tactical problems, and pointed out that what General 
Montgomery said was the exact opposite of what was laid 
down in the pamphlet.  General Montgomery looked at him 
in pained astonishment, [...] he strongly advised him to 
take notice of what he had said, which he knew to be right, 
rather than what an anonymous author at the War Office 
thought was right.7 
     Montgomery‟s centrality resulted in his interpretation of what would 
work and what would not work being given official prominence within 
21st Army Group over other earlier views.  Although Montgomery 
imposed the importance of co-operation between the two arms – 
armoured and infantry – his actual template for how this would evolve 
or be implemented did not survive the initial fighting in Normandy and 
itself changed because, as circumstances would show, what was 
required in North-West Europe was proto-type battle groups, and not 
the tank regiment and the infantry battalion as separate entities.  
                                                          
5
 Barker MSS, Montgomery to Brig. E.H. Barker, 15 October 1940. 
6
 S. Brooks, (ed.), Montgomery and the Eighth Army. 
7
 IWM, Lyne Papers, 71/2/7, unpublished autobiography, Ch.IV, pp.7-8.  
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     We have seen Montgomery facing the Normandy problem, and how 
he tried to resolve that.  Normandy represented a new experience: it also 
represented a new operating environment.  Beyond the close, confined 
country the terrain was – for the most part – apparently wide, yet there 
were no fast-flowing tank versus tank battles even in the wide open 
fields where such actions might have been possible.8  Firepower on its 
own could not prevail.  Operations called for large-scale infantry attacks 
with armour supporting.  It was necessary to learn again from new 
experience what would work in this new situation and under the 
demands of being in action.  Now he had a completely new and different 
problem.  This had to be solved.  In addition to this situation, 
Montgomery also had to deal with the different experiences of his 
subordinate commanders.   
     In late 1944, three instructional, training pamphlets were produced 
and circulated within 21st Army Group.  Two, Some Notes on the 
Conduct of War and The Infantry Division in Battle (November 1944) and 
The Armoured Division in Battle (December 1944), were sent to the 
commanders of corps and divisions, often with a short personal 
dedication.9  The third, Some Notes on the Use of Air Power in support of 
Land Operations and Direct Air Support, dealt with the roles of air power 
in the tactical, land battle.  A fourth pamphlet, High Command in War 
appeared in June 1945.  There was, Montgomery felt, a definite 
requirement for his pamphlets.  They were needed and should be 
produced at once „whilst the lessons of the campaign were fresh in all 
our minds‟.10 
 
 
The Orchestration of Response     
 
 
     Montgomery was a very „modern‟ commander in the speed at which 
he was willing to revisit conventional wisdom to react to current 
circumstances.  Afterwards, he wrote:  
                                                          
8
 For example see Appendix III photographs 3 and 4.  
9
 Montgomery also sent copies to top figures, including Churchill, UKNA, PREM 3/316. 
10
 IWM, Lyne Papers, 71/2/4, unpublished autobiography, Ch.IV, p.1. 
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once a fighting machine has been trained thoroughly in the 
basic principles of warfare, it will have no great difficulty in 
operating successfully.  It is of course essential that 
commanders at all levels should be versatile and mentally 
robust and that they should not adhere rigidly to 
preconceived tactical methods.11  
Montgomery developed this view in his pamphlets.  Although each of 
them appeared over Montgomery‟s name and with his authority, we 
know that some of their preparation was entrusted to others; in the case 
of The Infantry Division in Battle to Major-General L.O. Lyne; and, 
apparently, in the case of The Armoured Division in Battle initially to 
Lieutenant-Colonel, A/Brigadier P.R.C. Hobart.12  Lyne had great 
experience in infantry command.  Having commanded 169th Infantry 
Brigade in England, Iraq, North Africa and Italy, 1942-44, he 
commanded 59th Infantry Division in North-West Europe until it was 
disbanded to provide replacements for other divisions.  Similarly, Hobart 
was a greatly experienced – albeit junior – armoured commander.  
Hobart was certainly available for the work in late 1944: „for ten 
relatively peaceful weeks, until the middle of January, the [7th 
Armoured] division was almost entirely motionless, initially guarding the 
west bank of the River Maas and later the east bank‟.13  This may have 
been the principal reason why Montgomery at first chose such a junior 
officer.14  The pamphlet went through several iterations and Roberts was 
involved in its preparation: „I spent a night with Monty recently; I had to 
go to discuss this pamphlet on Arm[oure]d Div[ision] tactics I have been 
told to write.  The first edition was almost entirely torn up!; I have now 
re-written most of it & am heartily sick of the sight of it!‟15   
                                                          
11
 Montgomery, El Alamein to the River Sangro (London: Book Club Associates, 1973 
[1948]), p.103. (Emphasis added.) 
12
 [Maj.] Sir Carol Mather [one of FM Montgomery‟s Liasion Officers] to the author, 22 
October 2005.  
13
 P. Delaforce, Churchill‟s Desert Rats: From Normandy to Berlin with the 7th Armoured 
Division (Stroud: Sutton, 1994), p.124. 
14
 Montgomery‟s choice of Hobart was not on account of Hobart‟s acquaintance and 
correspondence with Liddell Hart, Correspondence between BHLH and various members of 
the Hobart family, including Lieut.-Col. P.R.C. Hobart, LHCMA, Liddell Hart Papers, 
LH1/376.  It is not easy to think - or see - why that should have influenced Montgomery.  
15
LHCMA, Roberts Papers, Letters Home 1940-1944, Maj.-Gen. G.P.B. Roberts to his 
father and mother, 12 November 1944. 
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     Montgomery had his own ideas, but his main idea was to be so 
quickly responsive to circumstances as to influence a change of 
circumstance.  These pamphlets are evidence for how, in the light of his 
experience of the combat performance of his armoured and infantry 
divisions since D-Day, Montgomery thought the problems of fighting 
with these tools should be tackled during the remainder of the war 
against Germany.  They have been neglected, or treated somewhat 
cursorily, by some historians.16  They were never intended to formulate 
or state precisely a complete theory of strategy.  However, Montgomery‟s 
principles for major-level warfare as he formulated them in Some Notes 
on the Conduct of War and The Infantry Division in Battle and The 
Armoured Division in Battle added up to a coherent operational method.  
His ideas – in the pamphlets – reflected experience.  His „principles of 
war‟ and other war-fighting principles in turn gave rise to standard 
tactical methods which combined the action of all arms.   
     It is not possible to understand how 21st Army Group conducted the 
campaign through focusing solely on Montgomery: modern research has 
stressed that a large degree of similarity existed between the operational 
methods of the three highest command levels.17  However, within that 
mould of consensus there was also disagreement.  Whether or not 
Montgomery‟s experience was congruent with the experiences of 
subordinates responsible for tactical leadership actually fighting on the 
ground with these tools, or with official War Office doctrine, can be 
decided with reference to the pamphlets, among other types of evidence.  
The ideas which came to be widely accepted as the right ones in 21st 
Army Group Montgomery institutionalised, and then enforced, as 
doctrine.         
     Montgomery worked with others to produce these pamphlets, 
notably, Major-General Lyne.  This shows that they were a synergistic 
not an individualistic product.  Lyne found the process easy and 
congenial: „he [Montgomery] would always find time to see me whenever 
                                                          
16
 Jarymowycz‟s Tank Tactics: Normandy to Lorraine, for example, makes not a single 
reference to them, although Jarymowycz quotes widely from War Office pamphlets.   
17
 See, for example S. Hart, „Field Marshal Montgomery, 21st Army Group, and North West 
Europe, 1944-45‟ (doctoral thesis, University of London, 1995), pp. 262-3.  
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I asked for an interview.  His clear and logical thinking and quick grasp 
of essentials and discard of all unnecessary detail made my task [at 21st 
AG Tac HQ,  Eindhoven, September-October 1944] near much easier 
than it could otherwise have been‟.  Lyne visited nearly all the corps and 
divisional commanders in the Army Group and ran the ideas past them.  
This also shows that the evolution of doctrine within 21st Army Group 
was more synergistic with the experience of fighting and with 
commanders‟ experiences of actually fighting on the ground than has 
sometimes been supposed.  Although he sometimes got „rough handling 
if their minds were too preoccupied with present operations‟, Lyne got 
much useful advice and help from those he consulted.  He recognised 
the value of trying out the ideas as he was working them out, as „these 
roles in battle and the basic points in each role were naturally the 
subject of considerable difference of opinion amongst Corps and 
Divisional Commanders‟.18  He visited O‟Connor at VIII Corps 
Headquarters at Mierloo on 8 October, for example, as O‟Connor was 
preparing to launch CONSTELLATION, and O‟Connor lent him papers 
he had written on tactical problems met in Normandy.19   
     Lyne consulted widely among the corps and divisional commanders, 
but the conceptual imprint was predominantly that of his master.  The 
armoured brigade commander when Lyne commanded 7th Armoured 
Division later, thought him a „“Monty Yes-man”‟.20  It may have been the 
case, therefore, that in selecting Lyne Montgomery chose someone he 
knew would reflect his views.  It would only be surprising if it were 
otherwise. 
 
 
Montgomery’s Two Pamphlets of November and December: What the 
Doctrine Actually Said 
 
     Some Notes on the Conduct of War and The Infantry Division in Battle 
was the first of Montgomery‟s pamphlets on how to conduct modern war 
                                                          
18
 IWM, Lyne Papers, 71/2/4, unpublished autobiography, Ch. IX, „Writing a Book – 
Command of 50th (N) Division, N.W. Europe‟, pp. 1-4. 
19
 LHCMA, O‟Connor Papers, 5/3/60, Maj.-Gen. L.O. Lyne to Lieut.-Gen. Sir R.N. 
O‟Connor, 9 October 1944. 
20
 IWM, Wingfield Papers, PP/MCR/35, unpublished memoirs, p. 299.  
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by which the lessons of Normandy began to be circulated in 21st Army 
Group.  A war, it asserted at the outset, was won by victories in battle.  
No victories would be gained unless commanders sorted out clearly in 
their own minds those essentials which were vital for success, and 
ensured that those things formed the framework on which all action was 
based.  A body of general doctrine based on sound and well-founded 
operational principles – some determination as to how an army should 
fight – was fundamental for success in war.  Principles had to be 
rigorously translated into operational planning, that is decisions on how 
an army or a force would fight in a particular situation or set of 
circumstances.   
     Application of his rational analysis to military historical examples 
and – more particularly – to recent experience in the Second World War 
suggested to Montgomery that the conduct of war was subject to 
regulating principles which were few in number and capable of being 
simply expressed.  These identified prerequisites for successful military 
action.  Certain points were fundamental, and to neglect any of them 
would probably lead to failure.  They would apply, in a greater or lesser 
degree, to all commanders at all times.  In a keynote address after 
assuming command of 21st Army Group Montgomery spoke of „the 
things that matter i.e. the basic fundamental principles on which 
everything is based: the 7 principles of war[.]21  His thoughts developed 
as a consequence of the fighting in Normandy, and by November 1944 
he believed that it was possible to formulate eight such principles.  „I 
consider‟, he wrote, „that these points form the principles of modern 
war‟.22 
     As presented in Some Notes on the Conduct of War, Montgomery 
considered the eight principles of war in late 1944 to be: 
Air Power; 
Administration; 
Morale; 
                                                          
21
 Montgomery, address to the general officers of the armies under his command at 
Headquarters, 21st Army Group, St. Paul‟s School, London, 13 January 1944, quoted in 
Montgomery and the Battle of Normandy ed. by S. Brooks (London: Bodley Head, 2008), 
p.27. 
22
 Conduct of War & Infantry Div. in Battle, Conduct of War, paras. 1, 2 and 3. 
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The Initiative [new 8th principle]; 
Surprise; 
Concentration; 
Co-operation; 
Simplicity. 
The great importance of some of his principles, Montgomery believed, 
had come to the fore only since the beginning of the War, and of others 
only since the start of the North-West Europe campaign.  Nevertheless, 
Montgomery was precise as to the content of each principle.  Later, he 
wrote: „the last four [principles] are old stagers and can speak for 
themselves‟.23  These principles were not peculiar or unique to 
Montgomery.  Some, like the principles of surprise, concentration, and 
co-operation, go back to Jomini and were also included in the 1920 FSR 
list, deriving from experience in the First World War.  By 1918 the 
General Staff recognised that firepower dominated the battlefield, but 
firepower alone could not destroy an enemy who was properly dug in.  
Their solution to this problem depended on the co-operation of all arms 
to overwhelm the enemy by weight of fire and enable the attacking 
infantry to manoeuvre without incurring unacceptably high losses.  The 
British Army motorised to bring artillery and infantry into action closer 
to the centre of battle on the Western Front and to improve logistical 
efficiency.   
     The principle of simplicity also related to a particular strain of 
experience of the First World War.  Operations on the Western Front 
between 1916 and 1918 had seemed to prove that co-operation could be 
achieved only by unity of control and careful planning to co-ordinate the 
work of supporting arms with the movement of troops across the 
battlefield.  Planning, even of highly complex operations, had to remain 
as simple as possible, because the more complex a plan, the greater the 
chance that things would go wrong.  The hierarchy in which 
Montgomery ranked his principles is one way they can be differentiated 
from other modern lists including War Office doctrine and Fuller‟s 1920 
list. 
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     Looking at Montgomery‟s most important principles of war in order to 
understand better their origin, and how they „hang together‟, makes it 
easier to see how they formed a unified operational method, and also 
how they picked up on principles already established in British doctrine.  
Further, it makes clearer the relationship between Montgomery‟s 
principles of war – as listed above – and his war-fighting principles – 
which include a wider, more encompassing range of elements including, 
for example, command.  In particular, it will show the importance of The 
Initiative – now ranked a principle – unlike the early 1944 list, where it 
was not. 
          A prerequisite for any successful military operation, or combined 
operation, was the use of air power to destroy or degrade the enemy air 
force‟s capacity to intervene in the ensuing battle.  Air support was 
always vital in the tactical land battle but because fire support from the 
air was weather-dependent the aim should be to win with ground-based 
fire support.  The air force‟s contribution of firepower was of great 
importance in assisting offensive operations by armoured divisions.    
Between the two world wars, the proper employment of aircraft in war as 
well as command and control arrangements for army air support was 
the subject of bitter debates between the two services.  Army 
commanders sought the ultimate in close air support – aircraft under 
their direct control, in a ground attack role in the immediate battle zone 
– as being more important than other forms of combat aviation.  RAF 
leaders emphasised air superiority, interdiction, long-range bombing, 
and centralised air force command and control.  The first formal study 
of air power in relation to land warfare was Slessor‟s Air Power and 
Armies in 1936.24  An important reason for the significant improvement 
in British combat performance in North Africa was more effective army-
air force co-operation during 1942.25  Generals Wavell and Auchinleck 
never appreciated fully the interdependence of air-ground operations 
and the necessity of a culture change.  „I was very much heartened to 
discover‟, Air Marshal Sir Arthur Tedder wrote, „that co-operation with 
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the Army had further improved, thanks, at least in part, to the lead 
given by Montgomery on this subject‟.26  The change came about after 
Montgomery‟s appointment to command the 8th Army.  Principles 
espoused by Air Marshal Sir Arthur Conningham and the Western 
Desert Air Force system became the model for the application of tactical 
air power elsewhere in North Africa and in North-West Europe.27  
Montgomery had long understood the role and value of direct air 
support in wrecking an enemy command system and isolating a 
battlefield.  Though only a qualified success, the Battle of Amiens, in 
August 1918, at which Montgomery was present as a staff officer with 
47th Division, demonstrated the enormous potential that air forces had 
to isolate a battlefield and make a decisive impact on operations taking 
place on the ground.  In 1926, he noted the vulnerability to air attack of 
lorry columns moving reserves to join the battle – a perceptive 
appreciation of the role and value of directly supportive air 
interdiction.28  Further, Montgomery‟s role was important because he 
was willing to concede air control.  Also, Montgomery believed that the 
massed use of air power in support of ground forces was a battle-
winning factor.   
     Montgomery felt that the tank‟s role demanded full use of their 
firepower and mobility – which in turn depended on the tanks being 
kept supplied and maintained.  Thus, another prerequisite was good 
administration.  Administrative arrangements in the rear must have a 
very definite relation to what it was intended to achieve at the front if a 
force including armour was to be kept supplied and problems of 
logistical breakdown avoided.  The importance of problems of mobility 
and supply in operations was well-understood.  This can be traced to 
British experience in the First World War, British military thinking 
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between the world wars, and also to British experience in North Africa.29   
The motorization of logistics was a major achievement of the British 
Army before 1940.  By late 1944, administration became crucial: 
keeping tanks supplied with fuel and ammunition, and mechanically fit 
had become a major problem.  Montgomery‟s focus on the importance of 
administration provided excellent logistic support that sustained British 
fighting power in North-West Europe.   
     Montgomery also believed that „the big thing in war is morale‟.30  A 
high, confident morale, based on a firm but fair discipline, the self-
respect of the individual soldier, mutual confidence between soldiers 
and commanders, soldiers‟ confidence in their weapons and equipment, 
a sense of the justness of the cause for which they fight, and the spirit of 
the offensive was also a prerequisite.  His military training at Sandhurst 
and his service before the First World War was at the time when the 
influence of General (later Field-Marshal Sir) Henry Wilson was crucial 
in the transmission to the British Army of an approach to war which 
flowed from the Napoleonic model as interpreted by Clausewitz and 
Foch.31  Wilson, „a life time Francophile [...] hit it off from the start with 
[...] Foch, his French opposite number‟.32  Foch had placed great 
emphasis on the psychological factors in war.  However, his later view 
did not conflate this belief with adherence to an approach to war derived 
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from Clausewitz or Foch.33  He had learned the importance of careful 
planning, as well as meticulous logistical preparation as a staff officer 
with 33rd and 47th divisions in General Sir Herbert Plumer‟s 2nd Army 
in 1917 and 1918.  Montgomery‟s later views did not easily reconcile 
with his earlier training.  The key to high morale was success in battle 
with casualties held at acceptable levels.  The strengths of 21st Army 
Group, which were firepower and movement, if employed to maximum 
effect, would ensure that any operation launched would have the best 
chance of success possible with the least possible number of casualties.   
     Finally, Montgomery‟s was concerned with remaining balanced 
throughout his operations.  It was necessary to quickly gain, and to 
keep, the Initiative and constantly to create new reserves.  The enemy 
commander must discover that he had the wrong plan, and the wrong 
dispositions.  One‟s own dispositions must be flexible enough to be 
altered in response to the developing tactical situation but a force must 
be so well balanced and poised that enemy thrusts could be 
disregarded.  A military situation which was untenable for the enemy 
was achieved by launching a hard blow, with all arms co-operating, on a 
narrow front, in accordance with the principles of surprise and 
concentration – particularly if opportunities could be created for armour 
to penetrate into the enemy‟s rear areas to dislocate his lines of 
communication.  Planning was vital.  A good plan was a simple plan.  
The first requirement of a simple plan was that each component part of 
the force should have its own task to carry out, and its operations 
should not be dependent on the success of other formations or units.34 
     There were other points which were important but which were not 
principles of war.  The most centrally important of these was that each 
commander, clear as to the points which mattered on his own level, 
must exercise his initiative to be proactive.  Commanders of large 
formations must give careful thought to disposing their forces to best 
effect, in accordance with the overall plan.  Skill in grouping and 
initiative in quickly re-grouping to meet the changing tactical situation 
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played a large part in successful battle operations, and was required of 
commanders of both large formations and smaller units.35  Montgomery 
had attacked at Alamein along a series of different thrust lines, but with 
the reserves necessary to exploit success.  He employed this technique 
again at Mareth (Tunisia 1943) and around Caen during his attempts to 
take the city (June and August 1944).  Montgomery‟s temporary loss of 
the Initiative, at Arnhem, must be acknowledged.  However, he moved to 
recover quickly.  
     All commanders must be conversant with the operational handling of 
both the armoured and the infantry division and with the employment of 
artillery.  Between the two world wars there was an expectation among 
some military writers and soldiers that armour should be developed to 
become the predominant arm of the army.  The tank, Montgomery felt, 
was only one, albeit very important, weapon.  The operational handling 
of tanks required no more skill than that required for any other weapon 
and certainly no special skill.  Armour would not be developed to 
become an élite among his legions.   
     What The Armoured Division in Battle had to say about the role for 
armoured divisions under modern conditions completely contradicted 
what was said in MTP No. 41 The Tactical Handling of the Armoured 
Division and its Components (1943), Part 1, The Tactical Handling of 
Armoured Divisions (July 1943), which outlined their place in the War 
Office‟s concept of operations.  That place was the mobile role: 
It is a mounted, hard-hitting formation primarily 
constituted for use against hastily prepared enemy 
defences, for exploitation of initial success gained by other 
formations, and for pursuit.  It is designed for use in rapid 
thrusts against the enemy‟s vitals, rather than hammer 
blows against his organised defences.36 
Thus, the roles of an armoured division included a wide sweep round an 
enemy‟s flank to strike his rear communications and cut off his retreat; 
a rapid pursuit through a breach made in the lines by other formations 
so as to effect the complete destruction of the enemy; co-operation with 
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other arms in the defence, usually by counter-attack and to hold the 
enemy off at arms‟ length and prevent him interfering with operations.37 
     This contrasted sharply with Montgomery‟s view in The Armoured 
Division in Battle of what an armoured division was essentially for and 
its tactical roles, which flowed from his definition of a tank as „an 
armoured vehicle designed to carry about fire-power‟.38  For him, the 
armoured division was to be used for „hammer blows‟ or „colossal 
cracks‟; the mobile role was less important.  The Armoured Division in 
Battle presented the armoured division as a combined arms force.  In an 
attack on a main enemy defensive area which had been partially or 
wholly broken into by other arms, the armoured division would maintain 
the momentum of the attack by driving in the enemy rearguards and 
seizing key terrain (usually high ground) on which to establish infantry – 
anti-tank defences in order to release the tanks to retire or take part in a 
further attack.39 
     It is possible to see here resonances, echoes and elements of ideas 
which by December 1944 had come to be accepted as the right ones in 
21st Army Group and which can be associated with particular 
commanders, for example Carver.  SP anti-tank gunners must lose the 
idea that their true role was as a mobile reserve as per War Office 
teaching, and that anti-tank protection of forward defence lines was the 
job of the towed gun.  The tanks were best trained and equipped to 
provide the mobile reserve, and what self-propelled anti-tank guns there 
were should be used to release as many tanks as possible for this job.  
Thus, instead of being used in an offensive mobile role as tank-hunters, 
their tactical role should be flank protection and reinforcement of the 
anti-tank defence of armoured and infantry units in a largely static role, 
the role in fact envisioned by the War Office for the towed 17-pdrs.  
Thus: 
The first aim of the attack is to capture ground, the second 
to hold it.  Supporting weapons must be got up quickly to 
help the reorganisation.  Initially the tank is the best 
supporting weapon as it has fire power and mobility.  But 
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anti-tank guns must be got forward quickly so as to free the 
tanks, and allow them to be rallied in not less than 
squadron packets.  These [i.e. the tanks] are then available 
to deal with counter attacks, and for a further mobile and 
offensive role.40  
It is also possible to see the influence of Roberts‟s „homogeneous 
brigades‟ idea.  Roberts invented the term.  This new type of tactical 
formation embodied the principle of tactical co-operation in a way its 
author thought most appropriate in the light of 11th Armoured 
Division‟s experience in Normandy.  Thus: 
In close country or when anti-tank devices abound, the 
infantry brigade closely supported by tanks should lead.  In 
order to achieve this close support, it will probably be best 
to group the division so that there are two homogeneous 
brigades.41  
     The armoured division was particularly suited for employment in the 
fast moving, fluid battle after the breakout, in which its capacity to 
engage and defeat such enemy tanks as survived was likely to prove 
decisive.  Recent battle experience, however, showed that it was usually 
the enemy anti-tank gun or self-propelled gun, dug-in and lying in wait, 
which did the damage and not the enemy tank.42  There was still no 
fast-flowing battle.  One of the reasons for this was that by removing the 
turret from a tank the Germans could accommodate a bigger gun in a 
fixed superstructure.  This had the added advantage of a low silhouette.   
     However, Montgomery felt no plan for the employment of armour 
would be sound that does not exploit to the full tanks‟ characteristics of 
firepower, armoured protection and mobility, in that order.43  The 
general technique or governing tactical principle must be movement, 
accompanied by fire directed against the enemy.  British armour should 
not be used as self-propelled artillery because that would vitiate the 
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principle of „fire and movement‟.44  In terms of firepower, The Armoured 
Division in Battle demonstrated that Montgomery had become a convert 
to the idea that there should be only two types of tank: the dual purpose 
„capital‟ tank, for fighting, and the light tank, for reconnaissance.45  In 
laying down such a policy for 21st Army Group Montgomery was 
advocating something which was new – the desert appearing to many 
merely to confirm the soundness of the RAC‟s existing doctrine and 
methods.  It was also further at variance with War Office policy, which 
was officially to accept the bifurcation in armoured doctrine.  
Montgomery‟s „ubiquitous‟ use of armour – he hoped – would allow 
flexibility when planning the battle and not force a commander to keep a 
percentage of his armour unemployed at important phases, and increase 
speed of action.  „Ubiquitous‟ is used in MTP No. 41 to describe the 
„infinite variety of tasks‟ which infantry could undertake.46  However, 
considerable preparation and planning was to precede each operation to 
ensure the best use of available firepower.       
     The purpose of enumerating the roles in battle of the armoured and 
infantry divisions as well as the basic points of tactical tank-infantry co-
operation was to provide guidance as to those fighting techniques and 
procedures deemed of particular importance by Montgomery, in order to 
ensure that the two types of division were employed in the best way 
possible.  Improved armour unit-infantry unit co-operation, tied in 
appropriately to tactical artillery fire plans and fire support from the air, 
could be a solution to the problem of the enemy enjoying the possibility 
of long-range tank, or tank hunter fire from excellently camouflaged 
positions well-protected by anti-tank weapons – the problem which had 
tended to make the security of British tanks a function of their distance 
from the enemy.  An informed pragmatism was required of commanders 
as to how these points should be applied „in action‟.  Success in battle 
was what mattered. 
     The set piece attack to break into, or through, a main enemy 
defensive area was the most important role of the infantry division.  Its 
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other potential roles included the follow-up of an enemy force 
conducting a fighting withdrawal, temporary defence, the crossing of a 
contested water obstacle and an assault landing on an enemy held 
coast.  The success of a set piece attack in depth flowed in the first 
instance from the successful manipulation of adequate reserves: fresh 
troops must be ready to go through in the wake of the assaulting 
infantry and tanks and maintain the momentum of the attack even if 
the attacking troops had not got all their objectives.  Although not the 
primary – or even a suitable – role for an armoured division, the tanks of 
an armoured division could contribute to maintaining the momentum of 
the attack by attacking the enemy‟s flanks, and where a gap had been 
achieved in the enemy‟s defences by other tanks and the infantry, by 
moving through it to create the conditions for a strike at the enemy‟s 
lines of communication.  Secondly, the start line must be secure: if it 
was not the enemy might be able to disrupt the whole plan of attack.  
Thirdly, the assaulting troops must be assisted forward by adequate and 
well-directed air and artillery fire support.  Fourthly, assaulting infantry 
and tanks must keep close up to this supporting fire and be ready to 
assault the enemy immediately it lifted.  Fifthly, supporting armour 
must keep touch with the assaulting infantry; anti-tank guns must be 
got forward quickly.  Finally, once the attack had started, the enemy 
must be given no respite in which to reorganise and collect reserves.  
After the enemy had been driven from his defensive positions and the 
battle was now mobile, the principal roles of the armoured division in 
battle were exploitation and pursuit.  In an armoured division, the 
Armoured Reconnaissance Regiment – equipped principally with 
Cromwells, later Comets – was an additional armoured regiment.47  
     The basic points of how tanks and infantry should co-operate, 
according to The Infantry Division in Battle were firstly, infantry and 
tanks should „marry up‟ early; secondly, before every attack tank officers 
should personally and carefully observe the ground in order to assess 
tanks‟ ability to get over the country between the start line and the 
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objective and note obstacles placed by the enemy; thirdly, the formation 
adopted would depend on topography, among other factors: in open 
country tanks would usually lead on to the objective and in close 
country infantry would lead; fourthly, the first task of the tank working 
with infantry was to destroy enemy unarmoured troops – not to engage 
enemy tanks; fifthly, good communications were essential between the 
two arms; finally, tanks‟ need for ammunition, fuel and maintenance 
would always limit the length of time they could spend „in action‟. 
     In addition to its special training in the reconnaissance role it was 
now laid down that the Armoured Reconnaissance Regiment of an 
armoured division should be practised in co-operation with infantry.48  
How this worked out in practice is explained as follows: „we carried them 
[the Hereford Regiment infantry] on the back of our tanks‟.49  It can be 
assumed that the concession that under certain conditions the infantry 
could lead closely supported by tanks was a tactical lesson learnt in the 
fighting in Normandy (and southern Holland): often poor tank country, 
hedgerows, orchards and stone farm buildings of Normandy and canal 
bends, deep ditches and buildings in southern Holland gave the enemy 
enfilade fire and excellent cover for anti-tank weapons. 
 
 
Factors Affecting the Doctrine’s Shape, and its Application 
 
 
     The British official view was that the medium tank function consisted 
of two alternatives, infantry-support and exploitation, each requiring a 
different sort of tank.  There were also light tanks for reconnaissance 
and similar missions.   
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     Some British tanks (e.g. Cromwell, Challenger and Comet) were 
viewed as being „cruisers‟ intended to engage and defeat enemy tanks in 
specifically armoured operations, in fluid and mobile warfare.  British 
improvements to the American Sherman tank proved ultimately to be 
one of the best solutions to the problem of getting a powerful gun into 
the field where it could tackle the best German tanks. 
     The other British tanks (e.g. Churchill) were Infantry („I‟) tanks, 
intended only to operate in support of infantry in both the assault and 
defence, and deal with enemy support weapons, including enemy tanks.  
Churchills were given extra armour to compensate for their slow 
movement.  The I tanks – resembled in these respects the British „heavy‟ 
tanks of the 1914-18 period.        
     Two different types of tank did not fit with Montgomery‟s doctrine of 
use for them.  This had organizational implications.  Close co-operation 
with infantry had hitherto been primarily the responsibility of the I 
tanks of 21st Army Group‟s tank brigades under GHQ command, as 
opposed to the cruisers of the armoured brigades.  Thus, tank brigades 
and armoured brigades, reflecting their different intended functions, 
were equipped differently.  Montgomery had long decided that this was 
unsatisfactory.  All references to (Army) Tank Brigades now disappeared.   
     Different views existed lower down the chain of command.  Carver‟s 
view, in a document which can be dated to the last three months of 
1944, was that   
if the number of tank formations available for an army is 
limited by man-power and production, there must be as 
many capable of carrying out the pursuit as the 
communications of the country and the transport available 
can maintain.   If you can afford to have more tanks than 
that, as we have had, then they should be tanks primarily 
designed for the support of inf[antry].  Unless however you 
have sufficient of the latter, you may never be able to create 
the conditions as a result of which pursuit occurs.  If the 
tank b[riga]des, 6 Gds, 33 and 34 and previously 31, had 
been equipped with really good „I‟ tanks, the conditions in 
which the “cruiser” tanks could have been employed would 
have occurred earlier and more often.  I maintain therefore 
that an army or group of armies, can afford in a European 
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theatre of war to have both an „I‟ tank and a cruiser tank, 
and that it will profit by having them.50  
     Despite Carver‟s view, Montgomery wanted a multi-role tank.  What 
was required, Montgomery believed – this was brought out more fully in 
The Armoured Division in Battle – was armoured formations, equipped 
with a multi-role tank, equally capable of undertaking the roles of close 
support of infantry, exploitation and pursuit, and trained accordingly.  
Further, by late 1944, Montgomery had concluded that the Churchill‟s 
slowness rendered it unsuitable as a capital tank.  A true multi-role 
tank was not yet however available.51  Therefore, he did the next best 
thing, in the light of his view that it is easier to change tactics than it is 
to change technology, which was to insist on the „ubiquitous‟ use of 
armour irrespective of the type of tank with which a formation was 
equipped.  The writing was, therefore, intended to be clearly on the wall 
for 21st Army Group‟s tank brigades with the publication of the earlier 
pamphlet.  The 34th Tank Brigade – to cite just one example – re-
equipped and reorganised, was re-designated 34th Armoured Brigade in 
February 1945.   
 
      
The Pamphlets: their Doctrine in Action 
 
 
     We now need to switch from pamphlets and theoretical writings to 
detailed actions.  The crossing of the Rhine in1945 it is generally held – 
for obvious reasons – represented a further important turning point in 
the chronology of the 1944-45 North-West Europe campaign.  Here, the 
phrase „the advance to and from the Rhine‟ is used to give an overall 
shape to campaign events, including 21st Army Group‟s advance from 
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the western borders of Germany to the banks of the Rhine and, once 
over the Rhine, the final assault on Germany.  These also mark a 
crossover from the penultimate to the final phase of the campaign.  
Thus, although they were different phases of the campaign, analytically 
they should be seen as one framing contextual event, or turning point. 
     Secondly, although less obvious, the first phase or advance into 
Germany, then the advance from the Rhine can be taken to represent an 
important metaphorical watershed in the progress of the campaign over 
time for 21st Army Group as well, for the following reason.  In the last 
three months of 1944, the 21st Army Group pamphlets on the armoured 
and infantry divisions were intended by Montgomery to be the 
summation of the principles of war as he understood them.  They were 
also, in practice, syntheses of the methods which had come to be widely 
accepted as the right ones among commanders whose opinion he 
valued.52  These pamphlet „primers‟ summarised the principles or 
methods by which it was known – by Montgomery and  his senior 
officers – that certain results could be achieved.  Thus, this period saw 
the emergence of the final doctrine for the final „from the Rhine‟ phase of 
the campaign.  Further, the winter of 1944-45 was a testing or settling 
in period for the new techniques.  Initially, the new and the old offensive 
techniques existed alongside each other.  The importance of the 
Rhineland battles in early 1945 is that they were the „laboratory‟ for the 
wider adoption of the new techniques by 21st Army Group.  The 
backdrop was the advance to the Rhine and preparation for the final 
assault on Germany; and the projection on to the east bank of the Rhine 
of sufficient infantry and armour to establish a secure and viable 
bridgehead.   
     There is a final way in which the crossing of the Rhine marked an 
important watershed for 21st Army Group, which requires the „before‟ 
and „after‟ to be considered together (with much less attention or 
emphasis placed on the actual crossings themselves than has been 
usual).  New tactical problems in 1945 served to unpick some of the 
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threads in the tapestry as woven by late 1944.  The changing nature and 
context of operations put at issue whether the new doctrine and system 
Montgomery outlined in late 1944 could survive the transition to a new 
and different type of warfare across the Rhine on the north German 
plain in the spring of 1945. 
     The case of Barker and VIII Corps both before and after the Rhine 
Crossing demonstrates what Montgomery was after from a corps 
commander.  Montgomery was interested in people who could tell him 
what could work, in tactical lessons, rather than operational ones.  
Thus, we find that Barker „spent most of the day [12 Jan 1945] writing a 
paper for Monty on the Div[isional] Reconnaissance Reg[imen]t 
reorganization‟.53  A Corps Commander was not allowed much leeway in 
the planning of operations, as Barker soon found out: „Bimbo [Dempsey] 
came over this a.m. to talk futures which were completely changed this 
eve[ning].  I‟m getting v[ery] annoyed with these continual changes.  It‟s 
been going on ever since I took over here.  However I suppose it must be 
but its damnably annoying‟.54  „I always knew a Corps was a poor[?] job 
except when actually in active operations‟, he explained (9 March 1945).  
Even as a corps commander, Barker was not allowed latitude to change 
the master plan.     
     The speed of the advance was now paramount; at the operational 
level it was essential to prevent the Germans regaining their balance.  
However, there was also a change to a different kind of warfare.  Battles 
became a matter of deploying and attacking small groups of the enemy 
defending key points or finding a way around them, as Barker noted:  
Boche opposition is purely packets of chaps holding centres 
of roads and trees and some demolitions.  I‟ve now got an 
Airborne [Division], and an Arm[oure]d Div[ision] so I‟m 
getting set for a quick run in a N.E. direction.  Opposite 
Jorrocks [Horrocks] and Neil [Ritchie - GOC XII Corps] the 
para boys [the German First Parachute Army and/or the 
HJ] are still putting up a good fight but are getting worn 
down and reduced in numbers.55   
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Each parachute brigade within the Airborne Division had attached a 
Churchill tank squadron from 4th Tank Grenadier Guards, 6th Guards 
Armoured Brigade.   
     Allowing for the fact that VIII Corps was launched against German 
Army Group H‟s weak left flank, by 31 March his corps had bridged and 
crossed the River Ems and were making for the Ems Canal „which no 
doubt will have all bridges blown – we already know that one is.  Then 
Osnabr[ű]ck. […] We have been going too fast‟.56  The significance of this 
remark is that, despite problems such as the Germans‟ extensive use of 
demolitions, Barker still showed himself well able to take advantage of 
opportunities for rapid advance.  
     The German Army was, however, capable of determined resistance by 
individual units, battalions or divisions until the very end of the war: on 
1 April Barker recorded: „the Boche continue to put up a fight with quite 
a number of 88s.  All sorts of training battalions are being identified and 
the prisoners range between all ages‟.57  This is almost certainly a 
reference to the defence of Lengerich by NCO officer candidates.   These 
men, offering strong resistance, were aided by the thick woods which 
made observation, and artillery and close air support difficult.  However, 
the advance to Osnabrűck, which began on 3 April 1945, represented an 
important milestone – the Germans had no hope of organizing a firm 
defensive line before the next water barrier, the Weser, at which point 
and by which time VIII Corps would have advanced 125 miles from the 
Rhine.   
     34th Armoured Brigade did not take part in PLUNDER or in the 
advance from the Rhine, but during the course of operations across the 
Rhine it became apparent to Greenacre that additional firepower would 
be necessary to address the problem that even the up-gunned Mk VII 
version of the Churchill in 34th and 6th Guards armoured brigades, 
which featured many design improvements but was too narrow to take 
the larger turret required for the 17-pdr gun, „in its present form cannot 
shoot it out with the Tiger or Panther owing to the superior gun and 
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frontal armour carried by these two German types.  For this reason it 
was always necessary to have attached a b[at]t[er]y or t[roo]ps from an 
S.P. A[nti] T[an]k Reg[imen]t equipped with 17 Pdr guns to give 
protection to the tanks if attacked by enemy armour‟.58  It was 
Greenacre‟s view afterwards that: 
it is seldom that an Independent [Churchill-equipped] 
Arm[oure]d B[riga]de [operating in the infantry-support role] 
will fight as a B[riga]de for the reason that this conflicts 
with the principles of war as laid down by C-in-C 21 Army 
G[rou]p and F.S. Reg[ulation]s Viz:- [The] large numbers of 
tanks in a B[riga]de are likely to nullify “Surprise”, and are 
difficult to Concentrate.  Cooperation with other arms is not 
made easier and therefore the Plan loses its most essential 
characteristic “Simplicity” 59   
Greenacre‟s view as expressed here, however, represents the „official‟ 
perspective.  In practice, over the Rhine, in the advance to Műnster, 6th 
Guards Armoured Brigade (less 4th Tank Grenadier Guards) was to 
operate for the first time under its own Brigadier and not in support of 
an infantry division.  The task given 6th Guards Armoured Brigade 
Group was to make a rapid breakout carrying the paratroops of 513th 
Parachute Regiment, US 17th Airborne Division on the tanks.  
Greenacre had little or no rest or sleep for three or four nights at this 
time.  They were „irretrievably committed to get on‟.60  In the face of this 
overwhelming need to get on, inevitably there were tactical mistakes: 
outside Műnster, the two rearmost tanks of a troop were hit from close 
range by concealed 88s which had let the head of the column go 
through and then pounced on the tail, which might not have happened 
had the time been taken to reconnoitre.61  In the advance from the 
Rhine to Műnster by the Coldstreams and the Scots Guards of 6th 
Guards Armoured Brigade Group, with the American paratroops riding 
on the tanks, the Armoured Brigade was, however, thus operating in a 
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new role.  The implicit lesson Greenacre drew was that 6th Guards 
Armoured Brigade had fulfilled the requirement of „ubiquity‟ demanded 
by Montgomery for all armoured brigades and that a Churchill-equipped 
armoured brigade was „capable of swift inclusion in the order of battle 
for any particular operation‟, so long as the issues of the Churchill‟s lack 
of a really first class anti-tank gun, as well as the need for armoured 
engineers were addressed – as had been the case in 6th Guards 
Armoured Brigade Group.62  
     Because Carver was on the same wavelength as Montgomery he too 
did not end up getting the sack as did other commanders who differed 
from Montgomery in this way.  Like Greenacre, he is indicative of a 
specific type of brigadier: however, Carver in particular was one who was 
creative in the process of learning lessons over a longer period of time 
and applying them at a more general level than his own specific unit.  
Because of the success of these new lessons he was able to hold on to 
his job, despite the fact that he did not agree with Montgomery on 
everything.   
     At the end of March 1945 Carver, acting as he had during the Udem-
Sonsbeck battle in the Reichswald, again formed two armoured/infantry 
battle-groups, the infantry of one being carried in Kangaroos – in effect 
APCs.  Having reached Ochtrup on 3 April 1945 4th Armoured Brigade 
were switched to the command of 52nd Infantry Division to turn east for 
Rheine, cross the Dortmund-Ems canal and continue the advance 
beyond.  It was an unsatisfactory period for an armoured brigade which 
had been in action in Normandy: 52nd Division, which had not, was „not 
an easy formation to work with‟.  The reasons included: „their 
commander, Major-General Hakewill-Smith, was elderly, 49 years old, 
and their methods [...] pedestrian[:] Hakewill-Smith‟s „order groups‟ [...] 
were dominated by his Commander Royal Artillery‟.63  Complete 
dependence on artillery firepower, to be effective, called for rapid forward 
movement even in a direct frontal assault.  In Carver‟s view, 52nd 
Division‟s commanders lacked the speed of thought and action essential 
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for mobile operations.  This was also Montgomery‟s view, from his TAC 
HQ now at Rheine.  He sent Major P. Earle, his new Liasion Officer, who 
had come as a replacement for the wounded Major Mather, to see 
Hakewill Smith, „to find out why he [Hakewill Smith] was getting on so 
slowly‟.64    
     In addition, in 52nd Division, commanders did not have realistic 
expectations of what the tanks could achieve in the light of the 
difficulties that they faced.  These difficulties came particularly from 
hand-held weapons and anti-tank guns in built up areas which were the 
strategic nodal points through which they had to operate because of 
being largely road-bound.65  Some officers at lower level thought that the 
tanks were letting them down because of not actually fully 
comprehending the new understanding of the roles of armour and 
infantry in the changed conditions of combat.66  The lessons Carver 
drew from grouping an armoured regiment and a motor battalion in 
half-tracks, and an armoured regiment and an infantry battalion in 
Kangaroo APCs in the April 1945 battles were that:  
in execution [of] a deliberate attack, full use must be made 
of mobility to achieve surprise in time and direction, of the 
armour of the arm[oure]d personnel carrier to protect the 
inf[antry] in their approach as close to the objective as 
possible, and of the immense fire-power [of tanks] available 
to reduce the infantry‟s task as far as possible to the 
mopping up of demoralized defenders and protection of the 
tanks from close-range A Tk weapons.  Converging attacks 
from the enemy‟s flank or rear offer the best prospects of 
success.67  
These lessons were counter to the approach which prevailed among 
52nd Division officers.  The allocation of a squadron of Kangaroo APCs 
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to allow infantry accompanying tanks armoured mobility – the difference 
between poor practice and very good practice in spring 1945 – was not 
repeated while 4th Armoured Brigade was under command of 52nd 
Division. 
     After its deployment at the end of October 1944, Hakewill Smith‟s 
52nd Division had performed creditably in a number of important 
operations in North-West Europe.68  On its deployment, 52nd Division 
had a unique advantage over other divisions at that time: it retained 
most of its original officers.  They had experienced the period of training 
in the UK.  However, they now faced the special challenge of tactical 
learning informed by lessons from current experience of action, at the 
very stage of the campaign when there were few experienced officers to 
be spared from other divisions to spread their experience to 52nd 
Division.  Thus, although 52nd Division‟s late deployment to theatre was 
a factor affecting the new doctrine‟s application by those charged with 
tactical leadership in what had been „the last major reserve formation in 
the British Army‟, despite the shortcomings identified by Carver, by 
eventually performing in the manner envisaged by Montgomery they 
were considered to have acquitted themselves well enough.  Indeed, in 
the view of one senior commander, by the last battles of the campaign 
52nd Division was to become „one of the best divisions in Twenty-first 
Army Group‟.69  The inference can be made that this success can be put 
down to 52nd‟s willingness to learn from the pamphlets (among other 
sources and means of communication) to bring themselves quickly up to 
speed. 
     The climax of Carver‟s achievement with his battle-groups in carrying 
out Montgomery‟s wider plans was 4th Armoured Brigade‟s breakout of 
the Aller bridgehead north-east of Verden on 14 April 1945.  
Montgomery could now implement his plans for 21st Army Group‟s final 
advance northwards to the Baltic.  Advancing to victory, well-planned, 
surprise encircling movements combined firepower and mobility to great 
effect.  The breakout, carried out by 4th Armoured Brigade at 
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Westerwalsede, which was heavily defended by German anti-tank guns, 
showed just how far the British Army had come from the days when the 
German „88‟ gun line had so often confounded their best attempts to 
find success in armoured warfare. 
     Ten months after PERCH – when 22nd Armoured Brigade, 7th 
Armoured Division had been attacked while it was strung out through 
Villers-Bocage – elements of 6th Guards Armoured Brigade which had 
recently occupied Stadensen during the battle for Uelzen were attacked 
by Panzer-Division Clausewitz, the last panzer division created by the 
Wehrmacht.  The 22nd Armoured Brigade was attacked when the 
leading tanks and infantry transport were stationary and backed up; 
when they had arrived the night of 14/15 April 1945, the Churchills, the 
S.P.s and the Infantry transport of the Coldstreams had been forced to 
cram themselves into the village street, nose to tail.  As at Villers-Bocage 
this had added considerably to the difficulties: German S.P.s and half-
tracks, having got into Stadensen „proceeded to play havoc with 
anything they saw‟.70  However, although there were undoubted British 
failings at Stadensen, „as [German] tracked vehicles tried to get away, 
they were struck by the Coldstream tanks, ably assisted by the M10.s 
[tank destroyers mounting the 17-pdr] and by the 6 pdrs. of the 
Infantry‟.71  The enemy who remained in houses were dislodged with 
H.E. fire the speed at which operations were conducted was maintained.  
The success of the resumed assault on and capture of Uelzen 
maintained the momentum of the British advance to the Elbe – now only 
some thirty miles ahead – and denied the Germans the possibility to 
organise any further strong opposition west of the Elbe in sufficient 
time.   
 
 
 
 
     In his assumption that well-founded principles of war are important, 
and fundamental to the capacity for success in war, Montgomery‟s 
approach to the conduct of war was rooted in the experience of the 
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British Army expressed in FSR.  However, his principles of war did not 
directly come out of FSR.  British doctrine identified principles as a 
broad set of tools.  It is possible to distinguish between Montgomery‟s 
principles of war and the other centrally important points – best 
described as Montgomery‟s war-fighting principles – which added up to 
a coherent operational method.  Montgomery‟s approach was in broad 
conformity with the way the British Army looked at principles.  Further, 
the roots of some of his ideas can be tracked down to specific core 
principles in prevailing, general British doctrine.  Fire-power became 
embedded into it as a result of the experiences of World War One.  The 
carefully staged conduct of battle, based on superior firepower and with 
all arms co-operating, was the major characteristic of this way of 
fighting.  However, it was Montgomery‟s recognition of the importance of, 
and the need for an institutionalization of, a problem-solving approach 
which emphasised the importance of context which led to success in 
North-West Europe. 
     A concept of operations which emphasised a „master plan‟ in which 
as little as possible was left to chance and to which subordinate 
commanders were required to adhere unwaveringly left correspondingly 
little scope for independent initiative as far as planning of operations 
was concerned.  Further, an unhelpful carry-over from Normandy – and 
before – was the cumbersomeness of command arrangements whereby 
each arm retained separate headquarters.  This negatively affected the 
efficiency of armoured units.  Furthermore, the armoured commander 
was subject to the infantry commander in an independent tactical 
command, with only one exception of which this author is aware – the 
case of Clarkeforce in October 1944.72  However, in the final stages of 
the campaign the armoured regiment commander was often placed in 
command of the group.  Nevertheless deployment, using established 
routines for combining infantry and armour, took considerable time – 
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with consequent loss of the advantage of surprise and perhaps also of 
the fleeting opportunity to achieve a breakthrough. 
     If this almost guaranteed that it was difficult for the armoured 
commander to act „independently‟, this was not what Montgomery was 
essentially after.  Although he recognised that a large force of armour 
which had broken into the enemy‟s rear could have „great moral effect‟, 
he did not believe that armour should operate independently.  This was 
inter-related for him with making his plan, which ensured not only 
crude material and numerical superiority but also – based on 
intelligence information that had been processed and analysed, as well 
as his own insight, imagination and initiative – the best weight of 
firepower and numbers applied at the decisive point, at the right 
moment for decision. 
     For the above reasons, there was little scope in Montgomery‟s system 
for decisions which resulted in the master plan being altered.  There 
would be no new plan, unless Montgomery so decided.  There was 
however always scope for individual initiative on the part of 
subordinates.  This involved a problem-solving approach within the 
envelope of the overall plan.  Changing tactical problems emphasised 
the necessity for subordinates to be problem-solving in terms of the 
general intentions expressed in the given plan and if necessary to go 
beyond the official textbook. 
     In his pamphlets, Montgomery identified the problems of fighting 
with the tools at his disposal – infantry and tank divisions and 
supporting air power – and indicated how he believed they should be 
tackled in the remainder of the war against Germany.  Armoured 
brigades, whether part of an armoured division or independent, 
equipped with the same sort of tank, all equally capable of undertaking 
the roles of infantry-support, pursuit and exploitation – combined with 
an appropriate concept of tactical handling, to improve armour-infantry 
co-operation – should be and were enshrined as part of the solution.  
Fire support from the air, as well as from artillery, was also part of the 
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solution, because this concept was an integrated air battle-land battle.73  
However, new tactical problems in 1945 served to unpick some of the 
threads in the tapestry he had woven.  With his failure at Arnhem, 
Montgomery had realised there would be no easy or rapid advance into 
Germany.  As a result he had come to recognise that changes in tactical 
practice were required to deny the enemy the possibility of security by 
timely withdrawal across the Rhine.  Thus, the doctrine outlined in 
November and December 1944 reflected the lessons of the past but 
projected them forward into the immediate future as the means to meet 
and overcome the new challenges that were now evident.  
     For Montgomery, it was vital to retain the principle of the Initiative.  
In Normandy, the Germans, fighting determinedly, were also discovered 
to be adept at the speedy redeployment of their superior armour to block 
any British penetration.  An important thread in the tapestry had come 
loose.  Manoeuvring to bring firepower to bear on the enemy was the 
essence of Montgomery‟s method.  In the last months and weeks of the 
war this was now actually more difficult.  The opposition was organised, 
but not continuous, either in front or depth.  Henceforth, the campaign 
was going to be a matter of deploying and attacking small groups of the 
enemy defending key points or finding a way around.  Although German 
formations were rarely up to strength they retained cohesion.  This 
explains the shift from Montgomery‟s change in perception of „initiative‟ 
(as something that is essential for success in battle) to „Initiative‟ as a 
main principle of war.74  The principle that infantry, tanks and self-
propelled artillery should co-operate together to a closer degree had 
been established but the need for subordinates to exercise their 
initiative became imperative if the necessary momentum or tempo for 
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practising this in mobile operations was to be achieved and maintained.  
It was this combination that would finally break the cohesion of the 
Wehrmacht in the west.  
     The orientation that previously sufficed was experience of „what to 
do‟.  By late 1944 and into early 1945 the experience of „quick thinking‟ 
within the goals of the master plan, rather than any specific action, was 
the solution.  Because of the lessons learned, the new doctrine that was 
institutionalised was intrinsically able to cope with a different type of 
warfare and thus was successful.  As Montgomery advanced to and 
began to undertake his successful crossing of the Rhine, because of the 
initial innovation there was no further need to innovate.  The doctrine he 
had created could now handle, adapt to, and account for the change in 
the kind of warfare that 21st Army Group confronted in the final months 
of the war in Europe.      
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CONCLUSION     
 
 
 
     This thesis has proposed a new interpretation of how 21st Army 
Group produced a functional doctrine for armour, infantry and 
associated instruments by late 1944 and implemented this in early 
1945.  It has been shown that investigating the subject of armour-
infantry unit organization and structure in 21st Army Group in North-
West Europe 1944-1945, had to begin before 1939 with the development 
of British doctrine, problems and thought with respect to armoured 
warfare from the late 1930s as well as with the experiences of fighting 
earlier in the War – mainly in North Africa, Italy, and then in the initial 
days and weeks of the Normandy campaign.  The story then developed 
through „late Normandy‟ and „after Normandy‟ has described a series of 
events in late Normandy where individuals were coming up with 
different ideas at different levels of command, whereas by after 
Normandy the ideas – which can be associated with particular 
individuals – had widely come to be accepted as the right ones in 21st 
Army Group.  In short, 21st Army Group moved from a situation of 
doctrinal anarchy to one of doctrinal uniformity – it did this under 
Montgomery‟s direction.  A series of figures has been used throughout 
the thesis in order to make more clear the path of this particular set of 
historical issues (Figures 6.1 and 6.2 below are developments of Figure 
5.1, and 0.1, designed to show how the effect and the process changed 
over time).  The doctrine of late 1944 then reflected the lessons of the 
previous six months‟ fighting but projected them into 1945 as the means 
to overcome the problems that were now evident.  This close 
examination of how a group of „effervescent‟ commanders interrelated, 
and what the effect of those inter-relationships was in the formulation of 
a workable doctrine, then ends with a series of examples of the new 
doctrine in action.  
     Instead of looking at whether Montgomery imposed a doctrine from 
the top or whether the doctrinal situation was one of apparent anarchy, 
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the thesis is based on the proposition that this apparent problem posed 
by the historiography was not the most helpful way to look at the 
problem.  A more productive way is to see that what was happening was 
a more complex process which accommodated both.  This thesis 
demonstrates how the process worked and supports the central 
interpretive proposition that the apparent problem posed by the 
historiography has obscured the central question which needed to be 
addressed, which is how Montgomery‟s command produced a functional 
doctrine by late 1944.  
     In order to draw the threads of this thesis together, it is necessary 
finally to look at the whole tapestry rather than the individual threads 
and address what story can ultimately be told about the role of 
Montgomery, the contribution of others, and their ability collectively, to 
produce the functional doctrine identified.  It has been seen what this 
contributes to the historiographical debate about the strengths and 
weaknesses of Montgomery‟s command system, how corps and divisions 
responded to it, and the effectiveness of the weapon they shaped and 
used between them and it will now be shown how the new insights of 
this thesis can be used to re-interpret and explain operational 
development, innovation and command in 21st Army Group.  The 
conclusions that have been drawn from the research findings are that 
the command hierarchy functioned to produce new lessons more 
appropriate to North-West Europe and that the genesis of these ideas 
was both bottom-up as well as top-down.  The translation of experience 
into method involved a problem-solving approach within agreed-upon 
frameworks of common understandings which, once established, then 
became non-negotiable.  Montgomery moved from dogma towards being 
a „reflexive‟ commander by taking on board others‟ experience, but also 
responding to the unfolding situation and encouraging other 
commanders to do the same – albeit in what can be considered a 
somewhat inflexible manner.  Notwithstanding, it was Montgomery‟s 
adoption of a problem-solving approach which emphasised 
understanding the importance of context (i.e. the relationship between 
circumstances obtaining in a given situation and the goals of the master 
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plan), and the use of initiative to make plans to deal with the problem 
within the envelope of the master plan which led to success in North-
West Europe.  In sum, he did not tell commanders how to fight; he told 
them how to think, so that they could decide how to fight.    
 
 
The Factors that Produced a Functional Doctrine  
 
 
     This study set out to investigate the factors that produced a 
functional doctrine for armour, infantry and associated instruments and 
did just what was necessary to bring them „up to scratch‟: these factors 
were identified as: Montgomery; key commanders; and „circumstances‟ – 
what they were and how they changed from situation to situation.  The 
situation changes from: Normandy (bocage); „late Normandy‟, 
Belgium/Holland; „into Germany‟ and 21st Army Group‟s final advance 
to the Baltic and the Elbe.  Also changing the circumstances was the 
Germans‟ fighting capacity and methods, and the kind of problems they 
presented, including different German tank types.  The type of fighting 
could vary tremendously.  The German armoured defence in depth 
which also attempted to use armoured manoeuvre to restore ruptured 
fronts in Normandy gave way after an advance at great speed to the 
linear-type anti-tank defences of the Siegfried Line which formed 
Germany‟s western border defences.  Finally, there was fighting where 
there was little or no front at all, but small groups of the German armed 
forces fighting determinedly with traditional heavy weapons, or new-
technology hollow-charge ones.   
     Early in Normandy armoured division commanders had been 
frequently called on to assist in assault-type operations which had 
nothing to do with their intended role of armoured exploitation at all.  
However, the role of an independent armoured brigade charged 
primarily with infantry support (i.e. operating within quadrants 1 or 2 of 
Figure Appendix I.1) did not appeal to armoured commanders later on in 
Normandy any more than it had at the start – despite different (new) 
commanders.  In other words, they were on the whole happy to accept 
the official bifurcation in armoured doctrine.  This was unhelpful in 
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sequencing the phases of operations.  It did not allow operations to 
develop at the tempo that Montgomery and some armoured division 
commanders now understood was required.  Nevertheless, among 
armoured division commanders too, responses to the new tactical 
problems in Normandy were also intensifying to the point of expression.  
There were corresponding bubble-up developments in armoured 
divisions.  It was a traditional performance goal of the infantry of 
armoured divisions to be mobile, but the infantry‟s principal role was 
not seen as a protective one for the tanks.  In early-Normandy, reflecting 
War Office policy at the time, the armour and the infantry were brigaded 
separately, largely because it was thought that the infantry would 
advance more slowly, and firm up gains made by the tanks.  Armour 
and infantry were de facto mutually exclusive organizations.  In terms of 
this concept of armour-infantry co-operation, early in the campaign the 
official view was that the infantry were intended to come into action only 
in tandem with the tanks, not be in action fully alongside and close to 
the tanks, to protect them.  Important early setbacks in operations 
using manoeuvre-oriented or attrition-based methods provided the 
impetus for innovation with respect to combining and integrating 
armour and infantry in the British armoured divisions. 
     In the case of commanders of armoured divisions and commanders 
in them, responses to the interlinked dilemmas of purpose and practice 
had initially ranged from the critical to the creative.  Some commanders 
of armoured forces were critical when armoured divisions were called on 
to fight in confined country, or complained that they were often forced to 
deploy over too narrow an area – Hinde being a good example.  To realise 
the purposes to which armour could be put to best effect no longer 
rested on the perceived capabilities of the two arms in attack and 
defence however, but on experience, and took action away from the 
ideas that tanks protected infantry (quadrants 1 and 2 of Figure 
Appendix I.1) – and took action into quadrants 3 and 4.  The 
conclusions reached by creative armoured division commanders such as 
Roberts were different from those reached by other commanders in both 
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types of the independent brigades, and stemmed from a different basic 
concern: their tanks‟ security.  
     What people thought they could do related to their equipment 
amongst other factors.  Montgomery had come to believe that a multi-
role, or „capital‟ tank was required; it would be an important battlefield 
weapon.  On the battlefield, however, there was no mass availability of a 
true multi-role tank.  Yet, later on, new tanks were becoming available: 
the best Britain could produce, although they were intended for 
„armoured division-type‟ tasks rather than infantry co-operation (e.g. the 
Comet was a cruiser tank).  O‟Connor had also identified the need for 
really suitable armoured vehicles in which the infantry could be carried 
forward into battle.  In the interim, what Montgomery could do was to 
get everybody to think along similar lines: the major-generals 
commanding divisions and also the brigadiers commanding the two 
types of independent brigades, to produce commonality across the levels 
of command to ensure „ubiquity‟.  According to Montgomery‟s „capital 
tank‟ idea, making the Sherman tank – and all other models of tanks – a 
multi-role tank would best match tactics and a tank that was available 
to operational aims and intentions.  Montgomery realised however that 
this development would need to be complemented by managing 
expectations among the infantry and the armour as to what the other 
could achieve, so that the effect of what they could achieve together 
would be maximised.  A situation had arisen in which the perception 
had grown among tanks and infantry that it was the job of the other to 
defend them as they did their job of attacking.  This was what 
Montgomery was trying to change, replacing it with the idea that there 
should be one common, offensive purpose. Thus he developed his 
functional doctrine.   
     In mid- to late 1944, circumstances changed, requiring new 
responses.  After Normandy, British armour, moving at breakneck 
speed, spearheaded the power drive across northern France into the Low 
Countries in August and September 1944. Then circumstances changed 
again.  The performance of Clarkeforce in southern Holland in October 
1944 showed Montgomery a way in which his numerical superiority in 
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tanks – most of them in independent brigades, including the three 
independent tank brigades principally equipped with Churchills – could 
be brought to bear, opening up again the possibility of mobile operations 
on a decisive scale.  The critical factors were now different.  To conduct 
new-type operations successfully needed different structures; and if 
necessary new commanders.  A new set of relationships, a new pattern 
of command, and a new development of practice emerged to meet the 
challenge.  Montgomery intervened and commanded.  There was an 
official process in which Montgomery pulled everything together.  There 
was also now, for the first time need for a uniform doctrine that 
answered the „big‟ problem of method: the introduction of fluidity into 
the action of major formations.  As importantly, however, rather than 
telling people how to do things, Montgomery insisted on the importance 
of people coming up with their own answers with regard to problem 
solving, and on the interlinkages between problem solving and getting to 
the overall aim, which was the relentless imposition on the Germans of 
the condition, „mobile war‟.  He did not want to tell commanders how to 
fight; he wanted to tell them how to think, so that they could decide how 
to fight.  Armoured formations proved flexible enough to adapt 
thereafter.  This in its turn influenced and interacted with how 
Montgomery made his choices of subordinate commanders.   
 
 
‘Bubble up’ 
 
 
     We now know that there had been a significant amount of more 
informal communication between Montgomery and subordinate 
commanders than previously identified.  His desired output, that is a 
common doctrine, and also the desired outcome which was success at 
the campaign level, were to be the result of the interaction and 
interrelationship of a variety of processes that were at work during the 
campaign, which have been identified.  The „Montgomery factor‟, whilst 
identifiable and analysable, was ultimately inseparable from the other 
ingredients.  Montgomery managed the output and created 
commonality, managing different groups of people at differing levels in 
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the chain of command. Montgomery was thinking about how to 
supervise and guide people to try and ensure that correct lessons were 
learned as quickly, as well and as widely as possible.  He was looking 
for ways in which what he regarded as really important lessons could be 
adapted to new experience. 
     The „bubble up‟ which has been seen within 21st Army Group 
armoured units which had been in action since D-Day, and as 
eventually demonstrated in Carver‟s command of 4th Armoured Brigade, 
shows that commanders of independent armoured brigades such as 
Carver were looking beyond or, rather considering in a different way, the 
immediate „how-to‟ problem of utilizing the capabilities of the Sherman 
tank and the „in-house‟ infantry the Brigade had at their disposal to 
greatest effect.  Both Carver (Shermans) and Verney (Churchills) as 
noted in Chapter 3 arrived at the idea that the physical proximity of the 
two attacking arms was not always necessary (see also Appendix I).  The 
sacred cow that had to be sacrificed was the central tenet of traditional 
or classic British tank-infantry co-operation doctrine: that physical 
proximity of the two arms was required, a fact recognised by some prior 
to D-day but illustrated „in action‟ by the conduct of the independent 
brigades.  Verney and 6th Guards Tank Brigade (Churchills), acting on 
their own authority to move separately, were moving away from 
proximity with their infantry during BLUECOAT (thus taking action into 
quadrant 2 of Appendix I).  At that stage their action was still 
underpinned by the view that the role of the tanks was to support and 
protect the infantry.  Carver, however and 4th Armoured Brigade 
(Shermans) were taking action clearly into quadrant 3 during JUPITER, 
with the infantry ranging ahead to „protect‟ the tanks.  This also allowed 
for the possibility of action taking place in quadrant 4 where infantry 
might also operate in close proximity with tanks to protect them, as also 
realized in the armoured divisions. 
     Too often in the armoured divisions, however, the requirement for 
more infantry derived from a defensive rationale rather than from 
awareness of the need to get away from the idea of defence towards 
mutual supportiveness.  Finally, though, it was beginning to appear to 
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British commanders that the side that could most effectively manipulate 
available infantry reserves would win the day.   
     Carver‟s solution can best be described as integrated armour-cum-
infantry tactics, built around the configuration and capabilities of an 
independent armoured brigade.  These Sherman-specific tactics 
required changing the existing view of how armour-infantry co-operation 
worked, because the role of the infantry was now also to defend the 
tanks.  Carver interpreted his role in this way, even when tasked with 
direct support of infantry.  Further, however, an innovative aspect of 
Carver‟s solution was to develop a means of armoured assault different 
from War Office teaching.  Thus, at another cut, his solution was a 
„grand tactical‟ conception, and had application for „operational-level‟ 
tasks as well. 
     Up to late 1944, however, commanders still expected only to be 
guided by high level views on how to combine armour and infantry.  In 
late 1944 the principle of separate forms of organization for armoured 
brigades and infantry brigades was abandoned in favour of 
homogeneous brigades.  The homogeneous brigade of late 1944-early 
1945 can usefully be considered as a proto-type battle group.  These 
were mutually-reinforcing combinations of armour and infantry, and 
were an organizational development designed to facilitate the combined-
arms tactics necessary for success in the bocage countryside of 
Normandy.  In was only in late 1944 that all armoured division 
commanders really began to accept the idea of „square‟ proto-type battle 
groups which required an integral infantry component, although most 
were using this broad idea by August 1944.  Roberts‟ homogeneous 
brigade concept interacted, however, with what Montgomery believed 
was required, which was the ubiquitous use of armour.      
     Overcoming having to use inferior equipment (in some cases) can 
fairly be held to be a demonstration of the skill of many British 
commanders.  Equally some commanders could fairly be held 
responsible by Montgomery for a lack of quick thinking at a number of 
critical early junctures.  This had led to a lack of fast action; wherein, 
arguably, the fleeting opportunity for breakthrough had been missed.  
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Further, in the armoured advance into the Low Countries in September-
October 1944 armoured divisions under commanders with the capability 
of producing new ideas and organization tended to revert to a „normal‟ 
(i.e. pre-Normandy) structure, commensurate with a pursuit phase of 
operations.  The war had not however been won in Normandy.  By 
analysing the command changes in certain corps and divisions, an 
obvious break with existing norms and practices of command-and-
control can be seen.  The previous situation (in Normandy) had been one 
in which decisions on the actual methods of fighting were largely left to 
unit commanding officers.  Thus, in figure 0.1 the vertical „Montgomery‟ 
rectangle starts the process, but the lower ranking officers take it 
forward and Montgomery does not – at that point – interact with and 
cross the horizontal „subordinate commander‟ arrows centrally.  This 
state of affairs was replaced post-Normandy by one where military 
pamphlet literature emerged in the field as a means to convey specific 
tactical and organizational ideas which reflected collective experience,  
from which no deviation was permitted – or required.  Thus it can be 
established that Montgomery‟s evaluation of the performance of his 
armoured divisions was that their performance on the ground in 
Normandy had not been all that he had hoped for.  This was particularly 
true with respect to divisions which had fulfilled his expectations in 
North Africa: 7th Armoured Division being a classic case.    
     With the need to fight through the Siegfried Line after the failure of 
the Arnhem operation, Montgomery realised exactly the level of close co-
operation that would be required between armour and infantry and he 
really gripped the problem.  In short, the problems of fighting in 
Normandy, and the bubble-up responses from commanders, gave rise to 
three sets of responses from Montgomery: firstly there was a pattern of 
command changes in certain corps and divisions; then there was a step-
change within the existing culture and the norms and practices of the 
Army; and finally there was also the production of Montgomery‟s 
pamphlets as the means to convey and disseminate specific tactical and 
organisational ideas because at the start of the campaign some 
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commanders had produced these new lessons in a more or less isolated 
manner. 
 
 
From ‘Anarchy’ to Problem Solving  
 
 
     Once the invasion had begun, the time for a learning process was 
short.  Commanders in „early Normandy‟ had three different kinds of 
experiences which influenced the development of doctrine and practice 
in different ways.  There was a group of successful commanders who 
had fought in North Africa, who did not change their methods and 
continued to fight with methods of combat derived mainly from Western 
Desert tactics.  When they got to Normandy, they thought that desert 
practice was what should be carried out there.  Those in a second group 
of commanders fought in North Africa too, had also gained their high 
reputations in the desert, but were not bound by or to the lessons 
learned from previous victories in Libya, Tunisia, or Italy and when they 
arrived in Normandy were open to new ideas in a new operating 
environment.  A third group was comprised of new commanders who 
had served with the Home Forces and not fought in the desert or 
overseas between Dunkirk and D-Day (shown in Figure 5.1).  This led to 
a development of practice in response to the problems of fighting in 
North-West Europe where complexity which is illustrated in Figure 6.1 
(below) had to be simplified and all three groups brought into line 
behind a single concept, or individualist protagonists jettisoned.        
     The replacement of lessons from past experience by current 
experience of what would work was conducted at many different levels of 
the corps-division-brigade hierarchy as the push inland appeared to 
slow down.  In this situation, the experience of those who had never 
served in the desert, and not been influenced at first hand by desert 
practice, was both necessary and important as desert-influenced 
methods of combat floundered in the bocage countryside of Normandy.  
They implemented a way which crystallised as a recognizable, unified 
approach within 21st Army Group – the new way that emerged in 
Normandy, formed from a realisation that desert practice applied to very 
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special circumstances; it did not apply to Normandy.  The new amalgam 
emerged from the three groups, which, towards the end of 1944, were 
influencing the development of doctrine and practice in different ways.  
By also examining the issue of when 21st Army Group moved from 
„anarchy‟ to problem solving under Montgomery‟s direction, this thesis 
has demonstrated that in the relatively short space of four or five 
months, while the fighting was so hard, commanders were still able to 
learn and implement complex lessons.   
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.1: The process of translation of experience into method, late 1944 
 
 
 
     In the example from Normandy of Roberts and O‟Connor, O‟Connor 
was apparently leaving the initiative to subordinates to suggest what 
they wanted to do in a continuation of the ad hoc responses. In the case 
of Roberts and Montgomery and the production of Montgomery‟s 
pamphlets, Montgomery was not only the Field Marshal holding the 
Successful commanders from N.Africa who did not change
… new commanders who looked to N.Africa experience alone
N
e
w
 C
o
m
m
a
n
d
e
rs
 w
it
h
 a
n
d
 o
p
e
n
 t
o
 
n
e
w
 i
d
e
a
s
 +
 r
e
p
la
c
e
m
e
n
t 
c
o
m
m
a
n
d
e
rs
 
a
ls
o
 o
p
e
n
 t
o
 n
e
w
 i
d
e
a
s
F
o
rm
u
la
ti
o
n
 o
f 
n
e
w
 d
o
c
tr
in
e
 
m
e
d
ia
te
d
 t
h
ro
u
g
h
 
M
o
n
tg
o
m
e
ry
‟s
 C
o
m
m
a
n
d
Successful commanders 
from North Africa open to 
change
Successful commanders 
in North West Europe
209 
 
whole thing together and ensuring that things were moving forward in 
the right direction in terms of his operational aims and intentions, he 
also took an active role in shaping the methodology of how things 
should move forward at the level of the actual fighting.  This is evident, 
not only in actions but in the production of these pamphlets. 
     Armour-infantry doctrine for the final assault on Germany would 
soon be based around principles enunciated in Montgomery‟s pamphlets 
on the infantry and the armoured divisions of November and December 
1944. A complex set of actors in interaction produced this doctrine.  It 
was also shaped by how Montgomery commanded to produce a 
uniformity of method.  The process resulted in one of the three bodies or 
groups (those attempting to fight with desert-influenced methods) being 
sidelined, and the other two being brought together in a collective 
understanding.  The commanders open to change and the new and 
replacement commanders with ideas and open to change both 
contributed to the formulation of new doctrine, that is overlap with and 
fed through the vertical „Montgomery‟ rectangle (which has now 
assumed the centrality it would have henceforward), and also fed into 
the single emergent grouping which comprised successful higher and 
senior-to-middle level commanders.   
     By utilising the best available knowledge and experience at his 
disposal, not just his own knowledge or ideas, Montgomery ensured that 
the creative responses to the problems of the fighting in north-west 
France and latterly in North-West Europe were taken on board and a 
structure provided for these to be institutionalised.  Montgomery‟s ideas 
validated and absorbed the experiences of commanders at the sharp end 
whose opinions he valued.  He put them together with his own ideas 
through a process which allowed the output to be synergistic.  Thus, as 
armour and infantry were working together in new ways which neither 
arm could have delivered entirely on their own, this process was one 
which could not have been delivered by any one commander on their 
own – this includes Montgomery.   
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Roles of Commanders Old and New in the Development of Doctrine  
 
 
     The timeframe and relation of individuals within and to it was as 
follows.  As commanders attempted to push inland the initial XXX Corps 
(Bucknall) operation resulted in the defeat suffered at Villers-Bocage by 
7th Armoured Division.  For Erskine, 7th Armoured Division, and in 
particular for Hinde, commander of the division‟s armoured brigade, this 
experience not only demonstrated that the difficult nature of the 
Normandy terrain assisted the Germans‟ resolute defence against their 
tactics,  it also set up a pattern that was to be frequently repeated in the 
Normandy campaign in which German armour demonstrated an 
apparently endless capability to rapidly re-deploy and block any British 
advance with (in the case of the most modern German tanks) the further 
capability to engage and destroy British tanks with long-range fire, from 
often excellently camouflaged positions.  This made the security of 
British tanks a function of their distance from the enemy and called into 
question the supposed lessons of North Africa.   
     Hinde was a key middle ranking commander during the fighting in 
Normandy who was also representative of the first group of officers 
described in the thesis, that is successful commanders from North 
Africa who did not change their methods and thus had to go (see also 
below, Figure 6.2).  Further, Hinde‟s involvement in the process by 
which doctrine was being criticised, created, and changed below the 
higher levels of command during the Battle of Normandy may be 
considered as a baseline against which the involvement of others may be 
compared.  A significant, creative role in the process of learning of 
lessons after the Villers-Bocage battle was played by Carver.  Carver had 
initially gained his reputation as a first class commander in the Western 
Desert, but he had learned new lessons as was evident during his 
command of the independent 4th Armoured Brigade later in the 
Normandy fighting.  Another division in XXX Corps in June 1944 was 
49th Division commanded by Barker.  It is an observation of importance 
that Barker did not serve in the desert.  
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     Comparison shows that these three groups of commanders – those 
who did not change from previous lessons, those who were open to 
change, and those new to the field – initially displayed characteristically 
different methods of fighting.  However as time progressed, in response 
to problems of fighting in Normandy and in terms of the development of 
new doctrine, there developed an identifiable subgroup who followed a 
way which became crystallised as a recognizable, unified approach 
within 21st Army Group (see figures 5.1 and 6.1).   
     Roberts, GOC11th Armoured, a divisional commander of particular 
importance, made his name as an innovative commander in the Western 
Desert and was an important instigator of further tactical change in 
Normandy as also noted above.  However, innovations such as the 
brigade groups of mutually supportive infantry battalions and armoured 
regiments were particularly associated with Adair, GOC Guards 
Armoured Division, who had not fought in the desert or overseas.  
O‟Connor is also an important figure here.  A successful commander in 
North Africa, it is debatable whether he was or was not bound by or to 
the lessons learned from previous successes.  However, the inference 
that can be drawn from the evidence considered is that eventually he 
lost Montgomery‟s confidence because he seemed to question the 
methods Montgomery promulgated.  
     Some other commanders were also important and therefore worthy of 
note for recognizing and implementing innovation.  Whistler is a good 
example of a commander who was actively implementing the process of 
innovation but who was not himself an innovator – thus his command of 
3rd Division after Rennie (also important) was wounded shortly after D-
Day is of interest because he has been shown to have been attempting 
to address problems of fighting while being able to control and manage 
only the components of which he was in command.  Rennie, who was 
killed during the Rhine crossing leading 51st Division, is a further 
example of an implementer rather than an innovator.  Both Whistler and 
Rennie were outstanding commanders who fitted in no less well to 
Montgomery‟s scheme of things for being implementers, rather than 
innovators, because of their proven leadership skills and intense 
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pugnacity.  The „implementer/innovator‟ model is a useful and hopefully 
striking one in terms of its power to explain the „Middle Management‟ 
concepts used in the thesis: Instigators and Drivers of Innovation; 
Implementers; and Blockers.  In terms of the situation at the very end of 
1944/early 1945 the Blockers had gone, so that there now remained 
only two groups of commanders – „Innovators‟ and „Implementers‟.  
     By the time of the catastrophic operational defeat inflicted on the 
German Army in August 1944 which led to the Allied breakout from 
Normandy, Western Desert-style tactics had been shown wanting and 
most commanders adhering solely to desert-influenced methods of 
combat had been ousted.  Erskine, for example, was relieved of his 
command and instead Verney promoted from commanding 6th Guards 
Tank Brigade to the command of 7th Armoured Division.  Lyne took over 
7th Armoured Division from Verney in November 1944.  The findings 
indicate, however, that Lyne was an implementer rather than an 
innovator so far as re-organization and changes in respect of armour 
were concerned.  New and replacement commanders could be open to 
fresh ideas, or conceivably (though this was increasingly unlikely) bring 
in new ideas themselves.  Alternatively, they could be commanders who 
simply implemented the new 21st Army Group tactical method.  
Wingfield, the second-in-command of 34th Tank Brigade, having 
temporarily commanded 8th Armoured Brigade before returning to 34th 
Tank Brigade, is an example of a commander who was open to fresh 
ideas.  He would eventually come to command 22nd Armoured Brigade 
in 7th Armoured Division.   
     A completely new commander in theatre was Hakewill Smith.  
Hakewill Smith and 52nd Division were only committed to the campaign 
in September 1944.  He and his division exemplify the problems of 
replacement commanders and formations in learning from current 
experience – because of the gulf between the ideas which those 
responsible for tactical leadership were looking for and what was said in 
official written War Office doctrine.  Nevertheless, the example of 
Greenacre and 6th Guards Armoured Brigade makes it clear that for 
and in the advance from the Rhine new and replacement commanders 
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coming to prominence were tending to adopt the new methods that can 
be considered collectively to have been „Montgomery‟s‟ 21st Army Group 
tactical method.  Commanders new and old played important roles in 
the developments described here. 
 
 
Operational Development, Innovation and Command-and-Control in the 
Context of the Move from Anarchy to Problem Solving  
 
 
     This section addresses the main investigation of the thesis.  This 
allows us to start to draw together the strands and findings concerning 
the ways in which the translation of experience into method was 
innovative.  As the prime instigator of the process, Montgomery worked 
with others in ways that can now be fully appreciated.  However, this 
finding does not indicate what might be called a „Round Table‟: there is 
no evidence to suggest that this group of effervescent individuals 
engaged with each other – certainly at the higher levels – except through 
Montgomery and his agents in this process, such as Lyne.  
Consequently, it appears reasonable to argue that the effect in the 
formulation of a functional doctrine was that at the end of 1944 
Montgomery was more open than has been supposed to the bubbling up 
of new ideas that worked which originated at, or below the divisional 
level.  His main contribution in terms of ideas was to be so quickly 
responsive to circumstances as to influence a change of circumstance.  
The new way that emerged after Arnhem, was composed by people on 
the spot, including Montgomery but all working under Montgomery‟s 
direction in new ways with more direct (though heavily informal) 
communication than has hitherto been recognised between Montgomery 
and corps, divisions, and brigades.  Montgomery used individuals such 
as Lyne as a conduit to allow bubble up, even if there was little 
communication directly back from Montgomery (on these matters) to 
divisional level or below.  Thereafter, that is from late 1944, this complex 
approach which included both formal and informal elements was the 
basis on which Montgomery was content to leave things to the initiative 
of subordinate commanders.   
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     Thus, it was Montgomery‟s adoption of a problem-solving approach 
in a way which emphasised the importance of the relationship between 
circumstances obtaining in a given situation and the goals of the master 
plan („context‟) which led to success.  Subsequently, and after the 
sidelining of blockers, the remaining commanders were all innovators at 
different times and in their own different ways, thereby providing the 
means to overcome the problems of command, doctrine and organization 
which had already been highlighted as they struggled to adjust ideas on 
armoured warfare (including those of the War Office) to current 
circumstances.  In the case of Montgomery, he also had to reconcile 
these reactions and responses with his general theories.     
     Montgomery‟s approach to war was a traditional British one in 
recognising the importance of principles, and issues related to the 
experience of the First World War such as firepower, administration, 
and so on.  It was not the extent, but rather the depth of his innovations 
that is their particularly defining feature.  The way these elements joined 
together called for a new orientation.  What the War Office offered 
through its training and publications was textbook knowledge, 
supplemented by concrete examples from military history: the whole 
point of this exercise being to teach commanders how to fight battles.  
There are no examples in Montgomery‟s pamphlets except for some 
references to current experience.  What this says is that he wanted to 
facilitate what we would now call „out of the box‟ thinking, 
unconstrained by unhelpful examples from past successes.  Thus, what 
Montgomery wanted the pamphlets to do was to inculcate an 
understanding of how to think: he did want to constrain the options that 
armour and infantry commanders came up with to solutions that 
delivered certain ends in terms of the big picture in 1945, one of which 
was speed in mobile war.  However, he got people in the two arms at 
different levels to work in new ways under his direction.  Because of the 
lessons learned, the new doctrine that was institutionalised was 
intrinsically able to cope with a different type of warfare and thus was 
successful.  It was thus Montgomery‟s adoption of a problem-solving-
within-context approach which led to success in North-West Europe.  
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The orientation of „quick thinking‟ within the goals of the master plan 
was by then the solution rather than any alteration of the master plan.       
     Montgomery institutionalised emergent organizational change.  He 
changed the way the armoured arm functioned in terms of the 
requirements of fluidity of major formations and ubiquity of armoured 
formations.  This was a new framework for action which at the most 
basic level gave rise to standard operating procedures.  However, the 
core value became the „Initiative/initiative‟ for the reasons given in 
Chapter 4 and 5.  By late 1944, the Initiative had become one of 
Montgomery‟s principles of war.  By the end of the war, 21st Army 
Group was also capable of considerable flexibility on the battlefield with 
respect to co-operation between armour and infantry.  The key thing 
about Montgomery and innovation is that he moved from dogma 
towards being a „reflexive‟ commander by taking on board others‟ 
experience, but also responding to the unfolding situation and 
encouraging other commanders to do the same.  The process henceforth 
became command plus co-creation, within a framework of common 
understandings.  Figure 6.2 represents the effect of this 
diagrammatically: the effect was that the factors producing change had 
been optimised to meet the challenge of the final assault on Germany. 
     Montgomery had always sorted and sifted his commanders, but now 
he sorted and sifted them in terms of who could tell him what worked, 
and who were skilled at using available equipment to best effect.  The 
process of this happening was shown in Figure 6.1 (with new 
commanders coming in) but the effect – through the centrality of 
Montgomery – is shown here in Figure 6.2.  His active contribution was 
to impose the idea that, although a functional doctrine for armour, 
infantry, and associated instruments would have a number of different 
practice aspects which related to the capabilities of the various arms in 
terms of their contributions of different types of firepower and mobility, 
there should be a unity of purpose.  Multiple types of organisation mean 
multiple changes, but converging towards a single „mean‟.  It improved 
the fighting chances of 21st Army Group in ways that had not been tried 
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before in terms of a functional doctrine which covered armour, infantry, 
and associated instruments.   
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.2: Metamorphosis of experience into method (Effect) 
 
 
     Montgomery‟s solution in practice was to adapt tactics as if the 
„capital tank‟ existed.  This is where his insistence on the need for the 
change in thinking styles came from.  Montgomery optimised all those 
factors he could optimise.  Hence his transposition of the term „ubiquity‟ 
from the traditional infantry role, and the use he made of it as a 
concept: by which he meant „not tied to one role or the other‟.  Thus, 
Montgomery‟s was a holistic approach to the use of armoured divisions.  
However, the importance of the artillery and its role in assisting the 
other arms to achieve a breakthrough was affirmed as an important 
characteristic of 21st Army Group‟s way of fighting.  
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     The problem remained, however, as to just how local success on the 
battlefield could be turned into a driver for or coordinated with success 
at campaign level.  Montgomery‟s first step in this process was to make 
sure that there was a uniform understanding among commanders 
regarding decision making and outcomes in the context of his aims and 
intentions. 
      The manner in which the armour and infantry of armoured divisions 
could be used to best effect was perceived as the mutual defence of each 
by the other in offensive tactical groupings of armoured regiments and 
infantry battalions.  This was the solution to the problem of how the 
process of defending against enemy tanks and anti-tank guns could be 
made dynamic so that defence itself became mobile rather than static 
for armoured divisions.  Thus, the unity of purpose that underpinned 
new best practice emphasised not only fluidity of major formations 
(which pointed in the direction of modern „battlegroups‟), but also 
offensiveness.  Defence too moved – or needed to move – at the speed of 
the attack, and any apparently static defence was purely temporary and 
transitory.  The role of tank brigades had long been bound up with what 
had been traditionally understood to be a distinct phase of operations, 
which ended with the infantry established on their objectives.  Barker‟s 
promotion, subsequent to the success of Clarkeforce, the armour-cum-
infantry force pushed through a gap made by 49th Division supported 
by the tanks of 34th Tank Brigade, signalled the ongoing commitment to 
the battle that was now expected of the tank brigades as well.  For all 
senior officers, and the commanders of every type of armoured 
formation, this had considerable implications for speed of thought and 
action within operations and the sequencing between phases of 
operations.  
     Montgomery ruthlessly removed from command those officers he 
thought were likely to be in disagreement as he sought to impose a 
mould of consensus.  He intervened to stress and institutionalise the 
importance of connexions between „output‟ at the different levels of 
command and his aim at the „operational‟ level and common 
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understandings of same.  In sum, Montgomery institutionalised 
doctrine.   
     Thereafter, he was content to leave things to the initiative of 
subordinate commanders. Therefore, superficially, what Montgomery 
was doing and the way the command structure worked would appear to 
be quite similar, and thus compatible with existing culture and the 
norms and practices of the Army.  However, it was underpinned by 
different understandings.  Commanders working with Montgomery 
needed to think at two levels: the tactical – their problems, and the 
offensive use of the armour, infantry, and associated instruments at 
their disposal to solve them; but also at the strategic – how their 
problems and solutions fitted into Montgomery‟s aim and intention to 
gain and hold the Initiative.  Further, Montgomery wanted all 
commanders to think like two types of commander, like an armoured 
and like an infantry commander.  Montgomery was after what can be 
called „initiative-within-the Initiative‟: he wanted to gain and hold „the 
Initiative‟, and required individuals to use their initiative, which would 
relate output to outcome in the way that he wanted, as expressed 
generally in the relationship of his principles of war and his war-fighting 
principles.  These, when joined together, facilitated the capacity for 
success in war, as expressed in his pamphlets.  The final doctrine was 
appropriate and because of the initial innovation there was no further 
need to innovate.  The British Army successfully responded to each new 
set of challenges within the demands of the high-intensity warfare which 
characterised the close of the campaign.   
     The translation of experience into method involved a problem-solving 
approach within agreed-upon frameworks of common understandings 
which then became non-negotiable.  That 21st Army Group performed 
as well as it did in North-West Europe was due not only to the individual 
adaptability of various commanders at different levels, or simply to 
material advantages; it was due also to its collective ability under 
Montgomery‟s direction to institutionalise changes in thinking styles to 
accommodate changing styles of warfare. Montgomery sought to bring 
about orientational change among those he could communicate with or 
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to directly with the aim of bringing about organizational change on as 
wide a level as possible.  The fighting chances of armour and infantry 
which led assaults, on the ground were improved through the 
introduction of fluidity of major formations.  This emphasised the idea of 
armour‟s flexibility of role, but also that infantry had a protective role 
vis-à-vis armour.  Commanders were encouraged to change their 
thinking styles so to incorporate elements of each arm‟s individualised 
tactical thinking styles within a common framework.  This was a 
„combat multiplier‟ or battle-winning factor.  This included quick 
thinking and fast action, but not flexible tactical command as in the 
panzer divisions.  Indeed, it can be argued that given the circumstances 
that prevailed, 21st Army Group not only performed well but as well as 
they could have.  In effect, Montgomery optimised all those factors 
which he could optimise.  While this became synonymous with truly 
massive levels of artillery firepower, fire support from the air, and 
meticulous logistical preparations, it was not the whole story.  The two 
arms would have one combat mission.  Montgomery brought this about 
through both command changes and the institutionalisation of a 
common doctrine.   
     The effectiveness of the response was that the two arms, armour and 
infantry, were shaped to become a combined arms force, within an all-
arms team that also included the artillery.  However, arising from the 
fact that any initial fire plan for a breakthrough is almost entirely 
indirect fire, a number of things were understood from experience from 
early Normandy.  First, it was understood that complete dependence on 
artillery fire support, to be effective, called for fast forward movement if 
troops were to reach their objectives before the effects of covering fire 
had worn off.  This frequently presented armoured commanders with the 
dilemma of whether to stay with the infantry or go on close to the 
barrage.  Secondly, it was understood that enemy anti-tank guns and 
tanks beyond the range of artillery support, supporting the enemy from 
flank and rear, were not always destroyed, leaving tanks accompanying 
the infantry vulnerable, and making it difficult to convert a break-in into 
a break-out.   
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     Formations which arrived in theatre after the Normandy campaign at 
first attempted to operate on the basis of textbook artillery-based tactics, 
but initially without the speed of thought and action necessary to 
overcome the „last 200 yards‟ problem, when artillery could not be used.  
Further, however, the response in theatre in later Normandy and into 
the Low Countries of massed remote artillery fire support was being 
adapted to localised available all-arms firepower.  The new roles for 
tanks and other armoured fighting vehicles as recorded by Montgomery 
in The Armoured Division in Battle allowed 21st Army Group to do this.  
Problems, especially in 1945, were the dispersed nature of the enemy 
and the fluid nature of operations.  This did not supersede the standing 
arrangements whereby the fire of an infantry division‟s three affiliated 
Field Artillery Regiments could if necessary be switched onto supporting 
one brigade, or heavier fire from further back called down on a target.  It 
did not therefore set aside the important role of the artillery as an arm.  
It did, however, address the situation that armour was not integral to 
infantry divisions and brigades, and that tanks and infantry had not 
been integrated in armoured divisions – British armour had not been 
used to working together with infantry in any intimate way.  And so 
Montgomery recognised that there could be situations where infantry 
and armour could fight their way forward together without the need to 
wait for artillery or air support (air support being an independent 
variable).  This would contribute to his gaining, holding and retaining 
the Initiative.  This called for commanders on the spot to exercise their 
initiative to be proactive to bring his plans to a successful conclusion 
and to fight their way forward in this manner. 
 
 
A Different Explanation  
 
 
      Historians today seek to provide comprehensive and satisfying 
explanations of British operational and tactical failure and success in 
North-West Europe.  In order to provide such explanations, questions 
have been raised by a significant number of important contemporary 
historians about whether or not the development of the capacity to 
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integrate combat arms in 21st Army group had any basis in a common 
doctrine; how such doctrine may have been created; and how 
Montgomery commanded, that is, whether doctrine was imposed or 
generated.  Certainly, initial shortcomings in the operational methods in 
21st Army Group, and their impact on the effectiveness of armoured 
forces, would have mattered less if understood more and always 
incorporated into planning by all senior commanders employing 
armoured forces. This was offset by the fact that commanders at lower 
level had developed workable armour-infantry co-operation tactics, as 
this thesis shows, before the middle point of the campaign.  Therefore, 
what some have argued was a weakness in the Army‟s approach to 
doctrine – that is indiscipline – was to prove a considerable advantage 
for the armoured units as they attempted to grapple with the operational 
difficulties thrust upon them by the Normandy campaign.  While true, 
the fighting in Normandy was only one phase of the North-West Europe 
campaign.  Thus, it would be more accurate to say this was the 
approach at that time, but that this process was not an open-ended one 
in terms of the progress of the campaign over time.  As the lessons of 
Normandy were disseminated and institutionalised, they became the 
basis or core of a new 21st Army Group „official‟ doctrine or orthodoxy 
from which no repetition of the earlier permissiveness would be allowed 
or tolerated, because it was not needed.  
     What is argued in this thesis is that Montgomery recognised that 
finding ways to get people to depart from their rigorous training and buy 
into his conceptions – particularly at the interface of thinking and 
execution – was very important.  Also important was the challenge of 
finding really suitable subordinates who were not only specialists having 
an armour background or a knowledge of the use of armour, but who 
also saw completely eye-to-eye with him on the handling of armour and 
equally possessed the necessary forceful decisive leadership.  This 
recognition by Montgomery led to the production and circulation within 
21st Army Group of the instructional pamphlets, The Conduct of War 
and the Infantry Division in Battle and, The Armoured Division in Battle in 
late 1944.   
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     Montgomery was asking a lot from his subordinate commanders, yes, 
but it is important to understand also what he was prepared to settle for 
if he thought they were on the right wavelength and going in the right 
direction, as is shown by the example of Carver.  There was another 
management process working here, or rather the two processes working 
together.  Commanders, however senior, who could or would not 
practice Montgomery‟s methods as he promulgated them, found their 
services dispensed with regardless of their other competence or 
generalship.  This is the significance, for example, of O‟Connor‟s removal 
from VIII Corps and can also be seen in the examples of Bucknall, 
Erskine and Hinde.   
     There were differences of approach that affected the practice of 
armour-infantry co-operation differently during and subsequent to the 
Battle of Normandy.  There was the unofficial process in which 
subordinate commanders were challenging, criticizing and changing 
doctrine in response to the problems of fighting in Normandy on the 
basis of their practical experiences.  Montgomery, often through 
intermediaries he appointed and attached to Tac HQ to assist him in the 
production of his pamphlets, such as Lyne, made himself personally au 
fait with these challenges and criticisms.  Then, there was the official 
process within 21st Army Group in which Montgomery pulled all of 
these ideas together, stressing the importance of connections between 
„output‟ at the different levels of command, his aim at the „operational‟ 
level and the need for a general understanding of the latter.  This was 
what went out published over his name in the pamphlets.  Thus, 
Montgomery‟s pamphlets were a synergistic as well as an individualistic 
product and they were also congruent with commanders‟ experiences of 
fighting on the ground.  By late 1944, Montgomery and 21st Army 
Group had developed its operational methods in a way that was both 
coherent, generic in terms of the problems of fighting the campaign in 
North-West Europe, and successful.  By 1945 lessons were no longer 
being learned, but the learning that had been acquired was most 
certainly being implemented, even though a different solution was now 
required to respond to unfolding circumstances.  
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     This thesis has shown that Montgomery moved from dogma towards 
being a „reflexive‟ commander by taking on board others‟ experience, but 
that he also responded to the unfolding situation, encouraging other 
commanders to do the same.  It has also attempted to resolve the 
apparently irresolvable issue of the relationship between the 
authoritarian command style of Montgomery and the doctrinal 
indiscipline which existed at the start of the Normandy campaign.   
     
 
     
 
     In the Introduction it was noted that the process of resolving this 
issue was complex: the result of that process was that 21st Army Group 
fought operations and actions determined by doctrine.  From „others‟ or 
below there was an unofficial process whereby armoured warfare 
doctrine was being challenged, criticised and changed.  Then, from 
Montgomery, there came an official process of dynamic leadership which 
pulled it all together by institutionalizing doctrine and inculcating a 
unified mindset.  The characteristic of this mindset was a style of what 
can be called straight thinking, or as Lyne identified it, clear and logical 
thinking, a quick grasp of essentials and discard of all unnecessary 
detail.  The institutionalization of doctrine resulted first in the 
production of a set of ideas; secondly, in a style and speed of thinking 
applied to the application of those ideas, and finally, the willingness of 
individual commanders to use their initiative to solve the challenges 
within the constraints imposed by Montgomery.    
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Appendix I: Analytical Framework of the Choices Available to Armoured 
Commanders Co-operating with Infantry as to Proximity and Purpose – 
mid- 1920s to mid-1940s 
 
 
     The functional specificity of units and formations, that is the 
dedicated organization of units and formations tasked to carry out the 
function of the Army tank brigades, independent armoured brigades, 
and armoured divisions came under pressure in Normandy.   
     Army tank brigades operated independently (and are referred to 
hereafter as independent tank brigades), as did independent armoured 
brigades.  The armoured division was also an independent command.  
The armoured brigade of an armoured division was not an independent 
command.  Reflecting the bifurcation in British armoured warfare 
doctrine, the traditional functions of the independent tank and 
armoured brigades had been seen primarily as close-support to infantry 
divisions and those of the armoured divisions as fast-moving 
exploitation. 
     Nobody went in with entirely the right solution to how the problems 
presented by such a diversity of roles might be overcome.  Initially, the 
impetus for innovation with respect to integrating or combining armour 
and infantry was different in respect of the independent brigades and 
the armoured divisions.  However, dilemmas of purpose (what the 
different types of organization were actually for) interlinked with issues 
of practice (the tasks the two types of formations were actually called on 
to carry out) and vice versa.  At issue were best armour-infantry co-
operation practice and the purposes to which armour could be put to 
best effect.  These applied to the entire armoured force at the start of the 
campaign, with the exception of specialised armour whose task was 
never in doubt1.   
                                                          
1
 The purpose of the specialised armour, which was mostly grouped in 79th Armoured 
Division was always clear: to assist in the break-in phase of operations which involved 
attacks on fixed enemy defences.  79th Armd Div is not dealt with in this thesis for reasons 
which are covered in Appendix II.   
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     The interlinked problems of practice and purpose can helpfully be 
explored in terms of the options available to British commanders at the 
time.  These related initially to the perceived capabilities of the two arms 
in attack and defence.  To carry out each of armour‟s alternative 
purposes, the options for the tanks were traditionally seen as being 
either closeness with the infantry or separation from them.  Two 
practical contradictory conceptions for tanks tasked with infantry 
support held sway: firstly that armour-infantry co-operation required 
the close proximity of the tanks, and secondly that the tanks‟ purpose 
was infantry co-operation which could be realised by the separation of 
the two arms.  Early in the campaign they were drawing heavily for 
guidance on the War Office‟s attempts to adjust tactical doctrine to 
lessons learned from operations through its various series of official 
pamphlets.  Nevertheless, brigade commanders and above were always 
permitted considerable leeway to adopt a down-to-earth approach and 
adjust tactical doctrine to lessons learned from operations where this 
appeared to make sense.  Thus, early developments in Normandy had 
about them something of on-the-spot decision-making to discard 
„established‟ practice through pragmatism, which characterised all the 
early tactical improvisations.  
     In traditional infantry attacks supported by artillery and tanks 
against fixed defences, a shortcoming in any artillery fire support plan in 
the attack arises from the fact that the barrage or concentration, which 
is almost entirely indirect fire, must be lifted while the assaulting troops 
are some distance short of their target to avoid friendly casualties.  They 
were then vulnerable to enemy machine gun fire etc, all too often 
without an effective counter-measure, because the tanks accompanying 
them were themselves vulnerable to enemy weapons.  The solution that 
would emerge reaffirmed the importance of fire support in the attack, 
and included appropriate tactical fireplans which would coordinate 
support from field, medium and heavy artillery (as well as from the air).  
These plans would continue to be coordinated by the Commander, Royal 
Artillery (CRA) at Division.  In most barrage-led attacks, however a point 
came when the infantry faced a choice between fighting forward with 
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their own weapons or not going forward.  To maintain the momentum of 
the attack, immediate fire support had to be available.  The solution that 
would emerge emphasised closer tank-infantry-anti-tank artillery co-
operation as the means to maintain the momentum of the attack, after 
having broken into but not out of German defences.  However, reliance 
on artillery fire power, while an important ingredient of the solution, was 
increasingly incompatible with the fluid, mobile, armour-cum-infantry 
operations which Montgomery additionally wished to impose on the 
enemy as soon as possible. 
     In terms of the dimensions of combat mid- to late 1944, the most 
difficult dilemma of armour-infantry co-operation doctrine and practice 
was how to combine to best effect; the idea that armour was an 
independently-acting arm was redundant.  However, in armour-infantry 
co-operation, the purpose of the tanks was perceived to be to protect 
and defend the attacking infantry.  Tanks used their firepower and 
armoured mobility to do this.  It can be argued that it was, as yet in 
early Normandy, by no means widely perceived that the corollary 
applied: that the purpose of the infantry was, in turn to protect the 
tanks with their weapons.  Not until later on was the purpose of 
armour-infantry co-operation perceived in terms of support, each of the 
other.   Thus, early in the campaign, the understanding was largely that 
the role of tanks in armour-infantry co-operation was support of 
infantry.  These would be infantry tanks; long in vogue.  This type of 
tank was represented in the British Army in North-West Europe by the 
British Churchill tank in a variety of marks and variants.  The 
independent tank brigades were equipped with the Churchill.  However, 
American Sherman tanks were also used in the infantry support role by 
independent armoured brigades.  The organisation and structure of 
these Sherman-equipped independent armoured brigades was intended 
to make their infantry support role clear.2  
      There was a strongly held view that the task of infantry support 
required the close proximity of the tanks.  While this reflected most 
previous thinking and experience, some experience from the North 
                                                          
2
 For a brief description of tank types, see Appendix IV. 
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African theatre and from the early fighting in Normandy could be held to 
support a different view.  This view was that, in order to do their job in a 
close congested operational environment which gave the enemy ample 
opportunity for enfilade fire in addition to the advantage in long-range 
fire, the tanks should separate themselves from the infantry, take 
advantage of all protection the terrain could offer in order to protect 
themselves, and move into positions which allowed them to close the 
range between themselves and enemy tanks: this allows the following 
understanding of the interaction of ideas and choices facing 
commanders, as is shown in figure Appendix I.1.   
 
Figure App.I.1: Proximity versus purpose for armour infantry co-operation 
 
     The specific type of operation Churchill-equipped tank brigades were 
intended to undertake was not in dispute at the start of the campaign, 
although it was Montgomery‟s long-standing view that a heavy tank (i.e., 
the Churchill) would not be required.3  It was also Montgomery‟s prior 
view that there would not be any need to have different approaches for 
                                                          
3Montgomery would reaffirm this view in his „Memorandum on British Armour: No 2‟, 21 
February 1945, para. 6, p. 2.  
Close proximity
Separation of forces
Infantry should 
protect tanks
Tanks should 
protect Infantry
Choice 4: infantry needs to 
stay close to the tanks in 
order to protect the tanks
Choice 1: tanks needs to 
stay close to the infantry in 
order to protect them
Choice 2: tanks can best 
protect the infantry by 
ranging independently from 
them
Choice 3 infantry can best 
protect the tanks by ranging 
ahead and separately from 
them
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these two (Churchill and Sherman) types of independent brigades.  In 
Normandy, the Churchill-equipped independent tank brigades, that is 
the formations charged primarily with close support of infantry, were 
making great efforts to develop appropriate tactics, within the 
framework by which the British Army always tried to adjust its tactical 
doctrine to lessons learned from operations.  Follow-up formations – 
Churchill tank brigades slated for Normandy, such as 6th Guards Tank 
Brigade, which arrived in late July 1944 as part of the last wave of 
British armoured reinforcements – can be seen (in this thesis) to have 
been making efforts to develop appropriate tactics within the same 
framework while still in England.  Also, the Sherman-equipped 
independent armoured brigades intended for close support of infantry 
were struggling to develop suitable tactics while in Normandy, initially 
within the bounds set by the traditional framework described above (i.e. 
operating only within choice – or quadrant – 1 in figure App.I.1).  Within 
the apparently on-the-spot decision making process in Normandy, a 
clear pattern emerged – taking action very much into quadrant 2.     
     In parallel developments, the commanders of the armoured brigades 
of the Sherman-equipped independent were also faced with the 
problems of fighting in the bocage (see App.III Photographs 1 and 2).  In 
the case of the commanders of these brigades however, the problem of 
armour-infantry co-operation in the bocage was linked to the equipment 
and organization issue, and how best to utilise the forces they had at 
their disposal.  This was being addressed by creative brigadiers (and 
also by armoured division commanders), taking the action into 
quadrants 3 and 4 as will be seen in the chapters of this thesis.   
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Appendix II: Note on Approaches, Sources and Methods 
     
     The reader may benefit from an explanation of the approach used to 
produce this thesis.  It was found useful to turn „inside out‟ the idea that 
Montgomery has to be related to his subordinate commanders through 
hierarchy and the chain of command.  For the purposes of this study, 
Montgomery‟s input is thus taken as a sine qua non at each and every 
level of command.  Examining the levels from junior to senior 
commanders and vice versa, to establish how different commanders 
influenced issues in different ways, is helpful.  From the point of view of 
focus, this process then starts with the corps or the divisional 
commanders and subsequently moves up or down.  This allows us to 
extend investigation beyond Montgomery and to understand better what 
was happening.   
     We know what Montgomery was seeking in terms of the progress of 
the war over time because we have many sources for this.  This was 
relentless pressure, to create the conditions for a breakout and, 
thereafter, imposition on the Germans of the condition, mobile war.  
Therefore we can know – or reasonably infer – what he was seeking from 
his commanders.  From this, we can generate new insights about them 
in the context of process that is, what they were actually doing and how 
they did it.   
     Further explanation is required to justify the selection of the actual 
corps commanders, divisional commanders and brigade commanders, 
etc. who are important enough to make them members of a small group 
of commanders for the purpose of this thesis.   
     The 21st Army Group was formed on 9 July 1943 to command 2nd 
British Army and 1st Canadian Army for the invasion of North-West 
Europe: the Commander-in-Chief (GOC-in-C) 21st Army Group for the 
Invasion and throughout the North-West Europe campaign was General 
(from September 1944, Field-Marshal) Sir B.L. Montgomery.  Between 6 
June 1944 and the surrender of German forces to Montgomery in May 
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1945 seven lieutenant-generals held corps commands in five British 
corps: E.H. Barker, F.A.M. Browning, G.C. Bucknall, J.T. Crocker, B.G. 
Horrocks, Sir R.N. O‟Connor and N.M. Ritchie.  However, the number of 
corps commanders can be reduced from seven to six, and of corps from 
five to four, if I British Airborne Corps is omitted (for reasons which will 
be explained below).  The reason there are six commanders in the four 
corps in 2nd Army is that Lieutenant-General Sir R.N. O‟Connor was 
succeeded as VIII Corps commander in December 1944 by Lieutenant-
General E.H. Barker and Lieutenant-General B.G. Horrocks succeeded 
Lieutenant-General G.C. Bucknall as GOC XXX Corps in August 1944.   
     Including 1st 4th Airborne Divisions for completeness (Urquart, Gale, 
and Bols), 22 major-generals commanded British divisions in North-
West Europe up to May 1945.  Of these divisional commanders, only 
one, Barker, rose to become a corps commander.  General Barker 
commanded 49th (West Riding) Division in England and North-West 
Europe, 1943-44, then VIII Corps, 1944-45.   
     In this period, some 131 individuals held brigade commands in 21st 
Army Group.  This includes independent tank, and armoured brigades – 
important in any investigation of the subject of armoured-cum-infantry 
tactics because the role of a tank brigade was that of infantry close- 
support.  For completeness this number still includes Commando 
brigades and Parachute and Airlanding Brigades.  Of this total, three 
were appointed from brigade to divisional command: C.M. Barber (46th 
Brigade) to command of 15th (Scottish) Division; L.G. Whistler (131st 
Brigade) to command of 3rd Infantry Division; and G.L. Verney (6th 
Guards Tank Brigade) to command of 7th Armoured Division.  If those 
whose story properly belongs with that of the Airborne Forces are 
omitted, the list of relevant figures who were brigadiers becomes shorter.  
For the purposes of this study it was decided to omit commanders 
whose story properly belongs with either that of the Airborne Forces or 
the Commandos and this was done as a preliminary first step.   
     The next step in the process of selection was to generate a list of 
corps, divisional, and armoured and infantry brigade commanders.  The 
list was refined in two ways: it was reduced to a list of commanders who 
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appeared, based on the historiography, to be an important part of the 
story of operational development, innovation and command in North-
West Europe.  To complete this step, the names of other significant 
commanders not yet included but who appear also to have been part of 
the story were added to the list: these names were added by utilising 
primary sources and using new source material critically to re-examine 
the list generated by the current historiography.  
     A simple success/failure typology was applied to the later Second 
World War (1944 -45) military careers of those short listed as potentially 
researchable commanders.  As Professor Sir Michael Howard has 
observed „the military historian knows what is victory and what defeat, 
what is success and what failure‟ („The Use and Abuse of Military 
History‟, RUSI Journal 138 (February 1993): 28).  Howard‟s assertion 
was meaningful enough to serve as a launch pad from which to take this 
further step.  This produced two new lists, innovative commanders, and 
commanders who were demonstrably not innovative.  This process 
further focussed the list on those who were from an armoured 
background or who commanded armoured units simply because 
innovation was primarily required in the armoured arm: British 
armoured doctrine was still in a state of flux even in mid-1944, at the 
start of the Normandy campaign.  Therefore, in order to find out what 
innovations there were, that is new ways which would prove to be better, 
and how they occurred, it was necessary to begin to focus on the 
thoughts, activities and actions of armoured commanders and 
commanders in a position to direct armour.  Some determination as to 
the availability of primary source material with respect to the individuals 
completed this step. 
     Selection of the two lists described above, and passing the names 
through the filter of armoured commanders and commanders who were 
in a position to direct armour, yielded a final working list of corps 
commanders, armoured division/ brigade/ regiment commanders, and 
independent armoured and tank brigade commanders for whom data is 
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available.  This list contains the names of those who were innovative 
and those who were not.  The final working list was1: 
Major-General A.H.S. ADAIR (Guards Armoured Division); 
Lieutenant-General E.H. BARKER (49th Infantry Division and later VIII 
Corps); 
Lieutenant-General G.C. BUCKNALL (XXX Corps to August 1944); 
Brigadier R.M.P. CARVER (4th Armoured Brigade); 
Brigadier W.S. CLARKE (34th Armoured Brigade); 
Major-General G.W.E.J. ERSKINE (7th Armoured Division); 
Brigadier W.D.C. GREENACRE (6th Guards Tank Brigade); 
Major-General E. HAKEWILL SMITH (52nd Infantry Division); 
Brigadier the Hon. W.R.N. Hinde (22nd Armoured Brigade, [7th 
Armoured Division]); 
Lieutenant-Colonel/acting Brigadier P(atrick) R. C. HOBART (GSO1 
[Senior Staff Officer]; Guards Armoured Division, Commander, 1st 
Royal Tank Regiment; 22nd Armoured Brigade [7th Armoured 
Division]); 
Major-General P(ercy) C.S. HOBART (79th Armoured Division); 
Lieutenant-General B.G. HORROCKS (XXX Corps from Aug 1944);  
Major-General L.O. LYNE (50th Infantry Division, then 59th Infantry 
Division and later 7th Armoured Division); 
Major-General G.H.A. MACMILLAN (15th Infantry Division, then 49th 
Infantry Division, then 51st Infantry Division); 
Lieutenant-General Sir R.N. O‟CONNOR (VIII Corps to December 
1944); 
Major-General T.G. RENNIE (3rd Infantry Division and later 51st 
Infantry Division); 
Major-General G.P.B. ROBERTS (11th Armoured Division); 
Major-General G.L. VERNEY (6th Guards Tank Brigade and later 7th 
Armoured Division); 
Major-General L.G. WHISTLER (3rd Infantry Division); 
Brigadier A.D.R. WINGFIELD (Second- in-Command, 34th Tank 
Brigade; then acting Commander, 8th Armoured Brigade; and later 
Commander, 22nd Armoured Brigade [7th Armoured Division]). 
 
A decision was taken to omit in principle commanders who had been 
written about very extensively already, where this would not diminish 
                                                          
1
 The rank indicated was the highest held during the campaign.  The individual was the 
commander of the listed unit/ formation(s), except where otherwise indicated.  The term 
„commander‟ is therefore omitted, except when an aid to clarity.   
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representativeness of particular success or notable failure.  In addition, 
while historiographical evidence suggested Major-General P(ercy) C.S. 
Hobart (79th Armoured Division: the parent formation of the specialised 
armour) was important, yet other evidence which had to be given 
credence suggests his importance as an innovator was limited in respect 
of what this thesis set out to research with regard to armour infantry 
cooperation.  Thus, to draw together the historiography and the primary 
data it was decided to omit specific commanders. 
     To pursue „bubble up‟ operational methods it was necessary also to 
go down to the level of the regimental COs and below and this material 
was also used as a primary source where and when appropriate.  By 
utilising the records of more junior commanders, a more complete 
picture could be built up.  The command of 7th Armoured Division at 
the divisional and brigade levels, for example, is shown in Figure 
Appendix II.1, indicating in tabular form all commanders and 
highlighting those for whom papers have been traced and located. 
 
 7th Armoured Div 
Erskine 
Verney 
Lyne 
22nd Armoured Bde 131nd Infantry Bde 
 Hinde    Ekins 
 Gregson  Pepper 
 Mackeson  Freeland 
 Swetenham  Cox 
 Cracroft  Spurling 
 Paley  Brind 
 Wingfield    Freeland 
  Spurling 
 
Fig. AppII.1: (after Joslen, Orders of Battle) showing the commanders of 7th Armoured 
Division and component Brigades over time in North-West Europe.  Commanders for whom 
papers have been located are indicated, by bold typeface: no papers have been traced for any 
commander of the infantry brigade. 
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Figure App II.2, however, shows in diagrammatic form how it has been 
possible to remedy this lack of commanders from the infantry side to 
some extent through searching the IWM Documents Archive and other 
archives, producing a commander of some seniority on the infantry side.  
 
 
Fig. App.II.2: the same data as Fig.App.II.1 but showing how extending Joslen‟s list to 
regimental/battalion commands can help to complete the picture.  The bold typeface 
indicates unpublished, primary sources with the other names indicating additional sources 
such as published memoirs. 
 
Thus, Figure Appendix II.2 shows that, by utilising the records of more 
junior commanders, a more complete picture may be built up – with the 
caveat that the commanders from the different arms may not match 
exactly in terms of their responsibilities and areas of command. 
  
Armd Recce Regt 
8KRIH  - Bellamy  Tp Ldr 
HQ 7  Armoured Div.  
Erskine   Verney   Lyne  
HQ 22 Armed  Bde 
Hinde    Wingfield  
HQ 131  Inf Bde 
1 RTR 
(Patrick) Hobart 
5 RTR 
Wilson Tp Ldr 
1/5 Queen ‟ s 
Burton Maj 2  i/c 
1/6 Queen ‟ s / 2  Devons 
1/7 Queen ‟ s / 9 DLI 4 CLY /  5 RIDG 
Erskine  Carver (Tank  
Museum) 
Boardman  Tk Cmdr 
1 RB 
Erskine   Wake & Deeds 
3 RHA 
Brown CPO 
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APPENDIX III: The Terrain of Normandy 
 
App III.1 Typical „bocage‟ countryside of the Calvados region southwest of Caen, looking 
north towards Thury-Harcourt – the river is the Orne. 
 
 
AppIII.2 Close up of the steep sided fields / lanes typical of the bocage countryside, 
Calvados region 
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App.III.3 The apparently more open countryside south of Caen towards the town of Falaise, 
looking west/northwest towards “the bocage” 
 
 
App.III.4.  A typical Normandy farm just outside Falaise – the crops and stone buildings 
provided good cover for the defence, these buildings concealed a Tiger tank according to 
one local who was a child there in 1944 
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Appendix IV: Tank descriptions 
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Appendix V: The Independent Armoured Brigades (1945) 
 
     In January 1945, the Army Tank Brigades were re-designated 
Independent Armoured Brigades.  There already were, however, 
Independent Armoured Brigades.  These brigades were now known as 
Type „A‟ if they included a battalion of motorised infantry and Type „B‟ if 
they did not include infantry.  Thus, what had been an Independent 
Armoured Brigade prior to January 1945 was now an Independent 
Armoured Brigade, Type „A‟, and what an Army Tank Brigade as an 
Independent Armoured Brigade, Type „B‟. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. App.V.1  Type „A‟ Independent Armoured Brigade, 1945 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. App.V.2  Type „B‟ Independent Armoured Brigade, 1945 
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Bde HQ 
Tk Bn Tk Bn Tk Bn 
Bde HQ 
Tk Bn Tk Bn Tk Bn Mot Btn 
